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Abstract
This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of proto-
col implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run
of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the fact that
typical security protocols have linear structure. We then perform symbolic execu-
tion of that path to extract a model expressed in a process calculus similar to the
one used by the CryptoVerif tool. The symbolic execution uses a novel algorithm
that allows symbolic variables to represent bitstrings of potentially unknown length
to model incoming protocol messages.
The extracted models do not use pointer-addressed memory, but they may still
contain low-level details concerning message formats. In the next step we replace
the message formatting expressions by abstract tupling and projection operators.
The properties of these operators, such as the projection operation being the inverse
of the tupling operation, are typically only satisfied with respect to inputs of correct
types. Therefore we typecheck the model to ensure that all type-safety constraints
are satisfied. The resulting model can then be verified with CryptoVerif to obtain a
computational security result directly, or with ProVerif, to obtain a computational
security result by invoking a computational soundness theorem.
In order to formalise the security properties of C programs and to prove the cor-
rectness of our approach we describe an embedding of C programs into the process
calculus, such that C protocol participants can be executed as part of a larger sys-
tem, described by the process calculus, that represents the environment and the
attacker. We develop a security-preserving simulation relation that is preserved by
embedding, and show that each step of our model transformation simulates the pre-
vious step, thus proving the overall soundness of the approach. Currently we only
consider trace properties.
Our method achieves high automation and does not require user input beyond what
is necessary to specify the properties of the cryptographic primitives and the de-
sired security goals. We evaluated the method on several protocol implementations,
totalling over 3000 lines of code. The biggest case study was a 1000-line imple-
mentation that was independently written without verification in mind. We found
several flaws that were acknowledged and fixed by the authors, and were able to
verify the fixed code without any further modifications to it.
Contents
Contents v
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Running Example: RPC-enc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1 Program Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.2 Protocol Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.3 Reverse Engineering of Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Basic Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Security Definitions 19
2.1 The Language of Models—IML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 The Source Language—CVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 The Simulation Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Model Extraction By Symbolic Execution 41
3.1 From C to CVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Facts and Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Simplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Symbolic Pointers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 From CVM to IML: Symbolic Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Example: Symbolic Execution of RPC-enc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 Symbolic Execution Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Model Verification in Computational Setting 73
4.1 Review—CryptoVerif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 From IML to CryptoVerif: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Formatting-Normal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4 Formatting Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5 Type Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 Typechecking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.7 Fact Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.8 Parsing Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.9 Type-Safety of Formatting functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.10 Generalized Formatting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.11 Summary and Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
v
CONTENTS
5 Model Verification in Symbolic Setting 117
5.1 Review—CoSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.1.1 The Applied Pi Calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.1.2 ProVerif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.1.3 Computational Soundness For Public-Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.2 From IML to ProVerif: Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3 Process Strengthening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4 Erasing Conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Local Encryption-Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Relating IML and Pi Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.7 Summary and Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6 Implementation and Experiments 141
7 Future Work 147
7.1 Multipath Symbolic Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 Observational Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8 Conclusion 155
A Proxy Function Examples 161
B Extended Solving Example 165
C CryptoVerif Model of RPC-enc 173
D ProVerif Model of NSL 195
References 201
Notation 213
Index 215
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are used to securely transmit data in computer networks. Typical
goals are to establish a mutually known secret and ensure confidentiality and integrity of the
data. Protocols like TLS [Dierks and Rescorla, 2008] or SSH [Ylonen and Lonvick, 2006] are
widely used today and we rely on their correctness, both in terms of the logical structure
and the implementation. Violations of both have occurred before. A famous example of a
protocol with flawed structure is the Needham-Schroeder protocol, a serious flaw in which was
discovered by Lowe almost two decades after its inception [Lowe, 1995]. Perhaps even more
relevant to practice are errors in the implementations of protocols, such as the flaw in the
OpenSSL implementation of TLS [CVE, a] that allowed a carefully forged certificate to bypass
verification, or the more recent “Heartbleed” vulnerability [CVE, c] that allows the attacker
to learn the secret key with minimal effort. The goal of this work is to verify absence of both
types of flaws starting from the source code of a protocol implementation.
The approach that we propose draws on previous experience in security verification by ex-
tracting a high-level model from C code and then reusing existing tools ProVerif [Blanchet,
2009] or CryptoVerif [Blanchet, 2008] to verify that model. Consider, for example, the small
piece of C code in figure 1.1 that generates a random value, tags it, and sends it encrypted with
a one-time pad. Our method automatically extracts a much simpler model, shown under the
code, that makes no use of pointers and memory. The model is written in slightly simplified
CryptoVerif notation—it waits for an input from the attacker, so that the attacker can choose
when each participant runs, chooses a random value nonce and outputs XOR(0x01|nonce, pad),
where | denotes bitstring concatenation. The variable pad is free in the process—it is inserted
by the user-provided model of the function otp, and is meant to be bound in the user-provided
environment as shown below. The model is then further simplified to hide the bitstring concate-
nation operation—the expression 0x01|nonce is replaced by tag(nonce), while making sure that
the function tag satisfies the properties required to typecheck the process—we automatically
infer and prove prove the type tag : fixed20 → fixed21. At this point the secrecy of nonce
1
1. INTRODUCTION
unsigned char ∗ p a y l o a d = m a l l o c (PAYLOAD LEN ) ; // PAYLOAD LEN = 20
i f ( p a y l o a d == NULL) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
RAND bytes ( pay load , PAYLOAD LEN ) ;
s i z e t m s g l e n = PAYLOAD LEN + 1 ;
unsigned char ∗ msg = m a l l o c ( m s g l e n ) ;
i f ( msg == NULL) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
∗msg = 0 x01 ; // add the tag
memcpy ( msg + 1 , pay load , PAYLOAD LEN ) ; // add the pay load
unsigned char ∗ pad = otp ( m s g l e n ) ;
x o r ( msg , pad , m s g l e n ) ; // app l y one−t ime pad
send ( msg , m s g l e n ) ;
Q1 = in(); new nonce : fixed20; out(XOR(0x01|nonce, pad))
tag : fixed20 → fixed21
Q2 = in(); new nonce : fixed20; out(XOR(tag(nonce), pad))
XOR : fixed21 × fixed21 → fixed21
CE = !
N ( in(); new pad : fixed21; out(); [] )
Figure 1.1: Example C fragment, the extracted models, and the user-provided verification
environment (the hole [] is filled with Q2 for verification).
can be easily verified by CryptoVerif with respect to a user-provided environment, shown at
the bottom of figure, that encodes our assumptions about the origin of pad and the way we
invoke the program—we generate N versions of pad , but only run the program once with each
of them.
The model extraction is done by symbolic execution [King, 1976] of the C program, using
symbolic expressions to over-approximate the sets of values that may be stored in memory
during concrete execution. The main difference from existing symbolic execution algorithms,
such as Cadar et al. [2008] or Godefroid et al. [2008], is that our symbolic variables represent
bitstrings of potentially unknown length, whereas in previous algorithms a single variable corre-
sponds to a single byte. The reason for this difference is that our symbolic expressions are used
to capture the formats of the messages generated by the program, where often a field of the
message has variable length, and the length is stored separately in another field. To represent
these formats we allow expressions of the form len(e) denoting the length of an expression e.
Our symbolic execution therefore needs to reason about lengths. For instance, if a memory
location contains a concatenation a|b, and the program checks that x = len(a) for some x then
we know that extracting len(b) bytes at position x, written as (a|b){x, len(b)}, results in b.
To formally define and prove security for C programs we allow them to be executed in an
environment defined by a high-level process calculus. For instance, if Q is the C program in
figure 1.1, Q˜ the extracted model, and CE the user-provided environment then our soundness
results state that CE{Q} satisfies all the security properties of CE{Q˜}. In our work we only
consider trace properties of protocols, that is, properties that either hold or do not hold for
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any particular execution, in contrast to observational equivalence properties that hold with
respect to the set of all executions. An example of a trace property is “Every event e1 is
preceded by an event e2”. Authentication is usually formulated as a trace property of the form
“If A has accepted the message from B then either B has sent the message before or B has
been corrupted by the attacker”. Weak secrecy is a trace property saying that the attacker
cannot obtain the full value of the secret—formally, there is no trace in which the secret is
sent on the network in plaintext (in section 2.1 we show how to set up an environment for
verification of weak secrecy of our example in figure 1.1). Unfortunately, weak secrecy does
not prevent the attacker from having partial knowledge of the secret. Instead CryptoVerif uses
strong secrecy based on observational equivalence, formulated as “The attacker cannot reliably
distinguish between a process that reveals the secret and a process that reveals a randomly chosen
value. Strong secrecy is an observational equivalence property, but not a trace property—it is
impossible to tell whether it is satisfied by looking at a single trace only. Our method supports
authentication and weak secrecy properties, but does not yet support strong secrecy. We believe
that the latter can be covered without significant changes to the method, and discuss it as future
work in section 7.2.
We assume that the protocol code follows a single execution path, without loops, and with
any deviation immediately leading to termination. We choose to accept this limitation because
many interesting protocols have this structure. For instance, the classic NSL protocol prescribes
a fixed sequence of messages and the conditions to check after receiving each message. If a
condition check fails, the participant simply stops execution of the protocol. As we show in one
of our verification examples, such a protocol can be implemented by a C program that satisfies
the assumptions of our method. Our method allows us to prove absence of security flaws in
such programs. In particular, we show that there are no bugs related to parsing and formatting
of messages, and no memory safety violations or integer overflows that lead to a vulnerability.
Some security bugs are closely related to non-trivial branching. For instance, Albrecht et al.
[2009] show how to recover the plaintext of a secret in some configurations of the SSH protocol.
The attack works by injecting the encrypted secret in place of the encrypted length field and
then seeing how many blocks an SSH implementation will accept before triggering an error, thus
finding out the decrypted value of the length field. This kind of attack cannot be expressed
in our model since it relies on looping behaviour of both the implementation and the attacker.
This is a general problem. In fact, the encryption scheme in question had been proved secure by
Bellare et al. [2004], but using a model that was too abstract. A more realistic security model,
proposed by Paterson and Watson [2010], is required to capture this kind of attacks. All of
this suggests that even defining security models for complex branching behaviour is difficult,
let alone extracting these models from code, which further justifies our restriction to linear
protocols. We believe that our method can be generalised to more complex control flow, and
discuss this as future work in section 7.1. Apart from the single path limitation we do not
require use of any specific programming style.
3
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We do not verify the code that implements the cryptographic primitives, such as encryption
or hashing. Instead we assume that the functions implemented by the code possess the desired
properties, say, that the encryption is indistinguishable with respect to a chosen ciphertext
attack (IND-CCA). Such assumptions are necessary because no encryption scheme has been
proven to be IND-CCA secure so far (however, Almeida et al. [2009] show how to verify that a
C implementation of a primitive is equivalent to a reference implementation). Our verification
method expects the user to provide models for cryptographic functions. These models are
themselves written as C functions that instruct the symbolic execution about how to interpret
a call to a primitive. This process is explained in more detail in section 3.1. In our example in
figure 1.1 the user provides models for functions RAND bytes, otp, and xor.
Our approach aims to achieve high automation: we do not expect the user to provide any
annotations beyond what is necessary to specify the properties of the cryptographic operations
and the desired security goals. In particular, we do not require an explicit specification of the
protocol. For many industrial protocols no formal specifications are provided by the designer—
these protocols are usually described by an RFC document, which is not meant to be machine-
readable. Thus the implementation code is the first place where the protocol is defined precisely
enough to be analysed, which justifies the use of a model extraction approach. Our experimental
results are encouraging—we were able to analyse an externally written 1000-line implementation
of a protocol without modifying it at all.
An important alternative approach is to develop a verified reference implementation of the
protocol. This has been done for the TLS protocol—Bhargavan et al. [2013, 2014] describe a
verified RFC-compliant implementation in F#. We hope that the effort required to produce
such implementations will eventually become small enough so that every new protocol can be
equipped with a formally verified reference implementation from the very start. In addition,
if the efficiency of such implementations approaches the efficiency of their C counterparts, no
further verification will be required, and our present work will become obsolete.
Original Contributions and Thesis Our two main contributions are:
• A theoretical framework, based on process calculus embedding, that allows to formalise
cryptographic security of C programs.
• A model extraction algorithm, based on symbolic execution, that allows to automatically
prove cryptographic security of C programs.
We use our theoretical framework to prove security of the model extraction algorithm. The-
orems 3.2, 4.3 and 5.2 establish the correctness of our approach. In a nutshell, their significance
is as follows: given C implementations Q1, . . . , Qn that satisfy our single-path assumption, and
a CryptoVerif context CE that describes an execution environment, if symbolic execution of
Q1, . . . , Qn yields models Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n, the process CE{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n} is successfully translated to
a CryptoVerif process QCV , and CryptoVerif successfully verifies QCV against a trace prop-
erty ρ then Q1, . . . , Qn form a secure protocol implementation with respect to the environment
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CE and property ρ. More precisely, for any attacker process QA the parallel composition
QA|CE{Q1, . . . , Qn} has negligible probability of producing an execution trace that violates
ρ. The same applies to verification with ProVerif, with additional computational soundness
conditions. Notice how the process CE{Q1, . . . , Qn} mixes high-level model code with low-level
implementation code—this is an important feature of our approach that enables a precise and
convenient definition of security for C programs.
We did not aim for theoretical results regarding completeness; instead we evaluated the
verification approach on a range of protocol implementations, including recent code for smart
electricity meters by Rial and Danezis [2010]. We were able to find bugs in preexisting imple-
mentations or to verify them without having to modify the code, covering more than 3000 lines
of C code in total. Chapter 6 provides details. Chapter 8 informally summarizes the types of
security flaws and programs that our method applies to.
Overall, our work supports the following thesis:
Process calculus embedding combined with model extraction is an appropriate tool for
analysing security of C programs.
The work on the symbolic execution and the ProVerif verification was presented at the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS’11) [Aizatulin et al., 2011b] and
the work on the CryptoVerif verification was presented at (CCS’12) [Aizatulin et al., 2012]. An
invited paper at the workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust (FAST 2011) contains
a high-level overview of symbolic execution on an extended example [Aizatulin et al., 2011a].
Our implementation can be found at http://github.com/tari3x/csec-modex.
Computational versus Symbolic Security Models Cryptographic security models can
be divided into two groups. Symbolic models [Dolev and Yao, 1983] define cryptographic op-
erations by rewriting rules over a set of abstract terms. A typical rewriting rule would be
decrypt(encrypt(m, k), k) = m, saying that the only way to extract information from an en-
cryption is by having a valid key. In other words, symbolic models assume unbreakable cryp-
tography. Computational models try to be closer to reality by viewing messages as bitstrings,
and encryption primitives and the attacker as polynomial-time algorithms operating on those
bitstrings [Blum and Micali, 1984; Goldwasser and Micali, 1984; Yao, 1982]. Security is then
formulated in terms of probabilities of certain computation outcomes.
ProVerif [Blanchet, 2009] allows to prove security of protocols in the symbolic model. It
works by converting the process that represents the protocol into a set of rewriting rules, adding
to this set the rewriting rules for the cryptographic operations, and then runs a resolution al-
gorithm on the resulting set. Proving a security property then amounts to making sure that
a fact of the form attacker(secrect) is not derivable or that a fact of the form receive(x) is
only derivable from send(x). CryptoVerif [Blanchet, 2008] works directly in the computational
model. It starts from the process that represents the protocol and constructs a sequence of
5
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transformations such that each process in the sequence cannot be distinguished from the pre-
vious process in polynomial time with non-negligible probability, and the last process in the
sequence is obviously secure.
We formalise security of C programs in the computational model, but we support verification
of extracted models both with ProVerif and CryptoVerif. We use a computational soundness
result of Backes et al. [2009] to transfer the ProVerif verification result back into the compu-
tational setting. In general, computational soundness principles have significant limitations.
They only apply to a limited set of cryptographic primitives and often make assumptions that
are not enforced in practice. For instance, Backes et al. [2009] require that all nonces are
tagged and that every parsing operation checks its argument for full compliance with the mes-
sage format, even when only extracting a single field of the message. To take another example,
obtaining computational soundness for XOR in general is not possible [Unruh, 2010], although
it is possible for a limited class of protocols [Ku¨sters and Truderung, 2011]. So far our example
in figure 1.1 cannot be analysed with ProVerif. The computational soundness result of Backes
et al. [2009] covers public encryption and signatures, and only applies to one of six examples
that we analysed.
CryptoVerif allows to obtain a verification result for a much wider range of crypto-algorithms:
the protocols that we verified make use of XOR, Diffie-Hellman commitments, as well as opera-
tions including public-key encryption, MACs, and authenticated encryption. On the other hand,
ProVerif is both easier to use and can deal with more sophisticated protocols than CryptoVerif.
Even without a computational soundness result ProVerif shows that the protocol cannot be
broken by a symbolic attacker who is only allowed to apply the rewriting rules of the symbolic
model. This can be used as an initial sanity check when developing a new protocol or when
dealing with a protocol that is too complex to be analysed with CryptoVerif or to support
a computational soundness result. Another advantage of ProVerif is that it is often able to
construct an explicit attack trace against the protocol, which CryptoVerif does not do.
Description of the Method and Structure of the Dissertation Our verification method
proceeds in several steps (cf. Figure 1.2). The method takes as input the C source code of the
protocol participants as well as a CryptoVerif or ProVerif template file, which contains the
cryptographic assumptions about the primitives used by the implementation, the environment
process which spawns the participants and generates shared cryptographic material, and a query
for the property that the implementation is supposed to satisfy. The template file omits the
actual model of the protocol participants. That model is extracted from C code by symbolic
execution and rewriting. For each cryptographic function f called by the implementation the
input also includes the C code of a function f proxy that describes the correspondence of the
C arguments of f to the formal arguments of the implemented primitive in the CryptoVerif
or ProVerif model. The template file and the proxy functions form the trusted base of the
verification.
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IML (intermediate model language, section 2.1)
Model of the environment:
interaction of the participants,
properties of cryptographic functions.
C · · · C
C code of the participants
CVM · · · CVM
CIL
CVM (C virtual machine, section 2.2)
Machine-level model of the protocol
· · ·IML IML
IML
· · ·CV CV
CryptoVerif model, CV ⊆ IML
Symbolic execution (chapter 3)
Message format abstraction (chapter 4)
Formatting-level model of the protocol
· · ·PV PV
ProVerif model, PV ⊆ IML
Computational soundness (chapter 5)
CryptoVerif
Verification result
ProVerif
Verification result
· · ·hole hole
· · ·CVM CVM
IMLC = IML with embedded CVM
Figure 1.2: An outline of the method. Our simulation results allow us to perform the transfor-
mation steps for each participant in isolation.
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In the first step, we compile the program down to a simple stack-based instruction language
(CVM), using CIL [Necula et al., 2002] to parse and simplify the C input (section 3.1). In the
next step we symbolically execute CVM programs to eliminate memory accesses and destructive
updates, thus obtaining a model in an intermediate model language (IML)—a version of the
applied pi calculus extended with bitstring manipulation primitives. For each allocated memory
area the symbolic execution stores an expression describing how the contents of the memory
area have been computed. For instance, a certain memory area might be associated with an
expression hmac(01|x, k), where x is known to originate from the network, k is known to be
an environment variable, and | denotes concatenation. The symbolic execution does not enter
the functions that implement the cryptographic primitives, it uses the models provided by the
proxy functions instead. We prove that the model simulates the original C program in any
environment, implying that any trace of the C program in an environment is also a trace of the
model in the same environment. The languages CVM and IML together with the simulation
relation are introduced in chapter 2 and the symbolic execution is described in chapter 3.
The next step abstracts away the details of message formatting that are present in IML
by replacing the bitstring manipulation expressions by application of new formatting functions
for encoding and parsing bitstrings, so that, say, 0x01| len(x1)|x1|x2 becomes conc(x1, x2) and
x{5, x{1, 4}} becomes parse(x), where b|b′ denotes the concatenation of b and b′ and b{p, l} is
the substring of b starting at position p of length l. A detail that we omit here is the encoding
of the integer expression len(x) as a bitstring and the conversion of the bitstring x{1, 4} to
an integer. Our method is aware of integer encodings used in C programs and is sound with
respect to integer overflows. By constructing suitable queries to an automatic prover Yices by
Dutertre and Moura [2006], we check certain properties of the formatting functions that help
CryptoVerif or ProVerif verify the protocol. These properties include parsing equations such
as parse(conc(x1, x2)) = x1, injectivity, or disjointness of ranges. These properties will often
be satisfied only for inputs of appropriate types. For instance, x1 in conc(x1, x2) must be short
enough for its length to fit in the length field. We therefore typecheck the model to make
sure that the formatting functions will only be supplied with inputs of acceptable types. The
formatting abstraction step is described in chapter 4.
After formatting abstraction we obtain a process in the CryptoVerif calculus. This can
either be verified directly with CryptoVerif as described in chapter 4 or with ProVerif with
application of a computational soundness result. The soundness result imposes certain con-
ditions on the formatting functions that cannot be satisfied by a typical implementation. For
instance, it requires that the concatenation operations should be defined for all bitstrings, which
is impossible if they use a fixed-size length field. To overcome this we consider a relaxed set of
soundness conditions that only hold for inputs of correct types. We then use our typechecking
algorithm to make sure that inputs to all formatting functions will always be of correct types.
This can be used to show that our process Q satisfying the relaxed soundness conditions can be
generalised to a process Q˜ that satisfies full soundness conditions, and such that Q˜ simulates
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Q. Verification with ProVerif is described in chapter 5.
Challenges It is important to understand why existing software verification tools cannot be
readily applied to cryptographic security verification. Tools like Frama-C [Frama-C] or SLAM
[Ball et al., 2004] allow to annotate the code with assume and assert statements and then
aim to statically prove that the assertions hold in each run of the program that satisfies the
assumptions.When trying to apply this approach to security properties one faces the following
difficulties:
• The assertions are only allowed to refer to the internal state of the program in question.
However, security properties are typically defined by reference to a state of some exter-
nal system. For instance, secrecy refers to the knowledge of an unknown attacker and
authentication is expressed through beliefs of the communication partner.
• Cryptographic verification has a different notion of what it means for an assertion to hold.
In typical software verification an assertion needs to be valid in all possible program runs.
Compared to that, cryptography is interested in events occurring with non-negligible
probability, where this probability is influenced by the abilities of the attacker.
An important step in many cryptographic proofs is elimination of collisions between inde-
pendently chosen random values: if two “large” values x and y are independently chosen
then the traces in which x equals y have negligible probability, therefore we can assume
x 6= y. General-purpose verification tools are not designed to perform such a reasoning
step.
An interesting theoretical challenge arises from the fact that cryptographic security defini-
tions are given with respect to a varying security parameter, but a C implementation is written
for a single value of the security parameter. In particular, it can only address a memory of a
fixed size, a problem that is also discussed by Ku¨sters et al. [2012]. In our work we deal with
this problem by defining the semantics of IML with respect to a fixed security parameter only
and then showing how to generalize the extracted IML model to arbitrary security parameters
such that all the relevant properties of the model are preserved. All our security results are
therefore a combination of two statements: 1) the insecurity of the C program is bounded by
the insecurity of the model with respect to our chosen security parameter, and 2) the insecurity
of the model is negligible with respect to an arbitrary security parameter. This is somewhat
unsatisfactory because a negligible function can still be arbitrarily large in any given point,
but this issue is always present when interpreting asymptotic results. One could read the two
statements above as 1) the C program is a correct implementation of the model with respect
to the chosen security parameter, and 2) the model is asymptotically secure with respect to an
arbitrary security parameter.
The formal description of CryptoVerif uses an asymptotic model but the tool itself goes a
step beyond that and provides concrete security bounds expressed in terms of probabilities of
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breaking the security primitives for each security parameter (as far as we know, this work has
not been formalised yet). Our soundness theorems show that these bounds apply directly to
the original C programs. The computational soundness result that we use with ProVerif only
provides us with an asymptotic statement.
Limitations Given the complexity of the C language, analysis tools rely on front ends that
translate the language into a much simpler representation. Examples are LLVM [Lattner, 2002]
used by KLEE [Cadar et al., 2008] and CIL [Necula et al., 2002] used by Frama-C [Frama-C].
We wrote a plugin for CIL that instruments a C program to output its own CVM representation
when run. As there is no formal proof of correctness for CIL, our formal results apply to CVM
programs, and the link to C is made only informally, as discussed in section 3.1.
We only analyse a single execution path of the protocol. The CVM is produced by a single
run R of the program Q and thus represents a pruned program Q˜ such that Q˜ produces the
same run. In the pruned program every statement of the form if (c){A}else{B} is replaced
by if (c){A}else{exit (1)} or if (c){ exit (1)} else{B}, depending on which branch was taken in
R, and loops are unrolled the number of times they were executed in R. All our soundness
results apply to the program Q˜. In the case of crypto-protocols we believe Q˜ to be a close
approximation of Q, as the structure the protocols (such as those in the extensive SPORE
repository [Project EVA, 2007]) is often linear. The code of libraries such as PolarSSL contains
a lot of if-statements, but many of those have conditions that become constant for particular
settings of configuration variables, or deal with cryptographic security checks and abort the
execution immediately if those checks fail. In section 7.1 we discuss ideas for generalising our
approach to multiple paths. The new approach will be able to provide a measure of difference
between Q and Q˜. For now we rely on a (straightforward) manual check that Q = Q˜: check that
Q contains no loops and all the conditional statements in Q contain an exit statement in one
of the branches without any attacker-observable actions preceding that statement. Verifying Q˜
increases confidence in the correctness of Q even if Q 6= Q˜, because Q˜ is a program that can
successfully execute a session of the protocol in place of Q.
Our work is currently limited to trace properties of protocols, such as authentication or weak
secrecy. We leave treatment of observational equivalence properties, such as strong secrecy, to
future work, as discussed in section 7.2.
1.1 Running Example: RPC-enc
Our example protocol, due to Fournet et al. [2011], is an encryption-based variant of the RPC
protocol, already considered by [Bhargavan et al., 2010; Dupressoir et al., 2014]. In section 3.6
we shall demonstrate how a fragment of the IML model is extracted from the C code by symbolic
execution, and in section 4.2 we shall use RPC-enc as a running example to describe the sequence
of transformations from IML to CryptoVerif. Appendix C shows the full CryptoVerif model of
10
A : event client begin(A,B , request)
A→ B : A, {request , kS}kAB
B : event server reply(A,B , request , response)
B → A : {response}kS
A : event client accept(A,B , request , response)
Figure 1.3: Authenticated RPC: RPC-enc
the protocol.
In the following, {m}k stands for the encryption, using an authenticated encryption mech-
anism, of plaintext m under key k while the comma represents an injective pairing operation.
The protocol narration in Figure 1.3 describes the process of A in client role communicating to
B in server role. The key kAB is a unidirectional long-term key shared between A and B (should
B wish to play the client role, they would rely on a key kBA, distinct from kAB). The key kS
is the session key freshly generated by A and the payloads request and response are freshly
generated. We assume that the server is always honest, but the client may be compromised.
We write bad(A) to mean that the client A is compromised.
We aim to prove authentication and secrecy properties:
1. Authentication properties state that each principal can ensure that a received message
was produced by the correct protocol participant. These properties are specified using
event correspondences of the form:
server reply(A,B, req, resp) =⇒ client begin(A,B, req) ∨ bad(A)
client accept(A,B, req, resp) =⇒ server reply(A,B, req, resp)
The first property states that, whenever server reply happens, either client begin has
happened with corresponding parameters or the client is compromised. Similarly, the sec-
ond property states that, whenever the event client accept happens, the event server reply
has happened before. There is no compromise in this case as we assume the server to be
honest.
2. Secrecy properties state that the attacker cannot learn values of payloads, where the
secrecy of response is conditional on the client being honest.
1.2 Related Work
The project is situated at the intersection of two major research areas—program verification
and protocol verification. The first deals with proving correctness of programs with respect to
their specifications and the second deals with proving correctness of cryptographic protocols.
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1.2.1 Program Verification
Historical Program verification has a very long history. The idea of using assertions in code
to specify and prove its properties dates back to Turing [1949]. In the 1960s formalisms were
proposed to precisely define meanings of programs, so that formal reasoning about programs
became possible [Floyd, 1967; McCarthy, 1963]. The work of Hoare [1969] proposed the idea
that the semantics of a programming language can actually be defined by stating axioms and
proof rules about different constructs of the language. Hoare introduced the notation for writing
such rules, which is now known as Hoare triples.
Using a formal definition of program semantics, it is possible to reduce the verification
problem to a set of mathematical theorems, which can then be solved with an automated or
manual theorem prover. Using this technique the first automated program verifier was built by
King [1970].
A common obstacle in making verification fully automatic is the necessity to provide explicit
loop invariants. Another difficulty is that reasoning about precise values of variables quickly
becomes infeasible in practice. To address these problems, modern tools commonly use the
technique of abstract interpretation: the sets of possible variable values are approximated by
larger sets having simpler structure. For instance, instead of keeping track of an integer value,
only its sign might be considered, or whether it belongs to a particular interval. The sets of
values are typically propagated through the program until they saturate, i.e. do not change
with further propagation. This incidentally establishes loop invariants which are sufficient for
many purposes. The theoretical foundation for abstract interpretation was laid by Cousot and
Cousot [1977].
Static Analysis Tools There is a wide range of tools that follow the approach, described
above, of using theorem proving for program analysis. VCC [Cohen et al., 2009] is targeting
concurrent system-level code, ASTRE [Blanchet et al., 2007] is aimed at verifying critical code
in a restricted subset of C and Frama-C [Frama-C] is a plug-in based framework for program
analysis. A much more comprehensive list can be found e.g. at List of Tools. The static
analysis tool Calysto [Babic´, 2008; Babic´ and Hu, 2008] uses a sophisticated symbolic execution
algorithm to avoid combinatorial explosion when obtaining summaries for multiple paths. Also
worth mentioning is the tool ESC/Java [Flanagan et al., 2002] that targets the Java language.
Calysto and ESC/Java are not sound and provide no correctness guarantees. Since the term
verifier is usually reserved for sound tools, Calysto and ESC/Java call themselves extended
static checkers instead.
Model Checking An alternative approach to program analysis is systematic exploration of
the program state space, known as model checking. It has been independently proposed by
Clarke and Emerson [1982] and Queille and Sifakis [1982]. One of the first popular model
checkers is SPIN [Holzmann, 1997], which has been applied to a range of critical software, for
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instance, at flood control gates or inside NASA space probes.
Model checking can produce very precise analysis, but at a very high cost: the size of the
state space to be explored grows very rapidly with required precision. For this reason model
checking is particularly useful for programs with bounded state space. An example of such
application is the Microsoft SLAM tool [Ball et al., 2006] targeting device drivers. Modern
tools often approximate the state space by retaining only partial information about the state,
like it is done in predicate abstraction. Often this is combined with a feedback technique: if
verification of an approximation fails, the results are used to construct a finer approximation.
This is iterated until the verification succeeds or a feasible counterexample is found. Such
technique is called counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [Clarke et al., 2000]
and is used, for instance, in the BLAST model checker [Beyer et al., 2007a].
Model checking and program analysis can be seen as two opposites on the precision-efficiency
spectrum. Model checking is mostly concerned with precision, aiming to eliminate spurious
counterexamples, while program analysis aims to give some performance guarantees. There are
theoretical results suggesting that model checking and program analysis have much in common
[Schmidt, 1998], so that the distinction between the two might blur in the future [Beyer et al.,
2007b].
Testing and Symbolic Execution An active area of research is test generation by sym-
bolic execution of programs: instead of supplying the normal inputs to programs, one supplies
symbols representing arbitrary values. These symbols are propagated through the code, so that
at the branching points we obtain terms describing the dependence of branching conditions on
input values. This allows to formulate equations about the input so that solving them forces the
branch to be taken in some particular direction. As a result, concrete inputs can be generated
that force a desired execution path through the program thus increasing test coverage. This
technique can be traced back to King [1976]. Modern tools like KLEE [Cadar et al., 2008]
or SAGE [Godefroid et al., 2008] use concrete and symbolic execution in parallel to increase
precision, this is often called concolic execution.
Adoption and Future Formal verification is now routinely used in firms like Microsoft [Ball
et al., 2004] and Intel [Fix, 2008]. The Verified Software Initiative [VSI, 2007] is a commitment
of leading computing researchers to producing a body of formally verified programs and tools
that automate the verification. Constructing a verifying compiler has been proposed as a
grand challenge in computing research [Hoare, 2003]. A more comprehensive survey of formal
verification tools can be found in D’Silva et al. [2008].
1.2.2 Protocol Verification
Security Properties A foundational work in cryptographic protocol verification is Needham
and Schroeder [1978]. This paper introduced the notion of the attacker, who is in full control
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of the network, which, by now, is a standard assumption in security verification. The property
of secrecy guarantees that such an attacker cannot learn a certain value exchanged during the
protocol. There is a distinction between weak secrecy in which the attacker cannot obtain full
knowledge of the value, and strong secrecy in which the attacker cannot obtain any information
about the value whatsoever.
Even though authentication protocols were being proposed since the 1970s, it was surpris-
ingly hard to define what authentication exactly means. The definition that is widely accepted
today is due to Woo and Lam [1993], where authentication is formulated using event correspon-
dences, for instance, “If A believes that the message m originates from B then it must be the
case that B has indeed sent m”.
Computational Soundness Theorems For a long time the divide between symbolic and
computational security models has not been addressed. The first results linking the two ap-
proaches are due to Abadi and Rogaway [2000] and independently Pfitzmann et al. [2000].
This started a long series of computational soundness theorems that would map results ob-
tained in the symbolic models to statements in computational model. The theorems usually
differ according to the range of cryptographic primitives considered, the powers of the attacker
(eavesdropping or active) and the definition of equivalence (trace-based or observational). For
instance, Abadi and Ju¨rjens [2001] provide a result for a passive (eavesdropping) attacker and
observational equivalence, Backes et al. [2009] provide a result for the active attacker with
trace-based equivalence, and Aizatulin et al. [2009] establish a result for strategy properties
involved in analysis of contract-signing protocols.
Verification of Formal Models There is a range of tools for verification of protocol de-
scriptions in a formal high-level language. ProVerif [Blanchet, 2009, 2014] and CryptoVerif
[Blanchet, 2008] accept pi-calculus models as inputs. The first tool works in the symbolic model
and the second in the computational. AVISPA [Armando et al., 2005] and LySatool [Bodei
et al., 2005] are further examples of well-developed protocol verification tools.
Many approaches to verifying formal specifications, such as Abadi [1999]; Focardi [2004];
Gordon and Jeffrey [2003] rely on typing. Their results state that a process in a certain formal
language (such as the spi calculus used by Gordon and Jeffrey [2003]) is well-typed by certain
rules then it is secure. The advantage of this approach is that typing can be easily automated.
A disadvantage is that support for new types of cryptographic operations requires new typing
rules.
CertiCrypt [Barthe et al., 2009] and EasyCrypt [Barthe et al., 2011] are frameworks for
writing machine-checked cryptographic proofs. They work at a lower level than our verification
and concentrate on proving properties of cryptographic primitives composed from other crypto-
graphic primitives. They do not explicitly model protocol participant interaction in a network.
Recently Almeida et al. [2013] added support for generating executable code from EasyCrypt
models.
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Verification of Functional Implementations Functional languages like ML have a for-
mally defined clean semantics, which allows to translate them directly into pi-calculus represen-
tations. This has been used for verification of protocol implementations in F# by translating
them to ProVerif and CryptoVerif models [Bhargavan et al., 2006, 2008]. Unfortunately this
approach is less suitable for low-level languages like C, because pointers and arithmetic have
no direct representation inside pi-calculus.
Another approach is using a type system for a dialect of F# such that type-correct programs
can be proved secure [Bengtson et al., 2008]. This approach has recently been used by Bhargavan
et al. [2013, 2014] to provide a fully verified reference implementation of the TLS protocol in
F#. It is unclear, how well such an approach maps to pre-existing low-level implementations C,
but we hope that some day verified functional implementations will become efficient and easy
to write so that they will displace the C implementations.
Verification of Java Implementations Several projects concentrate on verification of pro-
tocols written in Java. One approach is translating Java programs into a set of Horn clauses
that are fed directly into a general purpose theorem prover [Ju¨rjens, 2006]. Another method
is using static analysis to extract abstract models from Java programs that can subsequently
be verified using LySatool [O’Shea, 2008]. These works can provide a lot of inspiration for C
verification, in particular the second one follows a very similar strategy to what we are propos-
ing. However, C language poses additional challenges, mostly due to its unrestricted memory
access.
Recently there has been work on verifying indistinguishability properties for Java implemen-
tations in the universal composability framework Ku¨sters et al. [2012, 2013, 2014]. If a Java
program uses a particular library interface, it is possible to show that the concrete functionality
provided by the library can be replaced by an “ideal” functionality that perfectly realizes the
intended cryptographic goals. It is unclear how well this approach carries over to pre-existing
Java implementations.
Verification of C Implementations One of the first attempts at cryptographic verification
of C code is contained in Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes [2005], where a C program is used
to generate a set of Horn clauses that are then solved using a theorem prover. The method is
implemented in the tool CSur. We improve upon CSur in two ways in particular.
First, we have an explicit attacker model with a standard computational attacker. The
attacker in CSur is essentially symbolic—it is allowed to apply cryptographic operations, but
cannot perform any arithmetic computations.
Second, we handle authentication properties in addition to secrecy properties. Adding
authentication to CSur would be non-trivial, due to a rather coarse over-approximation of C
code. For instance, the order of instructions in CSur is ignored, and writing a single byte into an
array with unknown length is treated the same as overwriting the whole array. Authentication,
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however, crucially depends on the order of events in the execution trace as well as making sure
that the authenticity of a whole message is preserved and not only of a single byte of it.
Ju¨rjens [2005a,b]; Ju¨rjens and Yampolskiy [2005] present an approach that provides a Dolev-
Yao formalization in first-order logic starting from the program’s control-flow graph, which can
then be verified for security properties with automated theorem provers such as SPASS [Wei-
denbach et al., 2002]. There is a manual abstraction step between the (automated) generation
of the control-flow graph and the (automated) generation of the logical representation from the
control-flow graph.
ASPIER [Chaki and Datta, 2009] uses model checking to verify implementations of cryp-
tographic protocols. The model checking operates on a protocol description language, which
is rather more abstract than C; for instance, it does not contain pointers and cannot express
variable message lengths. The translation from C to the protocol language is not described in
the paper. Our method applies directly to C code with pointers, so that we expect it to provide
much greater automation.
[Jeffrey and Ley-Wild, 2006] presents an approach for finding attacks on C code. One
possible attack trace is chosen and encoded as a C program. The only thing left unresolved
in the trace are the messages that the attacker sends at each point. Those are resolved by
constructing an appropriate Prolog model. This approach requires the C code to use a specific
API and places further restrictions on the code, such as the requirement that all variables
should be assigned to only once.
Corin and Manzano [2011] report an extension of the KLEE test-generation tool [Cadar
et al., 2008] that allows KLEE to be applied to cryptographic protocol implementations (but
not to extract models, as in our work). They do not extend the class of properties that KLEE is
able to test for; in particular, testing for trace properties is not yet supported. Similarly to our
work, KLEE is based on symbolic execution; the main difference is that Corin and Manzano
[2011] treat every byte in a memory buffer separately and thus only supports buffers of fixed
length.
An advantage of the aforementioned tools (CSur, ASPIER, and KLEE) is that they do not
share our limitation to single execution paths.
Dupressoir et al. [2010, 2014] show how to adapt a general-purpose verifier to security
verification of C code. This approach does not have our restriction to non-branching code, on
the other hand, it requires the code to be annotated (with about one line of annotation per line
of code) and works in the symbolic model, requiring the pairing and projection operations to
be treated as abstract.
Code Generation A very active recent trend is generating executable implementations from
verified high-level models. This includes the work of Almeida et al. [2013] that generates
executable implementations from EasyCrypt models. Further examples of this approach include
generating OCaml code from verified CryptoVerif models [Cade´ and Blanchet, 2012, 2013a,b]
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and the framework CAOVerif described by Almeida et al. [2014]; Barbosa et al. [2014].
Manual Verification Some protocols have been analysed manually using an interactive the-
orem prover. Examples include an analysis of the Bull-Otway protocol [Paulson, 1997] and TLS
[Paulson, 1999] using Isabelle.
Compliance Checking Some work has been done on ensuring that an implementation of a
protocol corresponds to the protocol definition in an RFC document [Udrea et al., 2008]. This
is done by extracting correspondence rules from the document (for instance, “Every time the
server receives a request, it sends a reply.”) and annotating the code with them. Abstract
interpretation is then used to check that the rules are indeed fulfilled. Such assurance is very
useful, but it does not provide a formal guarantee of security, because only fragments of the
specification are formalised and there is no proof that these fragments are actually enough for
establishing security.
1.2.3 Reverse Engineering of Message Formats
Many tools aim to recover formats of protocol messages and are therefore related to our model
extraction step. However, their intended purpose is very different—they are usually applied
to compiled binaries such as malware, using some form of binary taint analysis, in an attempt
to gain insights into its operation. As a result, they usually apply heuristics and do not aim
for soundness—a message format they infer may happen to be incorrect. More importantly,
because the tools work without access to source code, they do not analyse semantic information
about the contents of the messages, such as whether a certain part of the message is encrypted.
Polyglot [Caballero et al., 2007] implements execution monitoring using the QEMU PC
emulator enhanced to support dynamic taint analysis. It tries to identify length fields, field
separators, keywords, and fixed-length fields. AutoFormat [Lin et al., 2008] is a similar tool
based on Valgrind. Wondracek et al. [2008] uses a self-made dynamic taint analyser. The
analysis first extracts format information for individual messages and then compares multiple
messages to extract a more general hierarchical format specification. Tupni [Cui et al., 2008]
uses Vigilante as its dynamic data flow engine and iDNA for capturing program traces. Antunes
and Neves [2009] aim to reconstruct an automaton that accepts the protocol message formats.
Unlike the tools mentioned above, ReFormat [Wang et al., 2009] aims to identify buffers
in memory that store encrypted information. It is based on the heuristic that cryptography
typically uses much more arithmetic and bitwise instructions than the rest of the processing
functions.
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1.3 Basic Notation and Terminology
In order to match the semantics of C programs we only consider bitstrings that consist of an
integral number of bytes: we define the set of all bitstrings to be BS = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}∗. A
more appropriate term would be “bytestring”, but we choose to stick with “bitstring” to match
the terminology of CryptoVerif used in chapter 4. For a bitstring b we let |b| denote the length
of b in bytes and we let b[i] be the ith byte of b counting from 0. The concatenation of two
bitstrings b1 and b2 is written as b1|b2. For a, b ∈ N we define {a}b = {a, . . . , a + b − 1}—this
notation will be useful for selecting substrings from a bitstring.
Let Var be a countably infinite set of variables. We write f : X ⇀ Y to denote a partial
function and let dom(f) ⊆ X be the set of x for which f(x) is defined. We use a special value
⊥, which does not imply that a function is partial: if f(x) = ⊥ for a given argument then we
consider the function to be defined for x, that is, x ∈ dom(f). This value should therefore be
understood as a None value in ML or Nothing in Haskell. Given a set X we write X⊥ as an
abbreviation for X ∪ {⊥}. We use the notation f{x 7→ a} to update functions.
When studying security properties of C implementations we shall be aiming to prove that
the probability of an attack is a negligible function of the security parameter—an integer that
relates to the lengths of inputs (most notably, keys) of cryptographic functions. A function
f : N → R is called negligible if for every c ∈ N there exists n0 ∈ N such that f(n) < 1/nc
for all n > n0. If we can show that the probability of an attack on an implementation is
bounded by a negligible function, this means that we can make the implementation as secure
as necessary by simply using longer keys—the probability of an attack will then scale with the
inverse exponential of the key length. Another intuition for the use of negligible functions in
the definition of security is that we are trying to prove that there is no better way to attack an
implementation than exhaustively enumerating all the keys.
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Chapter 2
Security Definitions
We define security for C programs by embedding them in a high-level process calculus. Our
calculus IML, presented in section 2.1, is a version of the CryptoVerif calculus [Blanchet, 2008],
but has a richer expression syntax which allows it to describe details of protocol message formats.
We shall use IML both to represent models extracted from C programs and to describe the
environment in which C programs and their models execute. The adversary is also modelled as
an IML process and our security definition mirrors that of CryptoVerif.
The language CVM, presented in section 2.2, is a simple stack-based instruction language
with memory access that we use to describe the behaviour of C programs. The semantics for
CVM is given by describing the execution of a CVM process within an IML context. Compila-
tion from C to CVM will be described informally in section 3.1.
Our security proofs will make heavy use of a simulation relation . for mixed IML and
CVM processes, developed in section 2.3. The main theoretical results of this chapter are
theorem 2.2 saying that Q . Q˜ implies that Q is at least as secure as Q˜ with respect to
any trace property ρ, and theorem 2.3 saying that simulation is preserved by embedding—if
Q . Q˜ then C{Q} . C{Q˜} for any context C, which allows us to prove preservation of security
properties with respect to all environments and adversaries.
2.1 The Language of Models—IML
This section presents the language IML (Intermediate Model Language) that we use to describe
models extracted from protocol implementations. It is a process calculus inspired by the Cryp-
toVerif tool [Blanchet, 2008] and can be seen as an intermediate stage between C programs
and CryptoVerif models. On the one hand, IML does not operate on memory and pointers,
on the other hand, it may still contain bitstring operations such as substring extraction or
concatenation, both of which would be beyond CryptoVerif’s reasoning abilities. Chapter 3
describes how we use symbolic execution to extract IML models that represent behaviours of C
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programs, and chapter 4 describes how we typecheck and simplify IML models to make them
amenable to analysis with CryptoVerif.
The syntax of IML is shown in figure 2.1. Expressions are of three kinds: logical expressions
(facts) that evaluate to boolean values, integer terms that evaluate to integers and binary
terms that evaluate to bitstrings. Any expression can evaluate to a special value ⊥ representing
failure. Expressions evaluate with respect to an environment η : Var ⇀ BS⊥, a partial function
that maps variables to bitstrings or ⊥. The result of the evaluation will be denoted with JeKη.
For an integer term t we have JtKη ∈ Z⊥, and for a bitstring term e we have JeKη ∈ BS⊥.
Following CryptoVerif, we identify boolean values with bitstrings, so that for a fact φ we haveJφKη ∈ BS⊥. We expect binary terms in boolean context to evaluate to a value from a set
Bool = {true, false} ⊆ BS with some arbitrary but fixed values of true and false.
The evaluation rules are shown in figure 2.2. If an expression e cannot be evaluated by these
rules for a particular environment η, we let JeKη = ⊥.
Since our expressions will be used to represent values computed by C programs, they need to
include a way to relate integer values and their bitstring representations. This is accomplished
by viewing each C integer type as a partial function τ : BS ⇀ Z with an inverse τ−1 : Z⇀ BS
that encode and decode integers as bitstrings. We let TI denote the set of all C types of
interest. We shall assume that τ and τ−1 are inverse to each other on their respective domains:
τ(τ−1(n)) = n for each n ∈ range(τ) and τ−1(τ(b)) = b for each b ∈ dom(τ). Throughout the
thesis we shall be dealing with two’s complement representations: a signed l-byte representation
will be denoted with τls and an unsigned representation with τlu with representable ranges
range(τlu) = [0, 2
l − 1] and range(τls) = [−2l−1, 2l−1 − 1]. We let len(τ) denote the length of
the bitstrings of type τ , that is, len(τlu) = len(τls) = l. We are not concerned with whether
the representation is big-endian or little-endian. Ones’ complement representation could also
be analysed, with minimal adjustments.
We let Ops be a set of function symbols such that to each f ∈ Ops we associate an arity n ∈ N
and an interpretation I(f) : BSn⊥ → BS⊥. We require that I(f) is computable in polynomial
time in the length of the input and evaluate expressions of the form f(e1, . . . , en) by applying
I(f) to the arguments. The set Ops is meant to contain both the primitive operations of
the language (such as the arithmetic or comparison operators of C) and the cryptographic
operations that are used by the implementation.
When analysing cryptographic protocol models, each cryptographic operation is usually a
family of functions fk, one for each security parameter k ∈ N. At the same time cryptographic
protocol implementations are written for a fixed value of the security parameter. Thus we fix
an arbitrary value k0 ∈ N and consider the interpretations I(f) of functions symbols to be
chosen with respect to that value. In chapter 4 we show how to link this view to CryptoVerif’s
definition that assigns a family of functions to each function symbol.
An expression e{p, l} evaluates to the substring of e starting at position p of length l, and
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φ, ψ ::= fact
φ ◦ ψ, ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,¬} logical operation
t ◦ t′, ◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>} integer comparison
e = e′ bitstring equality
e bitstring fact
t ∈ ITerm ::= integer term
n ∈ Z integer
t ◦ t′, ◦ ∈ {+,−, ∗} integer operation
len(e) length
τ(e), τ ∈ TI value
e ∈ IExp ::= bitstring term
x, i ∈ Var variable
b ∈ BS bitstring
f(e1, . . . , en), f ∈ Ops function application
τ−1(e), τ ∈ TI bitstring encoding
e{tp, tl} substring
e|e′ concatenation
Q ∈ IMLI ::= input process
0 nil
Q|Q′ parallel composition
!i≤NQ replication N times
in(c[e1, . . . , en], x); P input
P ∈ IMLO ::= output process
out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q output
new x : T ; P random number
let x = e in P assignment
if φ then P [else P ′] conditional
event ev(e1, . . . , en); P event
assume φ; P assumption
Figure 2.1: The syntax of IML.
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◦ ∈ {∧,∨,¬} JφKη = α ∈ Bool JψKη = β ∈ BoolJφ ◦ ψKη = α ◦ β
◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>} JtKη = n ∈ Z Jt′Kη = n′ ∈ ZJt ◦ t′Kη = n ◦ n′
◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>} JtKη = ⊥ or Jt′Kη = ⊥Jt ◦ t′Kη = false
Je = e′Kη = (JeKη = Je′Kη)
n ∈ ZJnKη = n
b ∈ BSJbKη = b
x ∈ dom(η)JxKη = η(x)
JeKη = b ∈ BSJlen(e)Kη = |b|
◦ ∈ {+,−, ∗} JtKη = n ∈ Z Jt′Kη = n′ ∈ ZJt ◦ t′Kη = n ◦ n′
τ ∈ TI JeKη = b ∈ dom(τ)Jτ(e)Kη = τ(b)
τ ∈ TI JtKη = n ∈ range(τ)Jτ−1(t)Kη = τ−1(n)
Jf(e1, . . . , en)Kη = I(f)(Je1Kη, . . . , JenKη)
JeKη = b ∈ BS JtpKη = np ∈ N JtlKη = nl ∈ N np + nl ≤ |b|Je{tp, tl}Kη = b[np] . . . b[np + nl − 1]
JeKη = b ∈ BS Je′Kη = b′ ∈ BSJe|e′Kη = b|b′
Figure 2.2: The evaluation of IML expressions.
an expression e|e′ evaluates to the concatenation of e and e′.
There is an important difference between evaluation of bitstring and integer comparisons.
For bitstring comparisons we follow CryptoVerif semantics in which a fact e1 = e2 evaluates to
true if both e1 and e2 evaluate to ⊥. On the other hand, integer comparisons are always used
in context where the arguments are known to or required to be well-defined, thus a fact t1 = t2
evaluates to false if either t1 or t2 evaluates to ⊥. This allows the rules of our rewriting solver
presented in section 3.2 to be a lot simpler.
The syntax of IML is exactly the same as of the CryptoVerif calculus. We require that inputs
and outputs alternate—this will guarantee that at any given time there is only one process ready
to produce output, and all the others are waiting to receive input. We let IML = IMLI ∪ IMLO
be the set of all input and output processes. The calculus uses replication parameters, denoted
by N , to bound the number of process replications. The value of a parameter N is written
as I(N) ∈ N. We let [1, I(N)] be the set of integers from 1 to I(N), represented as bitstrings
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{(η, S, 0)} unionmulti Q Q (INil)
{(η, S,Q1|Q2)} unionmulti Q {(η, S,Q1), (η, S,Q2)} unionmulti Q (IPar)
{(η, S, !i≤NQ)} unionmulti Q {(η{i 7→ b}, S,Q) | b ∈ [1, I(N)]} unionmulti Q (IRepl)
reduce(Q) is the normal form of Q by  
Figure 2.3: The semantics of IML for input processes.
T = fixedn for some n ∈ N |b| = n
(η, S, new x : T ;P ),Q −→1/28n (η{x 7→ b}, S, P ),Q
(INew)
JeKη = b ∈ BS⊥
(η, S, let x = e in P ),Q→1 (η{x 7→ b}, S, P ),Q (ILet)
JφKη = true
(η, S, if φ then P else P ′),Q −→1 (η, S, P ),Q (IIfTrue)
JφKη = false
(η, S, if φ then P else P ′),Q −→1 (η, S, P ′),Q (IIfFalse)
JφKη = true
(η, S, assume φ;P ),Q −→1 (η, S, P ),Q (IAssume)
JeKη = b 6= ⊥ b′ = truncate(b, I(maxlen(c))) ∀i ≤ n : JeiKη = bi 6= ⊥ Q′ = reduce({(η, S,Q)})
∃!(η′, S′, Q′) ∈ Q : Q′ = in(c[e′1, . . . , e′n], x′);P ′ ∧ ∀i ≤ n : Je′iKη′ = bi
(η, S, out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q),Q −→1 (η′{x′ 7→ b′}, S′, P ′),Q unionmulti Q′ \ {(η′, S′, Q′)}
(IOut)
∀i ≤ n : JeKη = bi 6= ⊥
(η, S, event ev(e1, . . . , en);P ),Q
ev(b1,...,bn)−−−−−−−−→1 (η, S, P ),Q
(IEvent)
Figure 2.4: The semantics of IML for output processes.
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without leading zeros. We do not use C integer types for the representation, as we do not
exclude the possibility that I(N) will be greater than any value representable using a given
C type. In IML the value of I(N) is fixed, but in CryptoVerif it will vary depending on the
security parameter. The calculus also assumes a countable set of channels. We denote channels
by c and for each channel c let I(maxlen(c)) ∈ N be the maximum length of the message
that can be sent on that channel. Longer messages will be truncated—in figure 2.4 we use
truncate(b, I(maxlen(c))) to denote the result of the truncation. We make it explicit that the
value I(maxlen(c)) depends on the interpretation I which in CryptoVerif calculus will vary
depending on the security parameter and will make sure that the processes are executable in
polynomial time.
The evaluation of IML processes is shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4. The basic unit of execution
is an executing process of the form (η, S, P ), where η is an environment, P is an IML (input
or output) process, and S is a process state. In IML the process state is defined to be ∅ and
is simply propagated through all the transformations. However, in section 2.2 we shall extend
the semantics with processes that model the behaviour of C programs. Those processes will
carry the memory and the execution stack in their state. We shall often write executing IML
processes simply as (η, P ), meaning (η, ∅, P ).
The rules of figure 2.3 transform multisets of executing input processes. The process 0 does
nothing, the process P |P ′ executes P and P ′ in parallel, the process !i≤NP executes I(N)
copies of P in parallel. The nth copy of P has the value of i set to n. The variable i is called a
replication index and may be used as a process identifier in input and output statements. The
transformation relation  is convergent [Blanchet, 2008], we denote the normal form of Q by
 with reduce(Q).
Transition rules for output processes are shown in figure 2.4. These rules operate on semantic
configurations of the form C = (η, S, P ),Q, where P is an output process and Q is a multiset
of executing input processes. A rule C E−→p C′ states that C gets transformed to C′ with
probability p and an event sequence E, which may be empty or contain a single event of the
form ev(b1, . . . , bn), where ev is an event symbol and b1, . . . , bn are bitstrings. We shall omit
probability or event labels from the arrows when those are not relevant.
Communication is performed using the in and out constructs in which channel names are used
with parameters, typically replication indices. When the semantic configuration is (η, S, P ),Q
and P is ready to produce output b, we choose an input process (η′, S′, Q) in Q that is ready to
receive input into a variable x on the same channel with the same parameters. The process Q
then reduces to an output process P ′, the executing process (η, S, P ) reduces to a multiset of in-
put processes Q′, and the new semantic configuration is (η′{x 7→ b}, S′, P ′),QunionmultiQ′\{(η′, S′, Q)}.
The channel parameters give the attacker the power to precisely specify the recipient of a mes-
sage. Unlike in CryptoVerif, where there may be several matching recipients, here we require
that there is precisely one. As we demonstrate below, this does not reduce the modelling power
of the language, but it does make it easier to prove security theorems. The construct new x : T
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generates a value of type T uniformly at random. For now we only consider types T of the
form fixedn with n ∈ N, representing the set of all bitstrings of length n. The construct
event ev(e1, . . . , en) with an event symbol ev is used to flag an event during the execution. The
rest of the language is standard. A process of the form if φ then P , without an else branch,
is an abbreviation for if φ then P else out(yield [i1, . . . , in]; ε); 0, where yield is a distinguished
channel name and i1, . . . , in are the replication indices under which the process occurs.
Given an input process Q the initial semantic configuration is defined to be initConfig(Q) =
(∅, ∅, out(start , ε); 0), reduce({(∅, ∅, Q)}). The process Q is thus expected to wait for a message
on the start channel. An IML trace is of the form T = C1 →p1 . . .→pn−1 Cn, where C1, . . . ,Cn
are semantic configurations such that for each i < n there is a transition Ci →pi Ci+1. We let
pr(T) = p1 . . . pn−1 be the probability of the trace, events(T) be the sequence of events on the
transitions of the trace, and let fst(T) = C1 and last(T) = Cn. We write C1
E−→∗p Cn if a trace
like the one above exists with E = events(T) and p = pr(T).
Our goal is to investigate the probability that a process will generate a sequence of events
with a certain property. For instance, authentication properties are formulated in the form “If
an event receive(x) has been executed then an event send(x) must have been executed before.”
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (Trace Properties) A trace property is a prefix-closed set of event sequences
such that given an event sequence E it is decidable in polynomial time whether E ∈ ρ. 
Definition 2.2 (IML Security) For an input IML process Q and a trace property ρ let
insec(Q, ρ) =
∑
T∈T
pr(T),
where T is the set of IML traces T such that fst(T) = initConfig(Q), events(T) /∈ ρ, and E ∈ ρ
for any proper prefix E of events(T). 
Given several processes Q1, . . . , Qn representing the protocol participants, we shall be study-
ing their security in an environment that defines how they interact with each other (spawns
multiple instances, distributes shared keys, etc) and with respect to an attacker. The environ-
ments are modelled by embedding the protocol process in a context.
Definition 2.3 (Embedding) An evaluation context is an IML process that contains a hole
[] in an input subprocess position. Given an evaluation context C and an input process Q we
let C[Q] be the process obtained from C by replacing the hole by Q.
Given a process Q and replication indices i1, . . . , in we denote with (i1, . . . , in).Q the process
in which every channel expression of the form c[e1, . . . , em] is replaced by c[i1, . . . , in, e1, . . . , em].
Given a context C and an input process Q we define C{Q} = C[(i1, . . . , in).Q], where
i1, . . . , in are the replication indices under which the hole occurs in C. The definition is easily
generalised to multiple holes, we write C{Q1, . . . , Qn} in this case. 
25
2. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
When substituting Q into C{Q} under replication, we insert the replication indices to make
sure that each instance of the process is uniquely identifiable. Given protocol participants
Q1, . . . , Qn, a trace property ρ, an environment context CE , and an attacker process QA we shall
be interested in the value of insec(QA|CE{Q1, . . . , Qn}, ρ). We shall allow processes Q1, . . . , Qn
to have free variables bound by CE , which enables us to model shared secrets generated by the
environment. However, we shall require that the full process is well-formed, as defined below.
Definition 2.4 (Well-Formed Processes) A variable is defined in an IML process in a let-
binding, a new-binding, an input, or a replication. An IML process is well-formed if no variable
is defined twice and every variable is defined before being used. 
The process syntax includes a way to add arbitrary assumptions that may be used by
verification. We shall restrict our results to processes in which all the inline assumptions are
always satisfied, as defined below:
Definition 2.5 (Inline Assumptions) We say that an IML semantic configuration C satis-
fies inline assumptions if every trace of the form
C −→∗ (η, S, assume φ;P ),Q
satisfies JφKη = true. An input IML process Q satisfies inline assumptions if initConfig(Q)
satisfies inline assumptions. 
Example 2.1 We show how to set up an environment for verification of weak secrecy of one-
time pad encryption, similar to our example in figure 1.1. Assume that our protocol has only
one participant, either modelled by hand or extracted from implementation code, of the form
Q = in(ca[], ()); out(cb[],XOR(n, p)); 0
The participant simply sends a value of a nonce n xored with a pad p, both of which are
meant to be specified in the environment. Since this is more instructional, we will set up an
environment in which the secrecy of the nonce is violated by reusing the same pad with several
nonces:
CE = (in(c1[], ()); new p : fixed2; out(c2[], ());
!i≤N (in(c3[i], ()); new n : fixed2; out(c4[i], ());
( []
| in(c5[i], ()); event leak(n); out(c6[i], n); 0
| in(c7[i], x ); if x = nonce then event knows(x); out(c8[], ()); 0)
The environment first generates a one-time pad and then spawns I(N) sessions, each running
with its own nonce (fur full generality one would usually put the environment itself under
replication, but this is not necessary to demonstrate an attack). Each session consists of the
participant Q inserted in place of the hole [] while replacing ca[] and cb[] by ca[i] and cb[i],
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together with two processes required to formulate weak secrecy. One of these is a sentinel
process that listens on the network and raises the event knows(x) if the incoming message x is
the nonce, thus signalling that the attacker knows the nonce. Our model must include notion
of compromise since recovery of a one time pad requires knowledge of at least one plaintext.
This is achieved by the other process that is prepared to reveal the value n of the nonce to the
attacker, but only after raising the event leak(n). The property of weak secrecy can now be
formulated by letting the trace property ρ be the set of traces in which every event knows(x)
is preceded by leak(x). In a secure protocol we would expect this property to be violated with
probability inversely proportional to the size of the type from which the plaintexts are drawn,
that is, for every attacker process QA we would expect that insec(QA|CE{Q}, ρ) = 2−16. This is
of course not the case: the attacker can use a leaked nonce to recover the value of the pad which
can then be used to retrieve a nonce from another session without having to compromise the
participant. This attack is implemented by the following attacker process that always succeeds:
QA = in(start [], ()); out(c1[], ()); in(c2[], ());
(∗ find out the value of the pad by corrupting session 1 ∗)
out(c3[1], ()); in(c4[1], ());
out(c5[1], ()); in(c6[1], n1);
out(ca[1], ()); in(cb[1],msg1);
let p = XOR(msg1, n1) in
(∗ use the value of the pad to recover the nonce in session 2 ∗)
out(c3[2], ()); in(c4[2], ());
out(ca[2], ()); in(cb[2],msg2);
let n2 = XOR(msg2, p) in
out(c7[], n2); 0
Below we show the first several steps in one of the traces of QA|CE{Q}, sufficient to demonstrate
all of the important features of the calculus.
initConfig(QA|CE{Q})
= ({}, out(start [], ()); 0), reduce({({}, QA|CE{Q})})
= ({}, out(start [], ()); 0), {({}, in(start [], ()); out(c1[], ()); . . .),
({}, in(c1 [], ()); . . .)}
→ ({}, out(c1[], ()); in(c2[], ()); . . .), {({}, in(c1 [], ()); new p : fixed2; . . .)}
→ ({}, new p : fixed2; out(c2[], ()); . . .), {({}, in(c2[], ()); . . .)}
→1/216 ({p 7→ 0x0201}, out(c2[], ()); !i≤N (in(c3[i], ()); . . .)),
{({}, in(c2[], ()); out(c3[1], ()); . . .)}
→ ({}, out(c3[1], ()); in(c4 [1], ()); . . .), {({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 1}, in(c3[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], ()); . . .), . . .}
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→ ({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 1}, new n : fixed2; out(c4[i], ()); (. . .)),
{({}, in(c4[1], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], ()); . . .), . . .}
→1/216 ({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1},
out(c4[i], ()); (in(ca[i], ()); . . . |in(c5[i], ()); . . . |in(c7[i], ()); . . .)),
{({}, in(c4 [1], ()); out(c5[1], (); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], (); . . .), . . .}
→ ({}, out(c5[1], (); in(c6[1], n1); . . .),
{({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(ca[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(c5[i], ()); event leak(n); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(c7[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], (); . . .), . . .}
→ ({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, event leak(n); out(c6[i], n); . . .),
{({}, in(c6[1], n1); out(ca[1], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(ca[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(c7[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], (); . . .), . . .}
leak(0x0102)−−−−−−−−→({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, out(c6[i], n); . . .),
{({}, in(c6[1], n1); out(ca[1], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(ca[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, n 7→ 0x0102, i 7→ 1}, in(c7[i], ()); . . .),
({p 7→ 0x0201, i 7→ 2}, in(c3[i], (); . . .), . . .}
→ . . .
This example highlights an important advantage of process calculi over Turing machines: it is
feasible to explicitly write down a process, removing any ambiguities and making it much easier
to reason about and amenable for formal verification. 
An important question is whether the process calculus is strong enough to model any efficient
attacker. To show that this is the case, consider an attacker that is given by a pair of functions
fnext and foutput . The function fnext takes a bitstring representation of an attacker state, say
an encoding of a Turing machine tape, a message from the protocol, and a random value, and
computes the representation of the attacker state that is ready to produce the next message
to the protocol. The function foutput takes a representation of an attacker state and returns a
triple of values: an identifier xc of the channel on which to send the message to the protocol,
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Q′E =
(
in(c1out [x1, . . . , xn], xin);
new r : fixedmaxr ;
out(cE [i+ 1], fnext(xE , xin , r)); 0.
|
in(c2out [x1, . . . , xn], xin);
new r : fixedmaxr ;
out(cE [i+ 1], fnext(xE , xin , r)); 0.
)
PE =
let (xc, (x1, . . . , xn), xout) = foutput(xE) in
if xc = 1
then out(c1in [x1, . . . , xn], xout); Q
′
E
else if xc = 2
then out(c2in [x1, . . . , xn], xout); Q
′
E
QE =
in(start , ); out(cE [1], (E0, ε)); 0.
| !i≤NE (in(cE [i], xE); PE)
Figure 2.5: A universal attacker process for two input and two output channels.
the values x1, . . . , xn of the channel parameters, and the value xout of the message to send.
Assume that the attacker is efficient, that is, there exists an upper bound on the execution
time of fnext and foutput , the attacker performs at most maxn iterations and consumes at most
maxr bits of randomness per iteration (in a setting with an arbitrary security parameter k these
upper bounds would need to be polynomial in k, but in IML we deal with a fixed setting of the
security parameter). Let E0 be the initial attacker state.
Assume that a protocol process Q is using two input channels c1in , c
2
in and two output
channels c1out , c
2
out . The interaction of the attacker with such a process can be modelled using
the process QE |Q with QE as described in figure 2.5. First the attacker spawns I(NE) copies
of the process PE—we assume that I(NE) = maxn. Each instance of PE represents a single
iteration of the attacker. First PE computes the values of the channel xc and channel parameters
x1, . . . , xn as well as the message xout to send to Q. Depending on the value of xc the message
is sent either on c1in or c
2
in . The attacker then uses parallel composition to wait for inputs on
either c1out or c
2
out . It then computes the next state using fnext and passes it on to the next
instance of PE . The construction can be easily generalised to an arbitrary number of input and
output channels of the protocol process.
Assume that every input and output in Q that occurs under replication indices i1, . . . , in uses
all of the replication indices as channel parameters. Then it is easy to see that the restriction
of the rule (IOut) that each output must have a uniquely determined recipient is satisfied. This
restriction does not therefore impact our modelling capabilities.
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2.2 The Source Language—CVM
This section describes the low-level source language CVM (C Virtual Machine) that we use to
model the behaviour of C programs. The language is easy to formalise, while at the same time
the operations of CVM are closely aligned with the operations performed by C programs, so
that it is easy to translate from C to CVM. We shall discuss such a translation informally and
present an example of a CVM program in section 3.1.
The model of execution of CVM is a stack-based machine with random memory access. All
operations with values are performed on the stack, and values can be loaded from memory
and stored back to memory. The language contains primitive operations that are necessary for
implementing security protocols: reading values from the network or the execution environment,
choosing random values, writing values to the network and signalling events. The only kind of
conditional that CVM supports is a testing operation that checks a boolean value and aborts
execution immediately if it is not true.
The fact that CVM permits no looping or recursion in the program allows us to inline all
function calls, so that we do not need to add a call operation to the language itself. For simplicity
of presentation we omit some aspects of the C language that are not essential for describing the
approach, such as global variable initialisation and structures. Our implementation does not
have these restrictions and deals with the full C language.
Modelling the behaviour of C programs is complicated by the fact that a lot of situations
are left undefined by the C standard [ISO, 1999, Annex J2], notable examples being signed
overflow or advancing a pointer outside the allocated range, except the special case when a
pointer points one past the last element. Upon encountering an undefined situation the program
is allowed to do absolutely anything, including divulging all the secrets to the attacker. Such a
literal interpretation of the standard would leave unverifiable any protocol implementation that
contains an undefined behaviour. A recent study [Dietz et al., 2012] found undefined integer
overflows in many programs, including OpenSSL, Firefox, and GCC itself, which suggests that
not allowing undefined behaviour at all may be too restrictive. Therefore we choose a more
pragmatic approach and make additional assumptions about the execution of C programs,
beyond what is provided by the standard. Specifically we assume that expressions resulting in
undefined behaviour, such as unsigned integer overflow, advancing a pointer past the allocated
memory range, or casting that truncates the argument, always evaluate to a certain value of the
right length. For instance, we assume that signed addition of τ−11s (1) and τ
−1
1s (127) will always
return the same value of length 1, but we make no assumptions about what that value is. This
matches how C programs behave in practice. Two other cases of undefined behaviour are more
complicated, namely reading from and writing to memory that has not been allocated. A read
operation will sometimes result in a crash, and sometimes return an unpredictable value, and
a write operation may have unpredictable consequences due to memory corruption. In these
cases we say that the program goes bad. Our symbolic execution will prove that this does not
happen.
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c ∈ BS ∪ N, v, x, i1, . . . , in ∈ Var , f ∈ Ops, n ∈ N
Q0 ∈ CVM0 ::= Init; Q initial process
Q ::= input process
in(c[i1, . . . , in], x); P input
0 nil
P ::= output process
Const c; P constant value
Ref v; P pointer to variable
Malloc; P pointer to fresh memory
Load; P load from memory
Store; P write to memory
New x; P random value
Apply f ; P operation
Dup; P duplicate
Test; P test a condition
Assume; P assume a fact
ReadEnv x; P read environment variable
WriteEnv x; P set environment variable
Event ev n; P event
out(c[i1, . . . , in], x); Q output
Figure 2.6: The syntax of CVM.
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The syntax of CVM is shown in figure 2.6. Similarly to IML, we require that the inputs and
the outputs alternate. This can be easily achieved for any CVM program by inserting dummy
inputs and outputs. The semantics of CVM shall be described by embedding it within the
IML calculus, producing a mixed language IMLC , in which IML processes may spawn CVM
programs. To describe the semantics of IMLC we shall only need to specify the additional rules
that describe the execution of CVM processes. An advantage of this approach is that it reuses
the definitions of IML for interprocess communication, relieving us of the burden of having to
redefine it for CVM. A more important advantage is that IMLC provides a unified framework in
which we can easily formulate and prove our security results. For instance, the soundness of our
model extraction (theorem 3.2) can be formulated by saying that if CVM processes Q1, . . . , Qn
yield IML models Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n then for any IML context CE the process CE{Q1, . . . , Qn} is not
less secure than CE{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}, thus reducing security verification for IMLC to much simpler
security verification for pure IML.
Definition 2.6 (IMLC) Let
IMLC = {C{Q1, . . . , Qn} | C is an IML context, Q1, . . . , Qn ∈ CVM0 ∪ IMLI } 
The semantics of IMLC is given by combining the rules in figures 2.3 and 2.4 with the rules
in figure 2.7. If at any point during the execution of the program there is no valid transition
then the program goes bad. The process states of CVM are of the form S = (A,M, S), where
• M : N⇀ {0x00, . . . , 0xFF} is a partial function that represents the memory.
• A ⊆ N is the set of allocated memory addresses.
• S is a list of bitstrings and integers (including ⊥) representing the execution stack.
The program represents pointers to memory as bitstrings of type τptr corresponding to C
pointer types. We make no assumption about the set of valid pointers, that is, we make no
assumptions about range(τptr) and dom(τptr) except that all pointers are of the same length
len(τptr) and 0 ∈ range(τptr). We use τ−1ptr (0) to represent the null pointer in C programs, but
we do not assume anything about its bitstring representation. Another distinguished type we
use is τsize that corresponds to the C type size t and is assumed to be unsigned.
Below we describe the effect that each CVM instruction has on the process state.
• When a CVM program gets spawned by an IML process, it inherits an empty process
state from IML. The first instruction of each CVM program is Init , which results in the
creation of an initial process state, ready to execute the program. In the initial state each
referenced variable v is allocated an address addr(v) ∈ N such that all allocations are non-
overlapping. More precisely, let var(P ) be the set of variables used in Ref instructions
within the program P , for each v ∈ var(P ) let len(v) be the size of the variable, and
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initmem(Q) = (
⋃
v∈var(P ) {addr(v)}len(v)
{(η, ∅, Init;Q)} unionmulti Q {(η, (initmem(Q), ∅, []), Q)} unionmulti Q
(CInit)
(η, (A, M, S), Const c;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, c :: S), P ), Q (CConst)
(η, (A, M, S), Ref v;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, τ−1ptr (addr(v)) :: S), P ), Q (CRef)
bl ∈ dom(τsize) l = τsize(bl) p = malloc(A, l) A′ = allocate(A, l)
(η, (A, M, bl :: S), Malloc;P ), Q→1 (η, (A′, M, τ−1ptr (p) :: S), P ), Q
(CMalloc)
bl ∈ dom(τsize) l = τsize(bl) bp ∈ dom(τptr) p = τptr(bp)
{p}l ⊆ dom(M) b = M(p) . . .M(p+ l − 1)
(η, (A, M, bl :: bp :: S), Load;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, b :: S), P ), Q
(CLoad)
b 6= ⊥ bp ∈ dom(τptr) p = τptr(bp) {p}|b| ⊆ A M′ = M{p+ i 7→ b[i] | i < |b|}
(η, (A, M, bp :: b :: S), Store;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M′, S), P ), Q
(CStore)
bl ∈ dom(τsize) l = τsize(bl) b ∈ {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}l
(η, (A, M, bl :: S), New x;P ), Q→1/28l (η{x 7→ b}, (A, M, b :: S), P ), Q
(CNew)
f has arity n b = I(f)(b1, . . . , bn)
(η, (A, M, b1 :: . . . :: bn :: S), Apply f ;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, b :: S), P ), Q
(CApply)
(η, (A, M, b :: S), Dup;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, b :: b :: S), P ), Q (CDup)
(η, (A, M, true :: S), Test;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, S), P ), Q (CTestTrue)
(η, (A, M, false :: S), Test;P ), Q→1 (η, ∅, out(yield , ε); 0),Q (CTestFalse)
(η, (A, M, true :: S), Assume;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, S), P ), Q (CAssume)
(η, (A, M, S), ReadEnv x;P ), Q→1 (η, (A, M, JxKη :: S), P ), Q (CReadEnv)
(η, (A, M, b :: S), WriteEnv x;P ), Q→1 (η{x 7→ b}, (A, M, S), P ),Q (CWriteEnv)
b1, . . . , bn 6= ⊥
(η, (A, M, b1 :: . . . :: bn :: S), Event ev n;P ), Q
ev(b1,...,bn)−−−−−−−−→1 (η, (A, M, S), P ),Q
(CEvent)
Figure 2.7: The semantics of CVM.
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choose an allocation function addr : var(P )→ N. We require that the allocated memory
ranges are valid and do not overlap, that is,
{addr(v)}len(v) ⊆ range(τptr) for all v ∈ var(P ),
{addr(v)}len(v) ∩ {addr(v′)}len(v′) = ∅ for all v, v′ ∈ var(P ) with v 6= v′.
A process of the form Init ; P is an input process, therefore the reduction is an input
reduction that gets added to the reductions in figure 2.3. All the other reductions of CVM
are output reductions.
• Const c places an integer or bitstring c on the stack.
• Ref v places τ−1ptr (addr(v)) on the stack.
• Malloc takes a value l = τsize(bl) from the stack and uses the function malloc to allocate a
block of memory {p}l. The pointer p to the beginning of the block is placed on the stack.
The function malloc : 2N × N→ N models the memory manager: it takes a set A ⊆ N of
allocated memory addresses and a length l ∈ N and either returns 0 or an address p ∈ N
such that {p}l ⊆ range(τptr)\A (using the notation {p}l = {p, . . . , p+ l−1}). We require
that malloc runs in time polynomial in the size of the inputs.
The allocation table is updated using the function allocate defined as follows:
allocate(A, l) =
A, if malloc(A, l) = 0,A ∪ {malloc(A, l)}l , otherwise.
• Load takes values l and p from the stack and returns the expression contained in the range
{p}l in memory. If part of the range is not initialised then the program goes bad.
• Store is the reverse of Load: it takes values p and b from the stack and writes b into
memory at position starting with p. If the memory to be written is not allocated then
the program goes bad.
• New x takes a length l from the stack and generates a random bitstring of length l. The
bitstring is then both placed on the stack and recorded in the process environment η.
• Apply f where f is a function symbol of arity n applies I(f) to n values on the stack,
replacing them by the result. As an abuse of notation we also allow instructions of the
form Apply τ and Apply τ−1 for an integer type τ ∈ TI to convert bitstrings to and from
integer values. The result of those operations is ⊥ if the argument on the stack is not in
the domain of the corresponding function.
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• Test checks the bitstring at the top of the stack. If the bitstring is true the execution
proceeds, if it is false the program terminates and yields to the evaluation context. Since
C interpretation of boolean values may differ from IML interpretation, the C to CVM
translation wraps every condition checked by the C program in a function truth : BS⊥ →
Bool such that truth(⊥) = false and truth(b) returns true for b ∈ BS if and only if the
string b evaluates to true according to C rules described in [ISO, 1999, 6.3.1.2].
• ReadEnv x and WriteEnv x are used by the program to access the environment η. When
a program wants to receive network input, it does so in two steps. First the input is
placed into the environment η by the rule (IOut) of IML. Then the input is read from
the environment and placed on the stack by the rule (CReadEnv). Conversely, when
producing network output, first the rule (CWriteEnv) is used to set an environment
variable, and then the rule (IOut) to actually send it. Appendix A shows examples of
communication functions that demonstrate this behaviour.
• Event ev n raises an event with event label ev and the top n values on the stack as payload.
The security of IMLC processes is defined in exactly the same way as for pure IML processes:
Definition 2.7 (IMLC Security) For an input IMLC process Q and a trace property ρ let
insec(Q, ρ) =
∑
T∈T
pr(T),
where T is the set of IMLC traces T such that fst(T) = initConfig(Q), events(T) /∈ ρ, and E ∈ ρ
for any proper prefix E of events(T). 
By analogy with IML we define well-formed processes and processes that satisfy inline
assumptions.
Definition 2.8 (Well-Formed IMLC Processes) A variable in an IMLC process is defined
if it is used in a New or WriteEnv statement or defined by an IML construct as in definition 2.4.
An IMLC process is well-formed if no variable is defined twice and every variable is defined
before being used. The well-formedness condition only speaks about the environment variables.
There is no restriction on how program variables in Ref statements are used. 
Definition 2.9 (Inline Assumptions) We say that an IMLC semantic configuration C sat-
isfies inline assumptions if it satisfies IML inline assumptions as in definition 2.5 and every
trace of the form
C −→∗ (η, (A, M, b :: S), Assume;P ),Q
satisfies b = true. An input IMLC process Q satisfies inline assumptions if initConfig(Q)
satisfies inline assumptions. 
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Our symbolic execution will prove that a CVM process never goes bad: there is no context
that can force the process into a non-reducible state, except when there is no matching network
communication partner. In order to make the link between a process and its descendant in the
semantic configuration the following definition makes use of a process identifier stored in the
process environment.
Definition 2.10 (Going Bad) An initial CVM process Q0 ∈ CVM0 goes bad if there exists
a semantic configuration C0 = P0, {(η0, ∅, Q0)} ∪ Q0 such that C0 satisfies inline assumptions;
there is a variable id ∈ dom(η0) that does not occur in P0 and Q0, and there is a trace
C0 −→∗ C = (η, S, P ),Q
where id ∈ dom(η), P does not start with an output, and C does not reduce. 
The use of the process identifier id in the definition makes sure that the process P is a
descendant of the process Q0. This allows us to exclude cases where the environment itself gets
stuck even though the process does not.
Apart from the immediate guarantee that the process does not crash, not going bad is
important from the modelling point of view: if a single process were to get stuck, this would
halt the entire semantic configuration including the attacker and the other processes, which is,
of course, not realistic.
2.3 The Simulation Relation
This section defines the main tool of our security proofs—a simulation relation . between IMLC
processes such that if Q . Q˜ then Q is at least as secure as Q˜ with respect to any trace property
(theorem 2.2). We also show that we can reduce the problem of checking simulation for the
system of several participants in any environment to checking simulation for the participants
in isolation (theorem 2.3).
Our definition for simulation requires that if an executing process (η, S,Q) is simulated by
(η˜, S˜, Q˜) then both executing processes reduce in a “similar” way to executing processes that
again simulate each other. For processes that perform communication “similar” means “exactly
the same” but for processes that perform computation we allow more freedom, so that many
instructions in a CVM process can be simulated by a single statement in an IML model, as
long as the probability of the transition and the executed events are the same.
Our definition of simulation applies to mixed IML and CVM processes, but there is nothing
CVM-specific in it. It can therefore be readily applied to an embedding of any other program-
ming language in a process calculus.
Given a relation . between executing processes, we consider the induced relation on mul-
tisets of executing processes: For two such multisets Q and Q˜ we write Q . Q˜ if there exists a
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pairwise matching between executing processes in Q and Q˜ such that for each (η, S,Q) ∈ Q and
its matching (η˜, S˜, Q˜) ∈ Q˜ we have (η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜).
Definition 2.11 (Simulation) An IMLC process Q˜0 simulates an IMLC process Q0, denoted
by Q0 . Q˜0, if there exists a relation . between executing processes such that
1. For all η we have (η, ∅, Q0) . (η, ∅, Q˜0).
2. If (η, S, in(c[e1, . . . , en], x);P ) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜) then Q˜ is of the form Q˜ = in(c[e˜1, . . . , e˜n], x˜); P˜
such that JeiKη = Je˜iKη˜ for all i ≤ n and (η{x 7→ b}, S, P ) . (η˜{x˜ 7→ b}, S˜, P˜ ) for all
b ∈ BS .
3. If (η, S, out(c[e1, . . . , en], e);Q) . (η˜, S˜, P˜ ) then P˜ is of the form P˜ = out(c[e˜1, . . . , e˜n], e˜); Q˜
such that JeKη = Je˜Kη˜ and JeiKη = Je˜iKη˜ for all i ≤ n, and (η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜).
4. If (η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜) for some input process Q then Q˜ is also an input process and
reduce({(η, S,Q)}) . reduce({(η˜, S˜, Q˜)})
5. If (η, S, P ) . (η˜, S˜, P˜ ) for some output process P and (η, S, P ),Q E−→p (η′, S′, P ′),Q with
event sequence E, probability p, and a multiset Q of input processes then P˜ is an output
process and for any multiset Q′ of input processes there exists a sequence of transitions
of the form (η˜, S˜, P˜ ),Q′ E−→∗p (η˜′, S˜′, P˜ ′),Q′ such that (η′, S′, P ′) . (η˜′, S˜′, P˜ ′).
6. If (η1, S1, P1) . (η˜1, S˜1, P˜1) and (η2, S2, P2) . (η˜2, S˜2, P˜2) and η1(x) 6= η2(x) for a variable
x that appears in a new-statement inQ0 then there exists a variable x˜ ∈ dom(η˜1)∩dom(η˜2)
such that x˜ appears in a new-statement in Q˜0 and η˜1(x˜) 6= η˜2(x˜). 
Condition 6 is necessary to prevent that several traces get simulated by a single trace, thus
reducing the probability of the trace set. Without this condition we could prove new x : T ; P .
new x : T ; if x = 0 then P else Q.
Theorem 2.1 The relation . is transitive. 
Proof Given two simulation relations .1 and .2 we can define a new relation . by letting
(η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜) if there exists an executing process (η′, S′, Q′) such that (η, S,Q) .1
(η′, S′, Q′) .2 (η˜, S˜, Q˜). It is straightforward to check that . is a simulation relation. 
Next we give a proof that simulation is security-preserving (theorem 2.2). First we need
to extend the simulation relation from single executing processes to semantic configurations:
given a relation . between executing processes we write C . C˜ for two semantic configurations
C = (η, P ),Q and C˜ = (η˜, P˜ ), Q˜ if (η, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ) and Q . Q˜.
Lemma 2.1 Assume that Q0 . Q˜0 for two input IMLC processes Q0 and Q˜0 and let . be
the corresponding simulation relation between executing processes. If C . C˜ and C E−→p C′ for
semantic configurations C, C′, and C˜ then there exists a semantic configuration C˜′ such that
C˜ E−→∗p C˜′ and C′ . C˜′. 
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Proof If the transition from C to C′ happens by any rule other than (IOut) then the statement
follows immediately by condition 5 in definition 2.11. Assume that the transition happens by
(IOut). Then C and C′ are of the form
C = (η, S, out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q),Q,
C′ = (η′[x′ 7→ a], S′, P ′),Q unionmulti reduce({(η, S,Q)}) \ {(η′, S′, Q′)},
where a = JeKη and (η′, Q′) ∈ Q such that Q′ is of the form Q′ = in(c[e′1, . . . , e′n], x′); P ′ andJeiKη = JeiKη′ for all i ≤ n. By item 3 in definition 2.11 C˜ is of the form
C˜ = (η˜, S˜, out(c[e˜1, . . . , e˜n], e˜); Q˜), Q˜,
such that (η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜) and JeKη = Je˜Kη˜ and JeiKη = Je˜iKη˜ for all i ≤ n. Simulation
provides us with (η˜′, S˜′, Q˜′) ∈ Q˜ such that (η′, S′, Q′) . (η˜′, S˜′, Q˜′). By item 2 in definition 2.11
Q˜′ is of the form
Q˜′ = in(c[e˜′1, . . . , e˜
′
n], x˜
′); P˜ ′
such that (η′[x′ 7→ a], S′, P ′) . (η˜′[x˜ 7→ a], S˜′, P˜ ′) and Je˜′iKη˜′ = Je′iKη′ for all i ≤ n. Let
C˜′ = (η˜′[x˜ 7→ a], S˜′, P˜ ′), Q˜ unionmulti reduce({(η˜, S˜, Q˜)}) \ {(η˜′, S˜′, Q˜′)}.
We show that C˜′ satisfies the statement of the lemma. To prove C˜→ C˜′ the only thing left to
check is the unique recipient condition: there exists no (η˜′′, S˜′′, Q˜′′) ∈ Q˜ with (η˜′′, S˜′′, Q˜′′) 6=
(η˜′, S˜′, Q˜′) such that
Q˜′′ = in(c[e˜′′1 , . . . , e˜
′′
n], x˜
′′); P˜ ′′)
and Je˜′′i Kη˜′′ = Je′iKη′ for all i ≤ n. Assume that such (η˜′′, S˜′′, Q˜′′) exists. By simulation we can
find (η′′, S′′, Q′′) ∈ Q such that Q′′ 6= Q′ and (η′′, S′′, Q′′) . (η˜′′, S˜′′, Q˜′′). All processes in Q
start with an input, thus using item 2 in definition 2.11 we see that
Q′′ = in(c[e′′1 , . . . , e
′′
n], x
′′); P ′′)
such that Je′′i Kη′′ = Je′iKη′ for all i ≤ n. This contradicts the unique recipient condition of the
transition C→ C′.
To prove C′ . C˜′ the only thing left to show is that reduce({(η, S,Q)}) . reduce({(η˜, S˜, Q˜)}).
This follows directly from (η, S,Q) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜) and condition 4 in definition 2.11. 
Theorem 2.2 (Simulation Preserves Security) If Q0 . Q˜0 for two input IMLC processes
Q0 and Q˜0 then insec(Q0, ρ) ≤ insec(Q˜0, ρ) for any correspondence property ρ. 
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Proof Let Q0 and Q˜0 be as in the statement of the theorem. Obtain a relation . between
executing processes from definition 2.11. We shall define a function sim from traces to traces as
follows. Consider a trace T = C1 → . . .→ Cn where C = initConfig(Q0). We can extend . by
letting (∅, ∅, out(start , ε); 0) . (∅, ∅, out(start , ε); 0) without breaking the properties of .. Then
by conditions 1 and 4 of definition 2.11 initConfig(Q0) . initConfig(Q˜0). Iterated application of
lemma 2.1 yields a trace T˜ = C˜1 →∗ . . .→∗ Cn such that C˜1 = initConfig(Q˜0), pr(T) = pr(T˜),
events(T) = events(T˜), and Ci . C˜i for all i ≤ n. Let sim(T) = T˜.
Consider a correspondence property ρ. Following definition 2.7 let T be the set of IMLC
traces T such that fst(T) = initConfig(Q0), events(T) /∈ ρ, and E ∈ ρ for any proper prefix
E of events(T). Then sim is injective on T: Consider two traces T = C1 → . . . → Cn ∈ T
and T′ = C′1 → . . . → C′n′ ∈ T such that T 6= T′. By definition if a trace T is in T then no
prefix of T is in T. Given that C1 = C′1 there exists i < min(n, n′) such that Cj = Cj for all
j ≤ i and Ci+1 6= C′i+1. The only semantic rules that allow multiple transitions are (INew) and
(CNew). Assume that the transition from Ci to Ci+1 is taken by (INew). Then the semantic
configurations have the form
Ci = (η, ∅, new x : T ;P ),Q Ci+1 = (η{x 7→ a}, ∅, P ),Q C′i+1 = (η{x 7→ a′}, ∅, P ),Q
for some a 6= a′. Let C˜1 →∗ . . . →∗ C˜n = sim(T) and C˜′1 →∗ . . . →∗ C˜′n′ = sim(T′). By
condition 6 of definition 2.11 it is easy to see that C˜i+1 6= C˜′i+1, thus sim(T) 6= sim(T′). The
case that the transition from Ci to Ci+1 is taken by (CNew) is similar.
Let T˜ be the set of IMLC traces T˜ such that fst(T˜) = initConfig(Q˜0), events(T˜) /∈ ρ, and
E ∈ ρ for any proper prefix E of events(T˜). Then
insec(Q0, ρ) =
∑
T∈T
pr(T) =
∑
T∈T
pr(sim(T)) =
∑
T∈sim(T)
pr(T) ≤
∑
T˜∈T˜
pr(T˜) = insec(Q˜0, ρ).
The third equality is true by injectivity of sim and the inequality is true because by construction
of sim we have sim(T) ⊆ T˜. 
We now prove that simulation is preserved by embedding of the form C{Q} (theorem 2.3).
This is done in two steps: first we show that simulation is preserved by prepending new indices
to all channel arguments of a process, and then we show that simulation is preserved by simple
embedding of the form C[Q].
Lemma 2.2 Let i1, . . . , in be replication indices and let Q0 and Q˜0 be IMLC processes such
that Q0 . Q˜0 and i1, . . . , in are defined neither in Q0 nor in Q˜0. Then (i1, . . . , in).Q0 .
(i1, . . . , in).Q˜0. 
Proof Let i1, . . . , in, Q0, and Q˜0 be as in the statement of the lemma. Obtain the simulation
relation. between executing processes from definition 2.11. Define a new simulation relation.∗
as follows: let (η, S,Q) .∗ (η˜, S˜, Q˜) if η(ij) = η˜(ij) for all j ≤ n and there exist processes Q′ and
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Q˜′ such that Q = (i1, . . . , in).Q, Q˜ = (i1, . . . , in).Q˜, and (η, S,Q′) . (η˜, S˜, Q˜′). It is straight-
forward to check that .∗ defines a simulation between (i1, . . . , in).Q0 and (i1, . . . , in).Q˜0. 
Theorem 2.3 (Simulation is Preserved by Embedding) Let Q1, . . . , Qn and Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n
be IMLC processes such that Qi . Q˜i for each i ≤ n. Then for any context C with n holes such
that both C{Q1, . . . , Qn} and C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n} are well-formed we have
C{Q1, . . . , Qn} . C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}. 
Proof LetQ1, . . . , Qn, Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n, and C be as in the statement of the theorem. The condition
that C{Q1, . . . , Qn} and C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n} are well-formed implies that neither Qi nor Q˜i for i ≤ n
define any replication indices in C. Therefore by lemma 2.2 it suffices to show the statement
for C[Q1, . . . , Qn] and C[Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n].
For each i ≤ n obtain a simulation relation .i between executing processes from defini-
tion 2.11 applied to Qi . Q˜i. Define a new simulation relation .∗ as follows: let (η, S,Q) .∗
(η˜, S˜, Q˜) if either of the following is true:
• There exist indices i1, . . . , ik ≤ n and a context C ′ such that Q = C ′[Qi1 , . . . , Qik ] and
Q˜ = C ′[Q˜i1 , . . . , Q˜ik ], and η = η˜, and S = S˜.
• (η, S,Q) .i (η˜, S˜, Q˜) for some i ≤ n.
It is straightforward to check that .∗ defines a simulation between the processes C[Q1, . . . , Qn]
and C[Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n]. 
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Chapter 3
Model Extraction By Symbolic
Execution
This chapter describes the path from a C program to its IML model. First the C program
is compiled to a CVM process as explained in section 3.1. The translation does not descend
into implementations of cryptographic primitives or system functions like memcpy, instead it
replaces these functions by their models. For instance, a call to encrypt may be replaced by a
single CVM instruction Apply encrypt . The models for cryptographic and system functions are
provided by the user in the form of proxy functions that are themselves written in C.
To obtain an IML model of a CVM process we execute it with respect to symbolic seman-
tics, in which instructions operate on expressions instead of concrete values, as outlined in
section 3.5. These expressions over-approximate the set of all possible values that can occur at
a given point. The main difference from existing symbolic execution algorithms, such as Cadar
et al. [2008] or Godefroid et al. [2008], is that our symbolic variables represent bitstrings of
potentially unknown length, whereas in previous algorithms a single variable corresponds to a
single byte. We demonstrate symbolic execution on the example of RPC-enc (section 1.1) in
section 3.6. The main theoretical results of this chapter are theorems 3.2 and 3.3 presented
in section 3.7 that capture the correctness of symbolic execution. Theorem 3.2 states that
model extraction by symbolic execution is sound: if Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n are IML models extracted
from CVM programs Q1, . . . , Qn then for any execution context C and trace property ρ we
have insec(C{Q1, . . . , Qn}, ρ) ≤ insec(C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}, ρ). The proof proceeds by demonstrat-
ing a simulation relation Qi . Q˜i (definition 2.11) and then applying theorems 2.2 and 2.3.
Theorem 3.3 additionally proves that a CVM program that can be successfully symbolically
executed never goes bad (definition 2.10). This means, in particular, that the CVM program is
memory-safe. Symbolic execution treats bitstring arithmetic operations soundly with respect
to overflow.
An important building block both for the symbolic execution and for the translation methods
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used in chapter 4 is the ability to check whether a certain fact implies another fact, where facts
can contain a mixture of integer and binary operations. In section 3.2 we show how to deal
with such facts in a sound way, using the SMT solver Yices [Dutertre and Moura, 2006] as our
backend. Our solver is based on rewriting rules of the form φ ` e  e′ meaning that e and e′
evaluate to the same value whenever φ is true. The same set of rules can be used for simplifying
expressions, as shown in section 3.3. Our solver is easily extensible—we can teach it to handle
more symbolic expressions by simply adding more rewriting rules. This is demonstrated in
section 3.4 where we add a new symbolic construct for representing C pointers during symbolic
execution and add support for pointers to our solver simply by listing the relevant rewriting
rules.
3.1 From C to CVM
Given a C program P we use CIL [Necula et al., 2002] to modify it such that it outputs its own
CVM representation when run. This means that we only analyse a single main path through
the code, so our verification result applies to a restriction P˜ of P that allows the execution
to proceed only on the main path, and aborts immediately if another path is taken. All of
the protocols that we analyse have linear structure—a participant stops execution if any of the
cryptographic checks fails. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the restricted program P˜
still remains a functional implementation of the protocol, and so security of P˜ gives confidence
in the security of P . It is important that, despite analysing a single path of the protocol, we
still cover all possible executions that take that path. In section 7.1 we discuss how we could
extend the architecture of our implementation to cover multiple branches.
The idea of instrumenting a program to emit a low-level set of instructions for symbolic
execution at runtime as well as some initial implementation code were borrowed from the
CREST symbolic execution tool [Burnim and Sen, 2008].
We do not formalise the compilation step from C to CVM and believe that prior work may
be used to fill this gap. For instance, instead of CVM we could start our analysis from one of
the intermediate stages of the CompCert compiler [Leroy, 2009] that has been formally proven
correct. Another option would be to use the LLVM language [Lattner, 2002] as the starting
point. LLVM is not formally verified, but using it would ensure that the low-level code we
verify is the same code that gets executed.
As mentioned in chapter 1, we do not verify the source code of cryptographic functions, but
instead trust that they implement the cryptographic algorithms correctly. Similarly, we would
not be able to translate the source code of functions like memcmp into CVM directly, as these
functions contain loops. Thus for the purpose of CVM translation we provide an abstraction
for these functions. We do so by writing a proxy function f proxy for each function f that needs
to be abstracted. Whenever a call to f is encountered during the translation, it is replaced by
the call to f proxy . The proxy functions are part of the trusted base of the verification.
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vo id LoadBuf ( vo id ∗ buf ; s i z e t l e n ) a t t r i b u t e ( ( n o t i n s t r u m e n t e d ) ) ;
vo id LoadBuf ( vo id ∗ buf ; s i z e t l e n ){
cvm( ” Load ” ) ;
}
vo id Val ( b o o l i s s i g n e d , s i z e t width ){
char cmd [ 1 0 0 ] ;
s p r i n t f (cmd , ” Apply Val(%ld , %s ) ” , width , i s s i g n e d ? ”S” : ”U” ) ;
cvm(cmd ) ;
}
vo id a s s u m e l e n ( const unsigned char ∗ l e n , b o o l i s s i g n e d , s i z e t width ){
cvm( ”Dup” ) ;
cvm( ” Len ” ) ;
LoadBuf ( l e n , width ) ;
Val ( i s s i g n e d , width ) ;
cvm( ” Apply E q I n t /2” ) ;
cvm( ”Assume” ) ;
}
vo id x o r p r o x y ( unsigned char ∗ buf , unsigned char ∗ pad , s i z e t l e n ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
x o r ( buf , pad , l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
LoadBuf ( buf , l e n ) ;
LoadBuf ( pad , l e n ) ;
cvm( ” Apply x o r /2” ) ;
a s s u m e l e n (& l e n , FALSE , s i z e o f ( l e n ) ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( buf ) ;
}
Figure 3.1: Examples of proxy functions.
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Examples of proxy functions are shown in figure 3.1. Each function f proxy starts by calling
the function f that is being proxied so that the concrete execution can proceed as usual. The
proxy function then uses the function cvm to print to a file the sequence of instructions that
represent in CVM the effect of calling f. The call to f itself is guarded by a pair of calls
mute cvm and unmute cvm that silence the printing of CVM instructions from within f itself.
We shall now walk through the code of xor proxy in detail. The calls to the helper function
LoadBuf are meant to extract a value from memory and put it on the CVM execution stack. In
order to understand how these calls work it is important to remember that more calls to cvm
will be inserted by the automated instrumentation. In particular, when a function is called, the
instrumentation inserts the necessary instructions to load the arguments from memory onto the
execution stack (the called function is then expected to store the values from the stack into its
local variables). Thus the call LoadBuf(buf, len) after instrumentation becomes
cvm( ” Ref buf ” ) ; cvm( ” Const 8” ) ; cvm( ” Apply t o b i t s t r i n g ( 8 , U)/1 ” ) ; cvm( ” Load ” ) ;
cvm( ” Ref l e n ” ) ; cvm( ” Const 8” ) ; cvm( ” Apply t o b i t s t r i n g ( 8 , U)/1 ” ) ; cvm( ” Load ” ) ;
LoadBuf ( buf , l e n ) ;
This instrumentation puts on the stack references to the variables buf and len, followed by
the sizes of these variables (8 bytes, assuming a 64-bit architecture), and then uses the Load in-
structions to load the values of these variables onto the stack. The symbol ” to bitstring (8, U)”
is the C string representation of τ−1U8 . When LoadBuf starts executing, the CVM stack already
contains the correct arguments for the CVM Load instruction. Automatically generated instru-
mentation would store these values into the C argument variables. Instead we use a user-defined
C attribute not instrumented to signal to our instrumentation to keep LoadBuf unmodified, and
we manually add the desired instruction Load.
After having loaded the arguments of the xor operation onto the stack xor proxy uses the
instruction Apply xor/2 which puts on the stack the result of the xor operation. It then uses the
call to the helper function assume len to communicate to the symbolic execution our assumption
that the length of the result is equal to the length of the arguments. If b is the result of xor and
bl the bitstring contained in the len variable then assume len constructs the fact len(b) = τU8(l)
on the stack. It then uses the Assume instruction to make the symbolic execution assume that
the value of the constructed fact is true in every possible run of the program.
The last step of xor proxy is to use use the helper function StoreBuf (not shown here) that
works similarly to LoadBuf and stores the result of xor from the stack into the memory pointed
to by variable buf.
Proxy functions allow to model library functions that are only partially trusted. For instance,
a proxy function can leak its arguments to the attacker, or make the result depend on a value
that is read from the attacker. Appendix A contains more examples of proxy functions, including
all the functions used by our example in figure 1.1.
Several aspects of our implementation are not mentioned elsewhere since they do not add
to the core idea of the approach:
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Init ; in(c, ) ; // CVM initialisation
// unsigned char ∗ payload = malloc(PAYLOAD LEN); // PAYLOAD LEN = 20
Const τ−18u (20); Malloc; Ref payload; Store;
// if (payload == NULL) exit(1);
Ref payload; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Apply null/0; Apply ==τptr /2; Apply truth/1; Apply ¬/1; Test;
// RAND bytes(payload, PAYLOAD LEN);
Const τ−14s (20); New payload; Ref payload; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load; Store;
// size t msg len = PAYLOAD LEN + 1;
Const τ−18u (20); Const τ
−1
8u (1); Apply +©τ8u/2; Ref msg len; Store;
// unsigned char ∗ msg = malloc(msg len);
Ref msg len; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Malloc; Ref msg; Store;
// if (msg == NULL) exit(1);
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Apply null/0; Apply ==τptr /2; Apply truth/1; Apply ¬/1; Test;
// ∗msg = 0x01; // add the tag
Const 0x01; Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Store;
// memcpy(msg + 1, payload, PAYLOAD LEN); // add the payload
Ref payload; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Const τ
−1
8u (20); Load;
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Const τ
−1
8u (1); Apply +©τ8uPI /2; Store;
// unsigned char ∗ pad = otp(msg len);
Ref msg len; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Malloc;
Dup; Apply null/0; Apply !=τptr /2; Apply truth/1; Assume;
Ref pad; Const τ−18u (8); Store;
ReadEnv pad;
Dup; Apply len/1; Apply τ−18u ; Ref msg len; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load;
Apply ==τ8u /2; Apply truth/1; Assume;
Ref pad; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Store;
// xor(msg, pad, msg len); // apply one−time pad
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Ref msg len; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load; Load;
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Ref msg len; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load; Load;
Apply xor/2;
Dup; Apply len/1; Apply τ−18u ; Ref msg len; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load;
Apply ==τ8u /2; Apply truth/1; Assume;
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Store;
// send(msg, msg len);
Ref msg; Const τ−18u (8); Load; Ref msg len; Const τ
−1
8u (8); Load; Load;
WriteEnv msg; out(c, msg); 0
Figure 3.2: Translation of the example C program (figure 1.1) into CVM.
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• Our implementation supports C structures by representing field offsets using CVM func-
tions. For instance, a pointer &(s.x) would be represented by taking the reference to s
using Ref s and then adding to it an integer expression field offset x ().
• Non-static variables in different calls to the same function are given different names. A
CIL transformation pulls local variables in inner scopes to function scope, so we do not
have to worry about locally scoped variables.
• Our verification works with respect to a particular machine architecture since it uses spe-
cific values for the sizes of variables. This could be improved by using symbolic expressions
for these sizes (say, sizeof int instead of 4) and making sure none of the messages that
reach the network refer to such symbolic sizes in any way.
• We allow calls of functions via function pointers, as long as those can be statically resolved
by the symbolic execution. For instance, we allow p = &f; p();, but not p = rand(); p(); .
• We do not support variadic functions, but luckily the only variadic functions we came
across are from the printf -family, and so can be removed from the code without affecting
the implementation (assuming these calls are not observable by the attacker).
Example 3.1 Figure 3.2 shows a CVM translation of the example program from figure 1.1,
simplified to remove a level of indirection arising from function calls. We assume a 64-bit
architecture, such that τsize = τ8u. An abbreviation Const τ(n) with an integer type τ and n ∈ N
stands for the sequence of instructions Const n; Apply τ/1. For convenience we write operation
arguments of Apply together with their arities. Operations used by the program include the
binary addition +©τ and an addition of an integer to a pointer +©τPI , both parameterised by the
type τ of their integer operands. The binary arithmetic operations are discussed in detail in
section 3.2 and the pointer operations are discussed in detail in section 3.4. The function truth
introduced in section 2.2 is used to convert C boolean values to CVM boolean values before
applying the Test instructions.
The proxy function for otp loads the value from the environment variable pad—this will be
a free variable in the extracted IML model. The user is expected to provide an environment,
like the one in figure 1.1 that binds pad to a value. The program variable pad used in C code
should not be confused with the environment variable pad .
The call to RAND bytes generates a simpler sequence of instructions compared to the model
shown in appendix A—here we assume that the function always succeeds. 
3.2 Facts and Implication
An important building block in all our algorithms is being able to decide whether a certain fact is
implied by another fact. The problem is that we are dealing with facts of two types. On the one
hand, we would like to prove facts about integers, say, to bound a length of a certain bitstring.
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φ, ψ ::= fact
φ ◦ ψ, ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,¬} logical operation
t ◦ t′, ◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>} integer comparison
e ◦τ e′, ◦τ ∈ {==τ , !=τ , <τ , >τ}, τ ∈ TI binary comparison
e = e′ bitstring equality
defined(e) e is well-defined
v ∈ Var logical variable
t, p, l ::= integer term
n ∈ Z integer
t ◦ t′, ◦ ∈ {+,−, ∗} integer operation
len(e) length
τ(e), τ ∈ TI value
e ::= bitstring term
e ◦τ e′, ◦τ ∈ {+©τ , −©τ , ∗©τ}, τ ∈ TI binary operation
castτ1→τ2(e), τ1, τ2 ∈ TI cast
cmp(e1, e2) C bitstring comparison
τ−1(t), τ ∈ TI bitstring encoding
x ∈ Var variable
b ∈ BS bitstring
e{p, l} substring
e|e′ concatenation
f(e1, . . . , en) other function
Figure 3.3: The syntax of facts.
On the other hand, the C implementation provides us with facts about bitstring representation
of integers. These representations can overflow or get truncated in a cast between a signed and
an unsigned value. The matter is further complicated by the necessity to prove that bitstring
expressions are well-defined (do not evaluate to ⊥). This section describes how we use the SMT
solver Yices [Dutertre and Moura, 2006] to solve these problems.
Yices contains both a theory of integers and a theory of fixed-size bitstrings, but it does not
allow to mix them freely. For instance, there is no function corresponding to any of our τ ∈ TI
that would allow to obtain an integer value of a bitstring. Since our expressions can contain
unbounded integers the theory of fixed-width bitstrings alone is not sufficient to deal with them.
Thus we chose to use integer arithmetic for all operations and to formulate side conditions to
ensure that no overflows occur whenever we replace bitstring arithmetic operations with their
integer counterparts. One advantage is efficiency: bitstring solving uses bit-blasting that may
take exponential time in the size of the bitstrings, whereas integer solving uses the simplex
method the runtime of which only depends logarithmically on the magnitude of the integers.
Another advantage is that formulating side-conditions allows us to catch overflows early—if a
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side condition fails it is a good indication that something is wrong with the implementation being
analysed. Bitstring solving treats overflows silently and does not provide such an indication.
The downside of relying on the integer solver is that we cannot easily analyse a protocol that
intentionally uses overflow for security-relevant purposes. Yices only supports linear arithmetic,
but that turns out to be sufficient, as all our facts essentially deal with lengths of bitstrings
and we have not yet seen an implementation that would multiply two lengths.
We shall be dealing with facts as defined in figure 2.1, but now we are specifically interested
in some binary operations arising from the execution of C programs. For an integer type
τ ∈ TI let +©τ , −©τ , ∗©τ be binary addition, subtraction, and multiplication operators, and let
==τ , !=τ , <τ , >τ be binary comparison operators. For τ1, τ2 ∈ TI let castτ1→τ2 be the C cast
function from type τ1 to τ2. Let cmp be the C bitstring comparison function (the application
of cmp is generated by the proxy function for memcmp, appendix A). The syntax of facts in
figure 3.3 makes these operations explicit—it is an instance of the syntax in figure 2.1, but now
we split the function application rule into binary comparisons, binary arithmetic operations,
and the remaining (non-arithmetic) function applications. We also make use of the function
defined that returns false if its argument evaluates to ⊥ and true otherwise.
Below we outline our assumptions regarding the binary operations. For an integer type
τ ∈ TI let ◦τ ∈ {+©τ , −©τ , ∗©τ} be a binary operator, and let ◦′ ∈ {+,−, ∗} be the corresponding
integer operator. We assume that ◦τ is only defined for two operands of type τ , that is,
b1 ◦τ b2 = ⊥ whenever b1 /∈ dom(τ) or b2 /∈ dom(τ). Otherwise if b1, b2 ∈ dom(τ) then the
operation ◦τ on bitstrings corresponds to the operation ◦′ on integer values as long as the result
is within the representable range, that is,
τ(b1 ◦τ b2) =
τ(b1) ◦′ τ(b2), if τ(b1) ◦′ τ(b2) ∈ range(τ),arbitrary otherwise. (3.21)
We do not assume a particular overflow behaviour, because such an assumption is provided
by the C standard only for unsigned operations. Signed overflow is left undefined [ISO, 1999,
Annex J2]. This means that a C program is free to do absolutely anything once a signed
overflow occurs, including divulging secrets to the attacker. Such an assumption would make
most protocols unverifiable, so we follow the behaviour of most compilers, and expect signed
overflow to return a deterministic yet arbitrary result.
Let τ1, τ2 ∈ TI . We assume that castτ1→τ2 is defined precisely for operands of type τ1:
castτ1→τ2(b) 6= ⊥ iff b ∈ dom(τ1). (3.22)
We also assume that castτ1→τ2 does not change the value of the operand as long as it is
representable in the new type τ2. More precisely, if b ∈ dom(τ1) and τ1(b) ∈ range(τ2) then
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(define−type bitstringbot )
( define defined :: (→ bitstringbot bool))
; ; integer types τy
( define value y unsigned :: (→ bitstringbot nat nat))
( define value y signed :: (→ bitstringbot nat int ))
; ; inverse integer types τ−1
( define bs signed :: (→ int bitstringbot ))
( define bs unsigned :: (→ nat bitstringbot ))
( define len y :: (→ bitstringbot nat))
( define range :: (→ bitstringbot nat nat bitstringbot ))
( define concat :: (→ bitstringbot bitstringbot bitstringbot ))
Figure 3.4: The Yices preamble.
castτ1→τ2(b) ∈ dom(τ2) and
τ2(castτ1→τ2(b)) = τ1(b). (3.23)
This behaviour is provided by the C standard: “When a value with integer type is con-
verted to another integer type other than bool, if the value can be represented by the new
type, it is unchanged.” [ISO, 1999, 6.3.1.3]. Some examples of invalid casts would include
castτ1s→τ1u(0xFF ) (the signed value of 0xFF is not representable as unsigned, and vice versa)
or castτ4u→τ4s(τ
−1
4u (1) −©τ4u τ−14u (2)). The last example highlights the fact that an operation
x = x1 + x2; may not work as expected when x is signed and x1 and x2 are unsigned.
Similarly to binary arithmetic operators, binary comparison operators are assumed to be
defined precisely for operands are of the right type. If both operands are of the right type, the
comparison operators compare their values. This can be conveniently summarized as
truth(b1 ◦τ b2) = τ(b1) ◦′ τ(b2) (3.24)
for b1, b2 ∈ BS , τ ∈ TI , ◦τ ∈ {==τ , !=τ , <τ , >τ}, and the corresponding integer operator
◦′ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>} (recall that truth(⊥) = false and integer comparison operators return false if
either operand evaluates to ⊥)
Given an environment η and a fact ψ we write η |= ψ if JψKη = true. Given two facts ψ
and ψ′ we write ψ |= ψ′ if for any environment η such that η |= ψ also η |= ψ′. This is the
entailment relation that we are actually interested in. Below we show how given two facts ψ
and ψ′ we construct a Yices formula that implies ψ |= ψ′. It is important to point out that
ψ and ψ′ are unlikely to be valid Yices formulas themselves due to the mixing of integer and
bitstring expressions that we discussed above.
Figure 3.4 shows the preamble that we give to Yices. Bitstring variables in our expressions
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map to Yices variables of type bitstringbot and logical variables map to Yices variables of type
bool. Functions that return bitstrings, such as substring extractions or bitstring encodings of
integers are represented as uninterpreted functions. Functions that return integers, namely len
and τ for an integer type τ ∈ TI cannot be represented directly because they may return ⊥
and Yices would not be able to perform arithmetic on such values. Instead we define two new
functions, leny, τy : BS → N that are defined exactly like len and τ except that they return an
arbitrary integer instead of ⊥. One of the goals of the translation that we describe below is to
make sure that it is safe to convert len and τ into their Yices counterparts.
Let ey be the expression e in which all occurrences of len are replaced by leny and all
occurrences of τ for τ ∈ TI are replaced by τy. We call e Yices-compatible if e = ey. Any Yices-
compatible expression can be represented in Yices by replacing every bitstring subexpression e′
that is not an application of one of the functions in figure 3.4 by a bitstring variable opaque[e′].
Given Yices-compatible facts ψ and ψ′ we write ψ `y ψ′ if Yices claims that ψ entails ψ′ which
under the assumption of Yices correctness implies ψ |= ψ′.
The goal of our method is therefore to rewrite arbitrary ψ and ψ′ into equivalent Yices-
compatible formulas. Additionally we would like to convert as many as possible applications of
binary arithmetic operations to integer operations (binary expressions that cannot be rewritten
will have to be replaced by opaque variables). We achieve this by using rewriting rules of the
form φ ` e e′ where φ is a fact and e and e′ are arbitrary expressions. Such a rule means thatJφKη = true implies JeKη = Je′Kη. The idea of the method is based on the following self-evident
theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Reduction of Facts to Yices-compatible Facts) Consider rewriting rules
φy ` ψ  ψy and φ′y ` ψ′  ψ′y such that all of φy, ψy, φ′y, and ψ′y are yices-compatible facts
and ψ and ψ′ are arbitrary facts. Then ψ |= ψ′ whenever (φy ⇒ ψy) `y (φ′y ∧ ψ′y). 
The difference in shape of the left- and the right-hand side of the conclusion can be un-
derstood as follows: both φy and φ
′
y are conditions that need to be proved. Even though we
assume ψ, we still need to prove φy in order to assume ψy.
Given two facts ψ and ψ′ we rewrite them using the rules in figures 3.5 and 3.6. The
first three rules allow to combine rewriting steps. Rule (R1) is the congruence rule: we can
rewrite subexpressions in a larger expression. Rule (R2) shows that rule conditions themselves
can be rewritten. This dictates the shape of our implementation: given a fact ψ we first
apply the rewriting rules to simplify it into a Yices-compatible fact ψy and collect conditions
φ1, . . . , φn along the way. We then apply the same procedure recursively to rewrite φ1, . . . , φn
themselves. Rule (R3) captures the fact that adding a condition is not necessary when rewriting
a conjunction if this condition is part of the conjunction already. The importance of this rule
will be demonstrated in example 3.3. Rules (R26) and (R27) are responsible for making sure
that the resulting expression is Yices-compatible.
The rule (R6) allows us to rewrite C logical conjunctions into their IML counterparts (the
same kind of rule exists for disjunctions and negations). The rule (R8) is useful for modelling the
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φ ` e1  e2
φ ` e[e1] e[e2]
(R1)
φ ` e e′ ψ ` φ φ′
ψ ∧ φ′ ` e e′
(R2)
φ1 ` e1  (e′1 ∧ φ′1) (φ′1 ∧ φ2) ` e2  e′2
(φ1 ∧ φ2) ` (e1 ∧ e2) (e′1 ∧ e′2)
(R3)
τ ∈ TI (◦τ , ◦′) ∈ {(==τ ,=), (!=τ , 6=), (<τ , <), (>τ , >)}
` truth(e ◦τ e′) τ(e) ◦′ τ(e′)
(R4)
◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>}
` t ◦ t′  defined(t) ∧ defined(t′) ∧ (t ◦ t′)
(R5)
` truth(e && e′) truth(e) ∧ truth(e′)
(R6)
τ ∈ TI (◦τ , ◦′) ∈ {(+©τ , +), (−©τ , −), ( ∗©τ , ∗)}
defined(e ◦τ e′) ∧ (τ(e) ◦′ τ(e′) ∈ range(τ)) ` τ(e ◦τ e′) τ(e) ◦′ τ(e′)
(R7)
defined(e) ∧ defined(e′) ` τint(cmp(e, e′)) = 0 e = e′ (R8)
τ ∈ TI
defined(τ−1(t)) ` τ(τ−1(t)) t
(R9)
τ ∈ TI
defined(τ−1(τ(e))) ` τ−1(τ(e)) e
(R10)
τ ∈ TI
defined(τ−1(t)) ` len(τ−1(t)) width(τ)
(R11)
b ∈ BS
` len(b) |b|
(R12)
τ ∈ TI ◦τ ∈ {+©τ , −©τ , ∗©τ}
defined(e ◦τ e′) ` len(e ◦τ e′) width(τ)
(R13)
` len(e|e′) len(e) + len(e′) (R14) defined(e{p, l}) ` len(e{p, l}) l (R15)
` defined(defined(e)) true (R16)
◦ ∈ {+,−, ∗}
` defined(t ◦ t′) defined(t) ∧ defined(t′)
(R17)
` defined(e{p, l}) (p+ l ≤ len(e)) ∧ (p ≥ 0) ∧ (l ≥ 0) (R18)
` defined(e|e′) defined(e) ∧ defined(e′) (R19)
τ ∈ TI
` defined(τ−1(t)) t ∈ range(τ)
(R20)
τ ∈ TI
` defined(τ(e)) e ∈ dom(τ)
(R21)
τ ∈ TI ◦τ ∈ {+©τ , −©τ , ∗©τ ,==τ , !=τ , <τ , >τ}
` defined(e ◦τ e′) e, e′ ∈ dom(τ)
(R22)
◦ ∈ {=, 6=, <,>}
` defined(e ◦ e′) true
(R23)
` defined(len(e)) defined(e) (R24)
e = b ∈ BS or e = n ∈ N
` defined(e) true
(R25)
τ ∈ TI
defined(e) ` τ(e) τy(e)
(R26)
defined(e) && len(e) leny(e)
(R27)
Figure 3.5: Rewriting of expressions.
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τ, τ ′ ∈ TI
` defined(castτ→τ ′(e)) e ∈ dom(τ)
(R28)
τ, τ ′ ∈ TI
defined(castτ→τ ′(e)) ` len(castτ→τ ′(e)) width(τ ′)
(R29)
τ, τ ′ ∈ TI
defined(castτ→τ ′(e)) ∧ (τ(e) ∈ range(τ ′)) ` τ ′(castτ→τ ′(e)) τ(e)
(R30)
τ1, τ2 ∈ TI
t ∈ range(τ1) ∩ range(τ2) ` castτ1→τ2(τ−12 (t)) τ−12 (t)
(R31)
τ1, τ2, τ3 ∈ TI
τ1(e) ∈ range(τ2) ∩ range(τ3) ` castτ2→τ3(castτ1→τ2(e)) castτ1→τ3(e)
(R32)
τ ∈ TI
e ∈ dom(τ) ` castτ→τ (e) e
(R33)
Figure 3.6: Rewriting of cast expressions.
memcmp function, as shown in appendix A: it shows how the expression cmp(e1 , e2 ) generated
by the proxy function for memcmp relates to the equality of e1 and e2.
Some rules mention facts of the form t ∈ range(τ) and e ∈ dom(τ) for an integer term t
or a bitstring term e and a type τ ∈ TI . These are easy to express for typical C types. For
instance, for a signed byte type τ1s we have t ∈ range(τ1s) = (t ≥ −128) ∧ (t ≤ 127) and
e ∈ dom(τ1s) = (len(e) = 1).
Some rules show applications of defined(·) to integer formulas. This is not part of the syntax
in figure 3.3, where defined(·) is meant to apply to bitstring expressions only. The meaning is
obvious though and those applications are only transient and always get rewritten themselves.
We now prove that the rewriting rules in figures 3.5 and 3.6 are valid.
Proof (Rewriting rules) Rules (R4) and (R7) correspond directly to our assumptions
(3.24) and (3.21) about binary operators. Rules (R29) and (R28) correspond to our assumptions
(3.23) and (3.22). Next we prove (R31), (R32), and (R33).
(R31) Let t be an integer expression such that n = JtKη ∈ range(τ1)∩ range(τ2). Let b = τ−11 (n).
By (3.23)
castτ1→τ2(τ
−1
2 (n)) = castτ1→τ2(b) = τ
−1
2 (τ2(castτ1→τ2(b))) = τ
−1
2 (τ1(b)) = τ
−1
2 (n).
(R32) Let e be a bitstring expression such that b = JeKη ∈ dom(τ1) and n = τ1(b) ∈ range(τ2) ∩
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range(τ3). By (R31)
castτ2→τ3(castτ1→τ2(b)) = castτ2→τ3(castτ1→τ2(τ
−1
1 (n))) = castτ2→τ3(τ
−1
2 (n)) = τ
−1
3 (n)
= castτ1→τ3(τ
−1
1 (n)) = castτ1→τ3(b).
(R33) Let e be a bitstring expression such that b = JeKη ∈ dom(τ). Let n = τ(b). By (R31)
castτ→τ (b) = castτ→τ (τ−1(n))) = τ−1(n)) = b.
All the other rules are straightforward. 
Example 3.2 We show how a single expression is simplified by rewriting. Suppose we would
like to prove len((x1 |x2 ){5, len(x2 )}) = len(x2 ) for two bitstring variables x1 and x2. We make
this expression number 1 below. Each rewriting step is labelled with some conditions and the
conditions are themselves rewritten in the same way.
1 len((x1 |x2 ){5, len(x2 )}) = len(x2 )
(2) len(x2 ) = len(x2 )
(3) leny(x2 ) = leny(x2 )
2 defined((x1 |x2 ){5, len(x2 )})
 (len(x1 |x2 ) ≥ (5 + len(x2 ))) ∧ (5 ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x2 ) ≥ 0)
 ((len(x1 ) + len(x2 )) ≥ (5 + len(x2 ))) ∧ (len(x2 ) ≥ 0)
(4) ((leny(x1 ) + len(x2 )) ≥ (5 + len(x2 ))) ∧ (len(x2 ) ≥ 0)
(3) ((leny(x1 ) + leny(x2 )) ≥ (5 + leny(x2 ))) ∧ (leny(x2 ) ≥ 0)
3 defined(x2 )
4 defined(x1 )
For simplicity we remove the obvious condition 5 ≥ 0 from subsequent rewriting steps, but
our implementation does not do this—all arithmetic facts are passed to Yices to deal with. In
order to prove the original fact it is sufficient to prove the rewritten facts 1–4. Clearly this can
be done under assumptions defined(x1), defined(x2), and len
y(x1) ≥ 5. Yices can discharge the
condition leny(x2 ) ≥ 0 on its own since it knows that lengths are non-negative since figure 3.4
defines len y to have the return type nat. 
Example 3.3 This example demonstrates how new assumptions, such as leny(x1) ≥ 5 in the
example above, are added to Yices. Suppose we would like Yices to know that τ8u(x ) ≥ 200 is
true for some variable x. Applying our rewriting procedure we get
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1 τ8u(x ) ≥ 200
 defined(τ8u(x )) ∧ defined(200) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
 (8 = len(x )) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
 defined(8) ∧ defined(len(x )) ∧ (8 = len(x )) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
 defined(len(x )) ∧ (8 = len(x )) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
 defined(x ) ∧ (8 = len(x )) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
(2) defined(x ) ∧ (8 = leny(x )) ∧ (τ8u(x ) ≥ 200)
(2) defined(x ) ∧ (8 = leny(x )) ∧ (τy8u(x ) ≥ 200)
2 defined(x )
In order to convert len(x ) into leny(x ) and τ8u(x ) into τ
y
8u(x ) we require the assumption
defined(x). However, this condition is already present in the expression that we are rewriting!
This is where the rule (R3) comes in: it allows us to omit the condition in this case and just
assert that defined(x ) ∧ (8 = leny(x )) ∧ (τy8u(x ) ≥ 200) holds unconditionally. In general, when
our implementation collects conditions while rewriting a conjunction, it drops all conditions
that are already present in the conjunction itself. 
Appendix B contains an extended example with assumptions and queries that would be
typical in our C program analysis.
3.3 Simplification
The rewriting system developed in the previous section can readily be used to simplify expres-
sions: each rewriting rule ψ ` e  e′ can be seen as a simplification rule. In addition to that
we add three rules for simplifying substring extraction expressions. Those rules are not part
of the solver described in the previous section because the solver itself needs to be invoked to
decide which instance of the rule to apply. We formalise this using the following simplification
relation, parameterised by a fact set Φ:
e Φ e′, if ψ ` e e′ and Φ ` ψ,
e{p, l} Φ ε, if Φ ` (l = 0),
(e1| . . . |em){p, l} Φ ei| . . . |ej , if Φ ` defined(e1| . . . |em)
∧ (p = len(e1| . . . |ei−1)) ∧ (l = len(ei| . . . |ej))
e{p, l}{p′, l′} Φ e{p+ p′, l′}, if Φ ` {p+ p′}l′ ⊆ {p}l .
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pb ∈ PBase ::= pointer base
addr(v) stack pointer to variable v
malloc(eA, tl) heap pointer
t ∈ ITerm ::= integer term
pb pointer base
. . . same as ITerm in figure 2.1
e ∈ IExp ::= bitstring expression
ptr(pb, to) pointer
. . . same as IExp in figure 2.1
Figure 3.7: Symbolic expressions with pointers.
The second rule simplifies expressions that select an empty substring, the third rule simpli-
fies substrings of concatenations, and the fourth rule simplifies repeated substring extractions.
These rules are very important for symbolic execution that we shall describe in section 3.5 since
without them the constructed symbolic expressions would quickly grow very large.
We exclude rules (R26) and (R27) from being used in simplification since the purpose of
these rules is to make the expression Yices-compatible, but this is not the goal here.
Let simplifyΦ(e) be recursively defined as follows: choose a rewriting rule e  Φ e′ and let
simplifyΦ(e) = simplifyΦ(e
′). If no such rule exists, let simplifyΦ(e) = e. Clearly this function
is sound in the following sense:
Lemma 3.1 Given a fact set Φ and an environment η, if η |= Φ then JsimplifyΦ(e)Kη = JeKη.
3.4 Symbolic Pointers
To track the values used as pointers during CVM execution we extend IML expressions with an
additional construct as shown in figure 3.7. An expression of the form ptr(pb, to) represents a
pointer into the memory location identified by the pointer base pb with an offset to relative to the
beginning of the location. Pointer bases are of two kinds: a base of the form addr(v) represents
a pointer to the program variable v and a base of the form malloc(eA, tl) represents the result
of a Malloc. These two expressions are evaluated using functions addr and malloc defined
in section 2.2. Given an environment η we let Jaddr(v)Kη = addr(v) and Jmalloc(eA, tl)Kη =
malloc(JeAKη, JtlKη) whenever JtlKη 6= ⊥ and JeAKη is an encoding of an allocation table suitable
as argument to malloc (we let Jmalloc(eA, tl)Kη = ⊥ otherwise). We allow to use a pointer base
as a free-standing integer term.
Evaluation rules for pointer expressions are shown in figure 3.8. The rule (3.45) evaluates
the null pointer—both the base and the offset must be zero in this case. Rules (3.46) and (3.47)
evaluate stack and heap pointers. In each case we require that the offset points within the
allocated memory area or one past the last element. This is specified by the C standard [ISO,
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JpbKη = JtoK = 0Jptr(pb, to)Kη = τ−1ptr (0) (3.45)
η |= 0 ≤ to ≤ len(v)Jptr(addr(v), to)Kη = Jτ−1ptr (addr(v) + to)Kη (3.46)
η |= malloc(eA, tl) 6= 0 η |= 0 ≤ to ≤ tlJptr(malloc(eA, tl), to)Kη = Jτ−1ptr (malloc(eA, tl) + to)Kη (3.47)
Figure 3.8: Pointer evaluation rules.
1999, 6.5.6 (8)] and creating (even without dereferencing) a pointer that fails these criteria
results in undefined behaviour. This justifies the requirement malloc(eA, tl) 6= 0 in (3.47) as we
need to make sure that the memory area is successfully allocated before moving the offset. In
both cases the evaluation results in the sum of the base and the offset converted to a bitstring
of type τptr.
In order to handle expressions with symbolic pointers we extend our solver from section 3.2
by the rules in figure 3.9. The first five rules are a direct consequence of the evaluation rules
in figure 3.8. The last two rules encode our assumptions about the C operators +©τPI and
−©τPI that are used to add or subtract an integer of type τ from a pointer, and −©PP that is
used to subtract two pointers (the rule (R39) is only shown for +©τPI but the same rule exists
for −©τPI). The behaviour of −©PP is somewhat subtle, because the result of the operation is
signed. According to [ISO, 1999, 6.5.6] “When two pointers are subtracted, [...] the result is the
difference of the subscripts of the two array elements. The size of the result is implementation-
defined, and its type (a signed integer type) is ptrdiff t [...]. The rule therefore subtracts the
values of the offsets and then checks whether the result is representable as a bitstring of type
τptrdiff . This is not quite the same as using unsigned subtraction and then casting to a signed
value (for instance, the result of castτ1u→τ1s(τ
−1
1u (1) −©τ1u τ−11u (2)) is undefined).
The above description of pointer operators assumes pointers of type void∗. To deal with
pointers to arbitrary underlying types we multiply the integer operand of +©τPI and −©τPI , and
divide the result of −©PP by the size of the underlying type.
The rule (R35) lists pb = malloc(eA, tl) 6= 0 as one of its conditions. It is useful to see how
such a condition will be proved in practice during symbolic execution. The symbolic execution
of Malloc will generate an expression of the form ptr(pb, 0). The C program is expected to check
that this value is not null before doing anything with it. Such a check would generate the fact
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` defined(ptr(addr(v), to)) 0 ≤ to ≤ len(v) (R34)
` defined(ptr(malloc(eA, tl), to)) (to = 0) ∨ (malloc(eA, tl) 6= 0 ∧ 0 ≤ to ≤ tl) (R35)
` defined(τ−1ptr (0)) true (R36)
defined(ptr(pb, to)) ` τptr(ptr(pb, to)) pb+ to (R37)
defined(ptr(pb, to)) ` len(ptr(pb, to)) len(τptr) (R38)
τ ∈ TI
defined(ptr(pb, t+ τ(e))) ` ptr(pb, t) +©τPI e ptr(pb, t+ τ(e))
(R39)
τ ∈ TI
defined(τptrdiff(t− t′)) ` ptr(pb, t) −©PP ptr(pb, t′) τptrdiff(t− t′)
(R40)
Figure 3.9: Rewriting of pointer expressions.
truth(ptr(pb, 0) !=τptr τ
−1
ptr (0)). This fact would be rewritten by our solver as follows:
truth(ptr(pb, 0) !=τptr τ
−1
ptr (0))
(R4) τptr(ptr(pb, 0)) 6= τptr(τ−1ptr (0))
(1), (R37) pb 6= τptr(τ−1ptr (0))
(2), (R9) pb 6= 0
1 defined(ptr(pb, 0))
(R34) or (R35) true
2 defined(τ−1ptr (0))
(R36) true
Despite having extended the class of symbolic expressions allowed in IML, the simulation
relation (section 2.3) still holds since the proof does not rely on the particular shape of the
expressions.
For convenience we define a function size : PBase → ITerm that gives the length of the
allocated memory associated with a given pointer base, under the assumption that the pointer
base is not null. We let
size(addr(v)) = len(v) and size(malloc( , ts)) = ts
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3.5 From CVM to IML: Symbolic Execution
We describe how to automatically extract an IML model from a CVM program. The model
we extract will simulate the original program, as defined in section 2.3, and so every security
property that we can prove on the model also holds for the original program. The key idea
of the model extraction is to execute a CVM program in a symbolic semantics, where, instead
of concrete bitstrings, memory locations contain IML expressions representing the set of all
possible concrete values at a given execution point.
The algorithm for symbolic execution is determined by the set of rules presented in fig-
ure 3.10. The initial semantic configuration has the form ∅, Q with an initial process Q ∈ CVM0.
After executing the Init instruction at the start of Q the semantic configurations take the form
S, P = (Φ, As, Ms, Ss), P , where
• Φ is a set of facts known to hold at a given execution point,
• As ∈ IExp is a symbolic expression representing the allocation table,
• Ms : PBase ⇀ IExp is the symbolic memory,
• Ss is a list of symbolic (integer or bitstring) expressions representing the execution stack,
• P ∈ CVM is the executing program.
The symbolic execution rules essentially mimic the rules of the concrete execution. The
algorithm makes heavy use of the implication relation ` developed in section 3.2.
The crucial rules are (SLoad) and (SStore) that reflect the effect of storing and loading
memory values on the symbolic level. The rule (SLoad) first checks that the dereferenced pointer
is not null and is well-formed. The rule then constructs the expression e = Ms(pb){to, τsize(el)}
that represents the value extracted from memory and checks that Φ ` defined(e). In particular,
defined(e) implies {to}τsize(el) ⊆ {0, . . . , len(Ms(pb)) − 1}, which means that we are extracting
from an initialised memory range.
The rule (SStore) first checks that the dereferenced pointer is not null and is well-formed,
same as in (SLoad). It then distinguishes between two cases depending on how the expression e
to be stored is aligned with the expression eh that is already present in memory. If e needs to be
stored completely within the bounds of eh then we replace the contents of the memory location
by e′h = eh{. . .}|e|eh{. . .} where the first and the last range expression represent the pieces of
eh that are not covered by e. In case e needs to be stored past the end of eh, the new expression
is of the form eh{. . .}|e. The rule still requires that the beginning of e is positioned before the
end of eh, and hence it is impossible to write in the middle of an uninitialised memory location.
This is for simplicity of presentation—the rule used in our implementation does not have this
limitation (it creates an explicit “undefined” expression in these cases). Finally the rule (SStore)
checks that the new expression fits within the allocated memory range, by testing the condition
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Φ0 = {addr(v) 6= 0 | v ∈ var(Q)} Ms0 = {addr(v) 7→ ε | v ∈ var(Q)}
∅, Init ;Q→ (Φ0, initmem(Q), Ms0, []), Q
(SInit)
x does not occur in (Φ, As, Ms, Ss)
(Φ, As, Ms, Ss), in(c, x);P
in(c,x);−−−−−→ (Φ ∪ {defined(x)}, As, Ms, Ss), P
(SIn)
(Φ, As, Ms, Ss), out(c, x);Q
out(c,x);−−−−−→ (Φ, As, Ms, Ss), Q (SOut)
(Φ, As, Ms, Ss), Const c;P → (Φ, As, Ms, c :: Ss), P (SConst)
(Φ, As, Ms, Ss), Ref v;P → (Φ, As, Ms, ptr(addr(v), 0) :: Ss), P (SRef)
Φ ` defined(τsize(el)) As′ = allocate(As, τsize(el)) pb = malloc(As, τsize(el))
(Φ, As, Ms, el :: S
s), Malloc;P → (Φ′, As′, Ms{pb 7→ ε}, ptr(pb, 0) :: Ss), P
(SMalloc)
pb ∈ dom(Ms) Φ ` defined(ptr(pb, to)) Φ ` (pb 6= 0) e = Ms(pb){to, τsize(el)} Φ ` defined(e)
(Φ, As, Ms, el :: ptr(pb, to) :: S
s), Load;P → (Φ, As, Ms, simplifyΦ(e) :: Ss), P
(SLoad)
pb ∈ dom(Ms) Φ ` defined(ptr(pb, to)) Φ ` (pb 6= 0) eh = Ms(pb)
either Φ ` (to + len(e) < len(eh)) and e′h = eh{0, to}|e|eh{to + len(e), len(eh)− (to + len(e))}
or Φ ` (to + len(e) ≥ len(eh)) ∧ (to ≤ len(eh)) and e′h = eh{0, to}|e
Φ ` len(e′h) ≤ size(pb)
(Φ, As, Ms, ptr(pb, to) :: e :: S
s), Store;P → (Φ, As, Ms{pb 7→ simplifyΦ(e′h)}, Ss), P
(SStore)
x does not occur in (Φ, As, Ms, Ss) n ∈ N T = fixedn
(Φ, As, Ms, τ−1size(n) :: S
s), New x;P
new x : T ;−−−−−−→ (Φ ∪ {len(x) = n}, As, Ms, x :: Ss), P
(SNew)
f has arity n e = f(e1, . . . , en)
(Φ, As, Ms, e1 :: . . . :: en :: S
s), Apply f ; P → (Φ, As, Ms, e :: Ss), P
(SApply)
(Φ, As, Ms, e :: Ss), Dup; P → (Φ, As, Ms, e :: e :: Ss), P (SDup)
Φ ` defined(e) φ = simplifyΦ(truth(e))
(Φ, As, Ms, truth(e) :: Ss), Test;P )
if φ then−−−−−→ (Φ ∪ {φ}, As, Ms, Ss), P
(STest)
φ is a fact
(Φ, As, Ms, φ :: Ss), Assume;P )
assume φ;−−−−−−→ (Φ ∪ {φ}, As, Ms, Ss), P
(SAssume)
(Φ, As, Ms, Ss), ReadEnv x;P → (Φ, As, Ms, x :: Ss), P (SReadEnv)
x does not occur in (Φ, As, Ms, e :: Ss)
(Φ, As, Ms, e :: Ss), WriteEnv x;P
let x = e in−−−−−−−→ (Φ ∪ {x = e}, As, Ms, Ss), P
(SWriteEnv)
Φ ` defined(e1) . . . Φ ` defined(en)
(Φ, As, Ms, e1 :: . . . :: en :: S
s), Event ev n;P
event ev(e1, . . . , en)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (Φ, As, Ms, Ss), P
(SEvent)
Figure 3.10: The symbolic execution of CVM.
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Φ ` len(e′h) ≤ size(pb). Both (SLoad) and (SStore) simplify the generated expressions using
the function simplify described in section 3.3.
The symbolic allocation table As is initialised in rule (SInit) to the expression initmem(Q)
and updated using the function symbol allocate on every invocation of Malloc (we let the
function symbols initmem and allocate be interpreted using the functions of the same name
introduced in section 2.2). The rule (SMalloc) includes the current value of the allocation
table in the pointer base expression that it constructs (this is the only place where the symbolic
allocation table is used). As a result the symbolic expression generated by every Malloc explicitly
depends on all preceding Malloc invocations. To see why this is necessary consider the following
code:
vo id ∗ i g n o r e d p t r = m a l l o c ( s e c r e t ) ;
vo id ∗ c h e c k e d p t r = m a l l o c ( 1 0 0 ) ;
i f ( c h e c k e d p t r == NULL) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
This program may leak information about secret since the success or failure of a malloc
call may depend on how much memory has been previously allocated. Our symbolic execution
makes this explicit by storing the following symbolic expression in checked ptr:
ptr(malloc(allocate(initmem(Q), τsize(secret)), 100), 0).
The rule (STest) expects the condition to be wrapped in function truth that extracts an
IML boolean value from a C bitstring. Our C to CVM translation described in section 3.1
inserts an application of truth before every Test instruction. The rule (SNew) requires that the
length of the randomly generated value is a fixed integer n, so that the randomness generation
can be represented using the IML new x : fixedn construct.
The information about lengths of expressions comes from three sources. First, the rule
(SNew) adds information about the lengths of randomly generated values to the fact set Φ.
Second, the rewriting rules used by the solving procedure (section 3.2) encode knowledge about
lengths of certain expressions. For instance, we rewrite expressions like len(a +©τ b) to len(τ).
Finally, explicit length tests and assumptions can be used to add knowledge about lengths via
the (STest) and (SAssume) rules. This is demonstrated in the example of section 3.1 where
the fact “The result of XOR has the same length as the argument” is added to the set Φ by an
explicit assumption in the proxy function xor proxy .
Whenever the CVM program performs a “model-relevant” action such as generating a ran-
dom value or sending a value on the network, we record this action as a transition label. The
extracted model is then simply the sequence of all the transition labels of the symbolic execu-
tion.
Definition 3.1 (Model Extraction by Symbolic Execution) Given a symbolic state S and
a CVM process P , if there exists a symbolic trace (S, P ) λ1−→ . . . λn−−→ (S′, 0) then we say that
(S, P ) yields the model Q˜ = λ1 . . . λn0 ∈ IML. Given an initial process Q ∈ CVM0 we say that
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Q0 yields a model Q˜0 ∈ IML if (∅, Q0) yields Q˜0 
The soundness of symbolic execution (theorem 3.2) which we prove in section 3.7 states
that all the security properties that hold for the model also hold for the original program.
Theorem 3.3 additionally states that successful symbolic execution proves that the program is
safe—it never goes bad (definition 2.10).
3.6 Example: Symbolic Execution of RPC-enc
We walk through the symbolic execution of the function send request of the client in the RPC-
enc protocol described in section 1.1. The code of the function is shown in figure 3.11. The
parameter of the function is the structure ctx that holds pointers to values relevant to the
protocol execution: the identities of both the client and the server (fields self and other), the
value of the request (field request), as well as fields k ab and k s pointing to a long-term key
and the session key. The symbolic memory when entering the function looks as follows:
addr(ctx) 7→ ptr(pb1, 0)
pb1 7→ { request = ptr(pb2, 0), request len = τ−14u (len(request)),
self = ptr(pb3, 0), self len = τ
−1
4u (len(clientID)),
other = ptr(pb4, 0), other len = τ
−1
4u (len(serverID)),
k s = ptr(pb5, 0), k s len = τ
−1
4u (len(kS)),
k ab = ptr(pb6, 0), k ab len = τ
−1
4u (len(key(clientID , serverID)))}
pb2 7→ request , pb3 7→ clientID , pb4 7→ serverID ,
pb5 7→ kS , pb6 7→ key(clientID , serverID)
The pointer bases pb1, . . . , pb6 are results of distinct calls to malloc. As described in sec-
tion 3.1 such pointer bases refer to all preceding calls of malloc and can therefore grow quite
large, so we do not spell them out explicitly. The values request , clientID , serverID , and kS are
symbolic variables that have been created during symbolic execution of the preceding code, by
a call to a random number generator in case of kS or by reading values from the environment in
case of other variables. The value key(clientID , serverID) is a symbolic expression representing
a long-term key. It is generated during symbolic execution of the call to get shared key .
We examine the symbolic execution of the function send request line by line in figure 3.11,
assuming that we start with the symbolic memory shown above. The left column shows the
source code and the right column shows the corresponding updates to the symbolic memory as
well as the generated IML expressions (in the last two lines).
In line 1, we compute the length of the encrypted part of the request message and store it in
m1 len. The values len(kS) and len(request) are extracted from the fields of the ctx structure,
the value 4 is the result of the sizeof operation.
Line 2 creates a new memory location pb7 and stores the pointer to the beginning of the
memory location (with offset 0) in p and m1. The length m1 len of the allocated area is stored in
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C line symbolic execution steps
i n t s e n d r e q u e s t ( RPCstate ∗ c t x ){
1. u i n t 3 2 t m1 len , m1 e len , f u l l l e n ;
uns igned char ∗ m1, ∗ p , ∗ m1 e ;
m1 len = 1 + ctx→k s l e n
+ s i z e o f ( c t x→r e q u e s t l e n )
+ c tx→r e q u e s t l e n ;
addr(m1 len) 7→ τ−14u (1) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(kS))
+©τ4u τ−14u (4)
+©τ4u τ−14u (len(request))
2. p = m1 = ma l l oc ( m1 len ) ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb7, 0)
addr(m1) 7→ ptr(pb7, 0)
where pb7 = malloc(. . . , 1 + len(kS) + 4 + len(reqeust))
3. memcpy(p , ”p” , 1 ) ; pb7 7→ ’p’
4. p += 1 ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb7, 1)
5. ∗ ( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) p = c tx→r e q u e s t l e n ; pb7 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(request))
6. p += s i z e o f ( c t x→r e q u e s t l e n ) ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb7, 5)
7. memcpy(p , c t x→r eque s t , c t x→r e q u e s t l e n ) ; pb7 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(request))|request
8. p += ctx→r e q u e s t l e n ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb7, 5 + len(request))
9. memcpy(p , c t x→k s , c t x→k s l e n ) ; pb7 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(request))|request|kS
10. f u l l l e n = 1 + s i z e o f ( c t x→s e l f l e n )
+ c tx→s e l f l e n
+ e n c r y p t l e n ( c t x→k ab , c t x→k ab l e n ,
m1, m1 len ) ;
addr( full len ) 7→ τ−14u (5) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(clientID))
+©τ4u encrypt len(msg1)
where msg1 = ’p’|τ−14u (len(request))|request|kS
11. p = m1 e = ma l l o c ( f u l l l e n ) ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb8, 0)
addr(m1 e) 7→ ptr(pb8, 0)
12. memcpy(p , ”p” , 1 ) ; pb8 7→ ’p’
13. p += 1 ;
addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb8, 1)
14. ∗ ( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) p = c tx→s e l f l e n ; pb8 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(clientID))
15. p += s i z e o f ( c t x→s e l f l e n ) ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb8, 5)
16. memcpy(p , c t x→s e l f , c t x→s e l f l e n ) ; pb8 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(clientID))|clientID
17. p += ctx→s e l f l e n ; addr(p) 7→ ptr(pb8, 5 + len(clientID))
18. m1 e l en
= enc r yp t ( c t x→k ab , c t x→k ab l e n ,
m1, m1 len , p ) ;
pb8 7→ ’p’|τ−14u (len(clientID))|clientID|cipher1
addr(m1 e len) 7→ τ−14u (len(cipher1))
new fact: len(cipher1) ≤ τ4u(encrypt len(msg1))
cipher1 = E(key(clientID, serverID),msg1)
19. f u l l l e n = 1 + s i z e o f ( c t x→s e l f l e n )
+ c tx→s e l f l e n + m1 e l en ;
addr( full len ) 7→ τ−14u (5) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(clientID))
+©τ4u τ−14u (len(cipher1))
20. send (&( c t x→b i o ) ,
&f u l l l e n , s i z e o f ( f u l l l e n ) ) ;
out(c, τ−14u (5) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(clientID))
+©τ4u τ−14u (len(cipher1)));
21. send (&( c t x→b i o ) , m1 e , f u l l l e n ) ; } out(c, ’p’|τ−14u (len(clientID))|clientID|cipher1);
Figure 3.11: Symbolic execution of the send request function.
pb7 and all future writes into pb7 are checked to be within allocated bounds. We have removed
the NULL checks after malloc for simplicity.
The call to function memcpy in line 3 invokes a proxy function (section 3.1 and appendix A)
that copies the literal bitstring ’p’ into the memory location pb7 stored in p. Line 4 increments
p by 1 so that the value stored in p becomes ptr(pb7, 1).
Line 5 stores the value len(request) from ctx→request len into p. Now that p points to the
offset 1 from the beginning of pb7 the value len(request) is written just past the value ’p’ that is
already in pb7, so that the memory location now contains a concatenation. Line 6 increments p
to point just past the end of the concatenation. Lines 7–9 proceed similarly and append request
and kS to the contents of the memory location.
Line 10 computes an upper bound of the length of the request message. The function
encrypt len gives an upper bound of the length of an encryption based on the key and the
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plaintext. In this case the plaintext is the concatenation in pb7. We are not verifying correctness
of cryptographic implementations and so the call to encrypt len is replaced by a call to a
proxy function that constructs the symbolic expression encrypt len(msg1 ), where msg1 is the
plaintext.
Lines 11–17 work similarly to lines 2–9 and build up the request message in the mem-
ory location pb8. In line 18 we add the ciphertext to the message by calling encrypt. The
call is redirected to a proxy function which generates a new symbolic expression cipher1 =
E(key(clientID , serverID),msg1 ) that represents the ciphertext and writes that expression
through the pointer passed as argument. The function returns the expression len(cipher1 ).
It additionally checks that len(cipher1 ) ≤ encrypt len(msg1 ). This fact is added to the set of
known facts and is used to prove that the length of the contents of pb8 is still less than or equal
to the allocated size of pb8, that is, the encryption function does not write past the end of the
allocated buffer.
Line 19 computes the full length of the request message. Lines 20 and 21 send this length
followed by the actual message. The call to send redirects to a proxy function that generates
the IML statement out(c, e), where e is the symbolic expression contained in the buffer passed
to send.
Section 4.2 shows the complete IML model extracted from the RPC-enc implementation
and the steps that we take to turn it into a CryptoVerif model.
3.7 Symbolic Execution Soundness
This section proves the main result of this chapter—the soundness of symbolic execution (the-
orem 3.2). In a nutshell, the soundness theorem states that if a CVM process Q yields an IML
model Q˜ then for any acceptable context C the process C{Q} is not less secure than C{Q˜}. The
idea of the proof is to demonstrate a simulation Q . Q˜ (lemma 3.3) after which the statement
of soundness follows from theorems 2.2 and 2.3. Another important result that we prove is
theorem 3.3 which states that if the symbolic execution of Q succeeds then Q never goes bad.
The main tool in the proof is a relation S ∼η S between a concrete process state S and
a symbolic state S with respect to an environment η. The relation holds whenever evaluating
all symbolic expressions in S with respect to η would yield corresponding bitstrings in S. The
relation also imposes a consistency condition on S: all the symbolic facts should hold with
respect to η, the symbolic expressions in memory should be contained within allocated regions,
and the allocated regions corresponding to different pointer bases should not overlap. The
following definitions make this precise.
Definition 3.2 (η-consistent Symbolic States) For a symbolic memoryMs : PBase ⇀ IExp
and an environment η let
baseη(M
s) = {pb ∈ dom(Ms) | JpbKη 6= 0} .
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(η1, S1, P1) −→ . . . −→ (ηn, Sn, Pn)
⇑S1 ∼η1 S1 ⇑Sn ∼ηn Sn
(S1, P1) −→ . . . −→ (Sn, Pn)
Figure 3.12: The correspondence between the concrete and the symbolic trace.
Given a symbolic state S = (Φ,As,Ms, Ss) and an environment η we say that S is η-consistent
when the following conditions hold:
1. η |= Φ.
2. For all pb ∈ baseη(Ms) : η |= (len(Ms(pb)) ≤ size(pb)). In particular, JMs(pb)Kη 6= ⊥ andJpbKη 6= ⊥.
3. For all pb, pb′ ∈ baseη(Ms) with pb 6= pb′:
{JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη ∩ {Jpb′Kη}Jsize(pb′)Kη = ∅.
4. JAsKη = ⋃{{JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη ∣∣∣ pb ∈ baseη(Ms)} .
The initial symbolic state ∅ is defined to be η-consistent for any environment η. 
Definition 3.3 (State Correspondence) Given an environment η we say that an η-consistent
symbolic state S = (Φ,As,Ms, Ss) corresponds to a concrete process state S = (A,M, S) with
respect to η, writing S ∼η S, if S is obtained from Ss by applying J·Kη to each element,
A = JAsKη, and for each pb ∈ baseη(Ms)
JMs(pb)Kη = M(p) . . .M(p+ l − 1), where p = JpbKη and l = |JMs(pb)Kη|. (3.78)
Additionally we let ∅ ∼η ∅ for every environment η. 
The main idea of the proof is illustrated in figure 3.12. Given a concrete trace with executing
processes (η1, S1, P1), . . . , (ηn, Sn, Pn) and a symbolic trace (S1, P1), . . . , (Sn, Pn) we shall show
that Si ∼ηi Si for each i ≤ n. We shall then define a simulation relation . between executing
CVM states and executing IML states in such a way that for each i ≤ n we have (ηi, Si, Pi) .
(ηi, P˜i), whenever (Si, Pi) yields the model P˜i. We shall then prove that. satisfies the conditions
in definition 2.11.
We start by proving a lemma that provides the inductive step necessary to establish the
correspondence in figure 3.12 for output processes. In the rest of the section Q is an arbitrary
multiset of executing input processes.
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Lemma 3.2 Assume that there is a concrete transition of the form (η, S, P ),Q→ (η′, S′, P ′),Q
with output CVM processes P and P ′. Further assume that there is a symbolic transition of the
form (S, P ) → (S′, P ′) such that S is η-consistent, and S ∼η S. Then S′ is η′-consistent, and
S′ ∼η′ S′. 
Proof We prove the statement by a case split based on the first instruction in P . In the
following M, . . . and M′, . . . refer to components of S and S′, and Ms, . . . and Ms′, . . . refer
to components of S and S′. For the purpose of this proof the labels of the concrete and the
symbolic transitions are not relevant.
• Const c
Both the concrete transition (CConst) and the symbolic transition (SConst) have the effect
of putting the same bitstring or integer c onto the stack. Thus both the η-consistency
and the state correspondence are preserved and the lemma holds with η′ = η.
• Ref v
The concrete transition (CRef) puts τ−1ptr (addr(v)) on the stack and the symbolic transition
(SRef) puts ptr(addr(v), 0) on the stack. By equation (3.46) (section 3.4)
Jptr(addr(v), 0)Kη = Jτ−1ptr (addr(v) + 0)Kη = τ−1ptr (addr(v))
and the lemma holds with η′ = η.
• Malloc
Let bl, l, and p be defined as in rule (CMalloc), and let el and pb be defined as in rule
(SMalloc). According to (CMalloc) η′ = η. First we prove that S′ is η-consistent.
1 The condition η |= Φ′ holds trivially since Φ′ = Φ.
2 The symbolic rule adds pb to baseη(M
s). According to (SRef) Jτsize(el)Kη 6= ⊥.
Together with the assumption that τsize is unsigned this gives
Jsize(pb)Kη = Jτsize(el)Kη ≥ 0 = |ε| = Jlen(Ms(pb))Kη.
Thus η |= (len(Ms(pb)) ≤ size(pb)).
3 Choose pb′ ∈ baseη(Ms) such that pb 6= pb′. By condition 4 of definition 3.2 applied
to η-consistency of S we have {Jpb′Kη}Jsize(pb′)Kη ⊆ JAsKη. On the other hand,
JpbKη = Jmalloc(As, τsize(el))Kη = malloc(JAsKη, Jsize(pb)Kη)
Under the assumption of correctness of malloc (section 2.2) we have
{JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη ∩ {Jpb′Kη}Jsize(pb′)Kη ⊆ {JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη ∩ JAsKη = ∅.
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4 This condition follows directly from the definition of allocate (section 2.2).
Now we prove that S′ ∼η′ S′. By the assumption S ∼η S we have A = JAsKη and by
comparing the symbolic and the concrete rule we see that A′ = JAs′Kη. It is left to
prove that Jptr(pb, 0)Kη = τ−1ptr (p). By (R37) we have Jptr(pb, 0)Kη = τ−1ptr (JpbKη). By the
assumption S ∼η S we have JelKη = bl and thus Jτsize(el)Kη = l. Therefore
Jptr(pb, 0)Kη = τ−1ptr (JpbKη) = τ−1ptr (Jmalloc(As, τsize(el))Kη)
= τ−1ptr (malloc(A, Jτsize(el)Kη)) = τ−1ptr (malloc(A, l)) = τ−1ptr (p).
• Load
Both the concrete rule (CLoad) and the symbolic rule (SLoad) have the effect of replacing
two values on the stack with a new value. In the concrete transition the new value is
b = M(p) . . .M(p + l − 1), where p and l are the pointer and the length value taken
from the stack. In the symbolic transition the new value is e′ = simplifyΦ(e) with e =
Ms(pb){to, τsize(el)}, where pb and to are the base and offset of a symbolic pointer taken
from the stack and and el is the length expression taken from the stack. We shall prove
that Je′Kη = b, so that η′ = η satisfies the requirements. Let
pb = JpbKη no = JtoKη lh = |JMs(pb)Kη|
All of these are well-defined due to the conditions checked by the rule (SLoad). One of
these conditions implies pb 6= 0, and so by condition (3.78) of the assumption S ∼η S
JMs(pb)Kη = M(pb) . . .M(pb + lh − 1).
By S ∼η S we know l = Jτsize(el)Kη. By condition Φ ` defined(e) of the rule (SLoad) the
following expression is well-defined:
JeKη = JMs(pb){to, τsize(el)}Kη = M(pb + no) . . .M(pb + no + l − 1).
Using the assumption S ∼η S, the condition Φ ` defined(ptr(pb, to)) of the rule (SLoad),
and the pointer evaluation rule (R37) we get
p = Jτptr(ptr(pb, to))Kη = τptr(τ−1ptr (JpbKη + JtoKη)) = pb + no,
and therefore
JeKη = M(p) . . .M(p+ 1− 1) = b.
By the soundness of simplification Je′Kη = JsimplifyΦ(e)Kη = JeKη.
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• Store
Let p and b be defined as in rule (CStore), and let pb, to, eh, and e
′
h be defined as in
rule (SStore). Both the concrete transition (CStore) and the symbolic transition (SStore)
perform a memory update. These updates are
M′ = M {p+ i 7→ b[i] | i < |b|} , (3.79)
Ms
′ = Ms {pb 7→ simplifyΦ(e′h)} , (3.710)
We shall prove that the lemma is satisfied with η′ = η. Let
lh = |JehKη| l′h = |Je′hKη| no = JtoKη
bh = JehKη l = |JeKη| pb = JpbKη
All of these values are well-defined: JehKη 6= ⊥ because S is η-consistent, Je′hKη 6= ⊥
because of the condition Φ ` len(e′h) ≤ size(pb) checked by the rule (SStore), and JtoKη 6=
⊥ and JpbKη 6= ⊥ because of the condition Φ ` defined(ptr(pb, to)).
It is easy to see that S′ is η-consistent: as the transition only updates the memory, we
only need to check that η |= len(Ms′(pb)) ≤ size(pb), but this is exatly the condition
checked by the rule (SStore).
To show S′ ∼η S′ we only need to prove (3.78) with M′ and Ms′. By assumption S ∼η S
we have b = JeKη and p = Jτptr(ptr(pb, to))Kη. Using the same argument as in the proof
for Load we get p = pb + no. To show (3.78) for pb we shall consider two cases, as in the
rule (SStore). The first case is
Φ ` (to + len(e) < len(eh))
e′h = eh{0, to} | e | eh{to + len(e), len(eh)− (to + len(e))}.
Applying (3.78) with S ∼η S and using (3.79) we get
Je′hKη = bh[0] . . . bh[no − 1]b[0] . . . b[l − 1]bh[no + l] . . . bh[lh − 1]
= M(pb) . . .M(pb + no − 1)M′(p) . . .M′(p+ l − 1)
M(pb + no + l) . . .M(pb + lh − 1).
Using p = pb + no we conclude
Je′hKη = M′(pb) . . .M′(p− 1)M′(p) . . .M′(p+ l − 1)M′(p+ l) . . .M′(pb + lh − 1)
= M′(pb) . . .M′(pb + lh − 1).
By the soundness of simplification JsimplifyΦ(e′h)Kη = Je′hKη, thus by applying (3.710) we
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see that (3.78) is satisfied for M′ and Ms′ with pb.
The second case is
Φ ` (to + len(e) ≥ len(eh)) ∧ (to ≤ len(eh)) and e′h = eh{0, to}|e
and it is proved the same way as the case above.
It remains to show that none of the other memory regions get overwritten, that is, we
need to show that (3.78) still holds for every pb′ ∈ baseη(Ms′) with pb′ 6= pb. Condition
Φ ` defined(ptr(pb, to)) of the rule (SStore) implies that no ≥ 0. In particular, p =
pb + no ≥ pb. At the same time both cases above imply Φ ` to + len(e) ≤ len(e′h), so that
no + l ≤ l′h ≤ Jsize(pb)Kη. Therefore
{p}l = {pb + no}l ⊆ {pb}Jsize(pb)Kη = {JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη .
Considering (3.79) this means that M′(i) = M(i) for all i /∈ {JpbKη}Jsize(pb)Kη . By condi-
tions 2 and 3 of η-consistency of S we see that (3.78) is satisfied for pb′.
• New x
The concrete rule (CNew) places on the stack a value b of length l = τsize(bl), where bl is
taken from the stack and updates η′ = η{x 7→ b}. The symbolic rule (SNew) takes τ−1size(n)
for some n ∈ N from the stack, places x on the stack, and adds a fact len(x) = n. It is
straightforward to check that the lemma is satisfied with η′. It is important that (SNew)
checks that x does not occur in S, so that η-consistency is not disrupted.
• Apply f
The rule (CApply) places on the stack the bitstring b = I(f)(b1, . . . , bn), whereby b1, . . . , bn
are taken from the stack. The rule (SApply) places on the stack the value e = f(e1, . . . , en),
whereby e1, . . . , en are taken from the stack. By S ∼η S we have JeiKη = bi for all i, there-
fore b = JeKη and the lemma holds with η′ = η.
• Dup with rules (CDup) and (SDup)
The lemma is satisfied with η′ = η.
• Test with rules (CTestTrue) and (STest)
The lemma is satisfied with η′ = η. We do not deal with the rule (CTestFalse) here since
it violates the premise of the lemma that the resulting state of the concrete transition is
the same as the resulting state of the symbolic transition. We shall cover (CTestFalse)
separately in the proof of lemma 3.3.
• Assume with rules (CAssume) and (SAssume)
The rule (SAssume) adds a fact φ to Φ. The condition of the concrete transition implies
that JφKη = true. Thus S′ is η-consistent and the lemma is satisfied with η′ = η.
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• ReadEnv x with rules (CReadEnv) and (SReadEnv)
The lemma is satisfied with η′ = η.
• WriteEnv x with rules (CWriteEnv) and (SWriteEnv)
The lemma is satisfied with η′ = η{x 7→ b}.
• Event ev n with rules (CEvent) and (SEvent)
The lemma is satisfied with η′ = η. 
We are now ready to define a simulation relation between a CVM process and its model
obtained by symbolic execution.
Lemma 3.3 Let Q0 be a CVM process that defines every variable at most once and satisfies
all inline assumptions. If Q0 successfully yields an IML model Q˜0 then Q0 . Q˜0. 
Proof Define the simulation relation between executing states as follows: let (η, S, P ) . (η˜, P˜ )
if η = η˜ and there exists a symbolic state S such that S is η-consistent, S ∼η S, and (S, P )
successfully yields the model P˜ . In order to cover reduction by rule (CTestFalse) we also let
(η, out(yield , ε); 0) . (η, out(yield , ε); 0) and (η, 0) . (η, 0) for each environment η.
We shall now check that . satisfies the conditions of definition 2.11.
1. To satisfy condition 1 in definition 2.11 we need to show that (η, ∅, Q0) . (η, Q˜0) for any
environment η. Choose S = ∅. By definition ∅ ∼η ∅, and by assumption of the lemma
(∅, Q0) successfully yields Q˜0.
2. Assume that (η, S,Q) . (η, Q˜) andQ = in(c, x);P . To satisfy condition 2 in definition 2.11
we show that Q˜ = in(c, x); P˜ and (η′, S, P ) . (η′, P˜ ) for all b ∈ BS and η′ = η{x 7→ b}.
Obtain the symbolic state S from the definition of the simulation relation .. Then by
rule (SIn) (S, Q) in(c,x);−−−−−→ (S′, P ) and therefore Q˜ = in(c, x); P˜ such that (S′, P ) yields the
model P˜ . Choose b ∈ BS and let η′ = η{x 7→ b}. The configuration S′ differs from S by
an addition of the fact defined(x) which is true with respect to η′. Thus S′ is η′-consistent
and S ∼η′ S′, and so we see that (η′, S, P ) . (η′, P˜ ).
3. Condition 3 in definition 2.11 is proved in the same way as condition 2.
4. Assume that (η, S,Q) . (η, Q˜) for an input CVM process Q and an input IML pro-
cess Q˜. To satisfy condition 4 in definition 2.11 we need to show reduce({(η, S,Q)}) .
reduce({(η, Q˜)}).
First consider the case Q˜ = 0. Then clearly Q = 0 as well, and so reduce({(η, S,Q)}) =
reduce({(η, Q˜)}) = ∅.
Now assume Q˜ 6= 0 and thus Q 6= 0. The symbolic execution does not produce any repli-
cations or parallel compositions, thus reduce({(η, Q˜)}) = {(η, Q˜)}. The only non-nil CVM
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process that performs a non-trivial reduction by is of the form Q = Init ;Q′ (figure 2.7).
By (CInit) S = ∅ and reduce({(η, S,Q)}) = {(η, S0, Q′)} with S0 = (initmem(Q), ∅, []).
Let S0 be the symbolic state such that (∅, Q) → (S0, Q′) by (SInit). We shall show that
(η, S0, Q
′) . (η, Q˜) with S0. Clearly (S0, Q′) yields Q˜. Condition 2 of η-consistency of
S0 is trivial. Conditions 1, 3 and 4 follow by the choice of addr and initmem functions
(section 2.2). Finally, it is straightforward to check that S0 ∼η S0.
5. Assume that (η, S, P ) . (η, P˜ ) for an output CVM process P and an output IML process
P˜ and there is a transition of the form (η, S, P ),Q
E−→p (η′, S′, P ′),Q. To satisfy condition
5 in definition 2.11 we need to find an IML process P˜ ′ such that there is a transition
(η, P˜ ),Q
E−→∗p (η′, P˜ ′),Q and (η′, S′, P ′) . (η′, P˜ ′).
Obtain S from the definition of (η, S, P ) . (η, P˜ ). First consider the case that P =
Test;P ∗ and the transition happens by (CTestFalse) so that P ′ = out(yield , ε); 0. From
S ∼η S it follows that P˜ is of the form P˜ = if φ then . . . with JφKη = b = false, where b is
the top of stack in S. By (IIfFalse) (η, P˜ ) also reduces to out(yield , ε); 0.
Now assume that the concrete transition happens by a rule other than (CTestFalse). In
that case the resulting process P ′ is the same as in the next step of the symbolic execution,
that is, there exists a symbolic state S′ such that (S, P ) λ−→ (S′, P ′) and (S′, P ′) successfully
yields a process P˜ ′ such that P˜ = λP˜ ′. By lemma 3.2 S′ is η′-consistent and S′ ∼η′ S′.
Thus (η′, S′, P ′) . (η′, P˜ ′).
To show (η, P˜ ),Q
E−→∗p (η′, P˜ ′),Q we make a case split on the value of λ.
• λ = ε with rules (SConst), (SRef), (SMalloc), (SStore), (SApply), and (SReadEnv).
In all these cases E = ε and p = 1, so that P˜ = P˜ ′ and an empty trace satisfies the
conditions.
• λ = new x : T ; with rule (SNew).
Assume that the CVM rule (CNew) executes with η′ = η{x 7→ b} for some b ∈ BS
with |b| = n and p = 1/2n. By (SNew) T = fixedn, so that by (INew) there is a
transition (η, new x : fixedn; P˜
′),Q→p (η{x 7→ b}, P˜ ′),Q.
• The statement for the rules (STest), (SWriteEnv), and (SEvent) is proved similarly.
6. The condition 6 in definition 2.11 is trivially satisfied since by definition η = η˜ for any
(η, S, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ). 
Theorem 3.2 (Symbolic Execution is Sound) Let Q1, . . . , Qn be CVM processes that suc-
cessfully yield IML models Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n. Then for any context C such that both C{Q1, . . . , Qn}
and C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n} are well-formed and any trace property ρ
insec(C{Q1, . . . , Qn}, ρ) ≤ insec(C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}, ρ). 
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Proof Let Q1, . . . , Qn, Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n, C, and ρ be defined as in the statement of the theorem.
By lemma 3.3 Qi . Q˜i for each i ≤ n. By theorem 2.3 C{Q1, . . . , Qn} . C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}. By
theorem 2.2 insec(C{Q1, . . . , Qn}, ρ) ≤ insec(C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}, ρ). 
Theorem 3.3 (Symbolic Execution Proves Safety) If a CVM process Q0 yields an IML
model Q˜0 then Q0 does not go bad. 
Proof Following definition 2.10 consider a semantic configuration C0 = P0, {(η0, ∅, Q0)} ∪ Q0
such that C0 satisfies inline assumptions and there is a variable id ∈ dom(η0) that does not
occur in P0 and Q0. Let there be a trace
C0 −→∗ C = (η, S, P ),Q
such that id ∈ dom(η) and P does not start with an output. We need to show that there exists
a transition C→ C′ for some semantic configuration C′.
Let C˜0 = P0, {(η0, ∅, Q˜0)} ∪ Q0. Define a relation between executing states as follows: let
(η, S, P ) . (η˜, S˜, P˜ ) if η = η˜ and one of the following conditions hold:
• id ∈ dom(η) and . is defined as in the proof of lemma 3.3.
• id /∈ dom(η), S = S˜, and P = P˜ .
Following the proof of lemma 3.3 it is easy to see that . is a simulation relation. Furthermore,
C0 . C˜0. Applying lemma 2.1 to the trace C0 →∗ C we obtain a semantic configuration
C˜ = (η˜, S˜, P˜ ), Q˜ such that C˜0 →∗ C˜ and C . C˜, in particular (η, S, P ) . (η˜, S˜, P˜ ). Since
id ∈ dom(η) and P is an output process that does not start with an output, by definition of
. in lemma 3.3 there exists a symbolic state S such that S is η-consistent, S ∼η S, and (S, P )
successfully yields the model P˜ . In particular, since P is an output process and thus P 6= 0,
there exists a symbolic state S′ such that (S, P ) → (S′, P ′). It is straightforward to verify
that the conditions checked by the symbolic execution imply that there is also a reduction of
(η, S, P ) (and thus also of C) in the concrete semantics. The only exception is the case when
P starts with an Assume statement, in which case the existence of a reduction follows from our
assumption that C0 satisfies inline assumptions. 
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Chapter 4
Model Verification in
Computational Setting
This chapter describes the path from an IML model extracted from a C program to a model that
is ready for verification with CryptoVerif. We start by reviewing the calculus of CryptoVerif
in section 4.1. Most important difference between CryptoVerif and IML is that bitstring-
manipulating expressions are no longer available in CryptoVerif. The goal of our translation,
described in section 4.2 will thus be to abstract these expressions away.
A crucial role in the translation is played by typechecking. One reason is that CryptoVerif
uses typing information to derive security properties. For instance, if an encryption may re-
veal the length of a payload then the payload must be of a fixed length in order to establish
secrecy. As another example, two random values may need to come from a large type in or-
der to eliminate collisions between them. Typing is also important due to specifics of dealing
with an implementation, as opposed to a model. We would like to supply CryptoVerif with
facts about our parsing functions. For instance, if conc(x, y) = 0x01|τ−14u (len(x1))|x1|x2 and
parse(x) = x{5, τ4u(x{1, 4})} then we would like CryptoVerif to know that parse(conc(x, y)) =
x. Unfortunately, such an equation does not hold for all values of x and y—if x is too long then
the length stored by the implementation overflows—τ−14u (len(x)) cannot be evaluated, and so
conc(x, y) evaluates to ⊥, making the equation invalid. It will therefore be important to give
conc a type Tx × Ty → T such that the fact parse(conc(x, y)) = x is true for all x ∈ I(Tx) and
y ∈ I(Ty). Once types for all such formatting functions have been established, we typecheck the
whole process to make sure that a formatting function will always be supplied with arguments
of the right type.
The translation that we develop transforms an IML process Q to a CryptoVerif model
(Q˜,Γ,Φ) with a typing environment Γ and a set of facts Φ. The main result of this chapter is
theorem 4.3 (section 4.11) that captures the soundness of this translation: First, Q . Q˜, and
so Q is at least as secure as Q˜ against any trace property ρ. Second, if CryptoVerif verifies the
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φ ::= facts
e = e′ bitstring equality
e bitstring fact
e ::= bitstring term
x, i ∈ Var variable
f(e1, . . . , en), f ∈ Ops function application
Q ∈ CV ::= input process
0 nil
Q|Q′ parallel composition
!i≤NQ replication N times
in(c[e1, . . . , en], x); P input
P ::= output process
out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q output
new x : T ; P random number
let x = e in P assignment
if φ then P [else P ′] conditional
event ev(e1, . . . , en); P event
Figure 4.1: The syntax of CryptoVerif processes.
model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) against a property ρ then Q˜ is (asymptotically) secure against ρ.
An interesting challenge arises from the fact that CryptoVerif assumes for each function
symbol f a family of functions, I˜k(f), one for each security parameter k ∈ N, but a C im-
plementation I(f) is written for a single value of the security parameter, an issue that is also
discussed by Ku¨sters et al. [2012]. We therefore need to define generalisations for our formatting
functions to arbitrary security parameters in such a way that the set of facts that we supply to
CryptoVerif remains true for the generalisations. This is described in section 4.10.
We start by reviewing the CryptoVerif calculus and semantics in section 4.1. We then
present a high-level overview of the whole translation procedure in section 4.2. The remaining
sections of this chapter fill in the details.
4.1 Review—CryptoVerif
This section reviews the input language of the CryptoVerif tool [Blanchet, 2008] that we use
to verify our models. It is a subset of our IML calculus—the process syntax is exactly the
same (except for the lack of inline assumptions), but expressions are restricted to variables and
cryptographic function applications as well as bitstring equality tests, as shown in figure 4.1.
In particular, CryptoVerif cannot reason directly about substring extraction and concatenation
or about arithmetic facts, so we shall aim to replace those by sound abstractions.
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Apart from the lack of reasoning about low-level primitives a big difference between Cryp-
toVerif and IML is that CryptoVerif processes are typed. This is necessary because some
properties of cryptographic functions only hold with respect to bitstring of bounded or fixed
lengths, a property that can be established by typing. The interpretation I defined in sec-
tion 2.1 for function symbols will now be extended to types: for every type T we consider its
interpretation I(T ) ⊆ BS⊥. A typing environment Γ assigns types T to variables and function
types T1 × . . . × Tn → T to function symbols. We shall assume that we are given a typing
environment Γ0 that contains types for all the cryptographic function symbols used by the pro-
cess. In our implementation this typing environment is provided by the user in the CryptoVerif
template file. We do not assume that Γ0 contains types for any formatting symbols that we
shall introduce in translation—those types will be inferred.
Definition 4.1 An interpretation is a function I that maps function symbols f of arity n to
functions I(f) : BSn⊥ → BS⊥, types T to sets I(T ) ⊆ BS⊥, replication parameters N to values
I(N) ∈ N and for every channel c maps the term maxlen(c) to a value I(maxlen(c)) ∈ N. 
In the rest of this chapter we shall make use of the following type-safety judgements.
Definition 4.2 (Typing Relations) For a function symbol f , types T , T1, . . . , Tn, an
environment η, a typing environment Γ, and an IML process Q let
• I, f |= T1 × . . .× Tn → T if I(f)(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ I(T ) for all b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn).
• I, f |= Γ if f ∈ dom(Γ) and I, f |= Γ(f).
• I|Q |= Γ if I, f |= Γ for all f used by Q.
• η |= Γ if for all x ∈ dom(η) we have x ∈ dom(Γ) and η(x) ∈ I(Γ(x)).
A process Q is well-typed with respect to a typing environment Γ that contains only function
symbols, if Γ ` Q according to the rules in figure 4.2. 
The semantics of the calculus as described in Blanchet [2008] and implemented in the Cryp-
toVerif tool is shown in figures 4.3 to 4.5. The semantics is parameterized by an interpretation
I and a typing environment Γ. The only difference from the IML semantics described in fig-
ures 2.3 and 2.4 is that the evaluation of expressions takes the types of functions into account:
if a function is ever applied to an argument of a wrong type, the evaluation fails and the exe-
cution of the process stops. The judgement η, e ⇓ b means that the expression e evaluates to
the bitstring b in the environment η. The rules of expression evaluation are shown in figure 4.3.
The semantic rules for processes are shown in figures 4.4 and 4.5. They are the same as the
rules for IML except that now we evaluate expressions using η, e ⇓ b instead of JeKη. We define
an initial configuration initConfig(Q) and traces the same way as for IML, except that now the
trace additionally depends on the typing environment.
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Γ(x) = T
Γ ` x : T (TVar)
Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T ∀i ≤ n : Γ ` ei : Ti
Γ ` f(e1, . . . , en) : T (TFun)
Γ ` e : T Γ ` e′ : T ′ T = T ′
Γ ` e = e′ : bool (TEq)
Γ ` 0 (TNil)
Γ ` Q Γ ` Q′
Γ ` Q|Q′ (TPar)
Γ{i 7→ bitstring} ` Q
Γ `!i≤nQ (TRepl)
∀i ≤ n : Γ ` ei : Ti Γ{x 7→ bitstring} ` P
Γ ` in(c[e1, . . . , en], x);P (TIn)
∀i ≤ n : Γ ` ei : Ti Γ ` e : T Γ ` Q
Γ ` out(c[e1, . . . , en], e);Q (TOut)
T = fixedn Γ{x 7→ T} ` P
Γ ` new x : T ;P (TNew)
Γ ` e : T Γ{x 7→ T} ` P
Γ ` let x = e in P (TLet)
Γ ` e : bool Γ ` P Γ ` P ′
Γ ` if e then P else P ′ (TIf)
∀i ≤ n : Γ ` ei : Ti Γ ` P
Γ ` event ev(e1, . . . , en); P (TEvent)
Figure 4.2: Typing rules for CryptoVerif processes.
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x ∈ dom(η)
η, x ⇓ η(x)
f ∈ dom(Γ) Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T ∀i ≤ n : η, ei ⇓ ai ∧ ai ∈ I(Ti)
η, f(e1, . . . , en) ⇓ I(f)(a1, . . . , an)
η, e ⇓ a η, e′ ⇓ a′
η, e = e′ ⇓ a = a′
Figure 4.3: The evaluation of CryptoVerif expressions.
{(η, 0)} unionmulti Q Q (CVNil)
{(η,Q1|Q2)} unionmulti Q {(η,Q1), (η,Q2)} unionmulti Q (CVPar)
{(η, !i≤NQ)} unionmulti Q {(η{i 7→ a}, Q) | a ∈ [1, I(N)]} unionmulti Q (CVRepl)
reduce(Q) is the normal form of Q by  
Figure 4.4: The semantics of the CryptoVerif calculus for input processes.
T = fixedn for some n ∈ N a ∈ I(T )
(η, new x : T ; P ),Q −→1/|I(T )| (η{x 7→ a}, P ),Q (CVNew)
η, e ⇓ a
(η, let x = e in P ),Q→1 (η{x 7→ a}, P ),Q (CVLet)
η, e ⇓ true
(η, if e then P else P ′),Q −→1 (η, P ),Q (CVIfTrue)
η, e ⇓ false
(η, if e then P else P ′),Q −→1 (η, P ′),Q (CVIfFalse)
η, e ⇓ a ∈ BS a′ = a{0, I(maxlen(c))} ∀i ≤ n : η, ei ⇓ ai Q′ = reduce({(η,Q)})
∃!(η′, Q′) ∈ Q : Q′ = in(c[e′1, . . . , e′n], x′);P ′ ∧ ∀i ≤ n : η′, e′i ⇓ ai
(η, out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q),Q −→1 (η′{x′ 7→ a′}, P ′),Q unionmulti Q′ \ {(η′, Q′)}
(CVOut)
η, ei ⇓ ai for all i ≤ n
(η, event ev(e1, . . . , en); P ),Q
ev(a1,...,an)−−−−−−−−→1 (η, P ),Q
(CVEvent)
Figure 4.5: The semantics of the CryptoVerif calculus for output processes.
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In the CryptoVerif security definition we shall make it explicit that the execution depends
on the interpretation I (definition 4.1) that provides implementations of the function symbols,
interpretations of types, values of the replication parameters and the maximum lengths of
messages that can be sent on a channel. Making the interpretations explicit will allow us to
vary them depending on the security parameter.
Definition 4.3 (CryptoVerif Security) For an input CryptoVerif process Q, a trace prop-
erty ρ, a typing environment Γ, and an interpretation I let
cvinsec(Q, I,Γ, ρ) =
∑
T∈T
pr(T),
where T is the set of CryptoVerif traces T with respect to Γ and I such that fst(T) =
initConfig(Q), events(T) /∈ ρ, and E ∈ ρ for any proper prefix E of events(T). 
CryptoVerif checks correspondence properties of the form “If an event has been executed
then a certain other event must have been executed before”. We refer the reader to Blanchet
[2008] for the exact definition. In our presentation we only rely on the fact that correspondence
properties are trace properties, and so are accounted for in our treatment. CryptoVerif inputs
a model of the form (Q,Γ,Φ) where Γ is a typing environment, Q is a well-formed process
(definition 2.4) that is well-typed with respect to Γ, and Φ is a set of facts. In addition to facts
defined in figure 4.1 CryptoVerif allows facts containing quantifiers and logical connectives, with
obvious evaluation rules. Given a set of facts Φ we write I |= Φ if ∅, φ ⇓ true for each φ ∈ Φ.
CryptoVerif makes a statement about the process QA|Q where QA is an arbitrary attacker
process that must be well-formed and well-typed and is not allowed to contain events. Cryp-
toVerif constructs a series of processes Q1, . . . , Qn such that Q1 = Q and for each i the processes
Qi and Qi+1 are indistinguishable in any context. In particular, for any attacker QA the pro-
cesses QA|Qi and QA|Qi+1 produce a trace belonging to ρ with almost the same probability.
Verification succeeds if the final process Qn trivially satisfies the security property. For instance,
Qn preserves the secrecy of a particular bitstring x if x does not occur in Qn at all. We can
then conclude that Q also satisfies the property with overwhelming probability.
In order to formally define what “almost the same” and “overwhelming” probabilities mean
CryptoVerif considers a family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N. A successful verification result implies
that the probability of breaking the security property is negligible in k. In order for the
semantics to be polynomial time executable the family of interpretations must be efficiently
computable as defined below.
Definition 4.4 (Efficient Interpretations) A family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N is called ef-
ficient if the following conditions are satisfied:
• For each function symbol f the function I˜k(f) is computable in time polynomial in k and
the length of the inputs.
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• For each type T the set I˜k(T ) is recognizable in time polynomial in k.
• For each replication parameter N and channel c, both I˜k(N) and I˜k(maxlen(c)) are poly-
nomially bounded and efficiently computable functions of k. 
In the input template the user can mark the cryptographic functions as satisfying certain
standard properties, say, IND-CPA (indistinguishability with respect to chosen-plaintext at-
tack) for encryption functions or UF-CMA (unforgeability against chosen-message attack) for
message authentication codes. These properties enable CryptoVerif to perform certain kinds
of transformations. For instance, if enc is an IND-CPA encryption function, keygen is the cor-
responding key generation function, and Z a function that replaces every bit of the argument
with 0, then an expression of the form enc(x, key , seed) can be rewritten to enc(Z(x), key , seed)
provided seed is a randomly generated encryption seed that is not used anywhere else and key
is a key generated using keygen and not used anywhere else.
We let I˜ck for k ∈ N denote the family of interpretations of cryptographic functions used by
our implementation together with interpretations of all types in Γ0. We shall assume that these
interpretations are sound with respect to the typing environment Γ0 provided by the user, that
is, I˜ck, f |= Γ0 for each cryptographic function f ∈ dom(I˜ck) and k ∈ N.
The following theorem summarizes the requirements that CryptoVerif places on its input
and the guarantee that it provides.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness of CryptoVerif [Blanchet, 2008]) Let (Q,Γ,Φ) be a Cryp-
toVerif model with a typing environment Γ, a set of facts Φ and a well-formed input process
Q ∈ CV that is well-typed with respect to Γ. Let (I˜k)k∈N be an efficient family of interpretations
such that for each k ∈ N the interpretation I˜k agrees with I˜ck for all cryptographic functions,
I˜k|Q |= Γ and I˜k |= Φ.
If CryptoVerif verifies the model (Q,Γ,Φ) with respect to a correspondence property ρ then
for any well-formed process QA that is well-typed with respect to Γ and does not contain events
the function cvinsec(QA|Q, I˜k,Γ, ρ) is negligible in k. 
We can reformulate correctness of CryptoVerif in such a way that the verification result
does not depend on the shape of the non-cryptographic functions used by the process. The idea
is to take the “least secure” implementation of non-cryptographic functions for each security
parameter.
Definition 4.5 Given a CryptoVerif model (Q,Γ,Φ), a correspondence property ρ, a polyno-
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mial p, and a security parameter k ∈ N let
cvboundp(Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) = sup{ cvinsec(Q, I,Γ, ρ) |
I agrees with I˜ck for cryptographic functions,
I|Q |= Γ, I |= Φ,
runtime(I(f)(b1, . . . , bn)) ≤ p(b1 + . . .+ bn + k)
for all f in Q and b1, . . . , bn ∈ BS },
where runtime(I(f)(b1, . . . , bn)) for a function f of arity n denotes the time it takes to compute
I(f)(b1, . . . , bn). 
Using the above definition we can restate theorem 4.1 as follows.
Lemma 4.1 Let (Q,Γ,Φ) be a CryptoVerif model with a typing environment Γ, a set of facts
Φ and a well-formed input process Q ∈ CV that is well-typed with respect to Γ.
If CryptoVerif verifies the model (Q,Γ,Φ) with respect to a correspondence property ρ then
for any well-formed process QA that is well-typed with respect to Γ and does not contain events
and for any polynomial p the function cvboundp(QA|Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) is negligible in k. 
Proof Assume that the conditions of the lemma are satisfied but cvboundp(QA|Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k)
is not negligible in k. For each k ∈ N choose an interpretation I˜k provided by definition 4.5
such that
cvinsec(QA|Q, I˜k,Γ, ρ) ≥ a ∗ cvboundp(QA|Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k)
for an arbitrary constant a ∈ (0, 1). The family of interpretations constructed in this way
satisfies the conditions of theorem 4.1 (in particular, it is efficient since the runtime of all
the functions is bounded by p), but the function cvinsec(QA|Q, I˜k,Γ, ρ) is not negligible in k,
yielding a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.1 sets the goal of this chapter: to verify an IML process Q obtained by symbolic
execution of a C program we must translate it to a model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) that satisfies the conditions
of the lemma. Since C programs are only written for a single value of the security parameter
k0, we first obtain a model that satisfies the conditions for k0 only: the model will be evaluated
with respect to a single interpretation I obtained by combining the cryptographic functions in
I˜ck0 with new functions for constructing and parsing messages that we add to the process. In
section 4.10 we show how we can generalize I to a family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N to prove
that cvboundp(Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) is well-defined for all k ∈ N with a sufficiently large polynomial p.
The CryptoVerif implementation goes further than the asymptotic statement in lemma 4.1
and actually provides a concrete estimate of the value cvboundp(QA|Q,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) in terms
of the security parameter, the runtime of the attacker, and the time it takes to break the
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cryptographic functions. This would remove the need for a generalization step, but alas this
feature of CryptoVerif has not been formalised.
We made some changes with respect to the original version of the calculus in Blanchet
[2008]. These changes are as follows:
• In CryptoVerif bitstring equality is implemented using a family of functions =T : T ×T →
bool. In our presentation we lift bitstring equality to a separate syntactic form. The
semantics of both versions are obviously equivalent—our evaluation rule for bitstring
equality can be viewed as an instance of function application with a function =T .
• The semantics in [Blanchet, 2008] uses a single global environment η where each variable
is an array, and each process uses a single cell to store its local value. This allows a
process to read the variables of another process by using the special construct find. As
we don’t use find in our modelling, we simplify the semantics, and bring it closer to the
IML semantics by giving each process a local environment.
• Our version of the rule (CVOut) in figure 4.5 requires that there is only one matching
recipient of a message. The original version does not have this restriction. This is fine
since we are dealing with trace properties and every trace in the restricted semantics is
also a trace in the original semantics.
• CryptoVerif definitions use “proper” bitstrings—sequences of 0 and 1, in contrast to
sequences of bytes used in this dissertation. The input statement in CryptoVerif allows
to specify the expected type of the message, so that a participant can refuse to accept
messages that do not contain an integral number of bytes.
4.2 From IML to CryptoVerif: Summary
This section describes how we generate a CryptoVerif model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) from an IML model Q.
We aim to provide motivation and a complete high-level overview of the method, while the
remaining sections of this chapter provide the details.
Since CryptoVerif cannot reason about string manipulation and arithmetic expressions, we
shall aim to replace these expressions by higher-level abstractions. The crucial observation
is that these expressions are used to implement tupling and projection operations, and so we
replace them by application of fresh function symbols for tupling and projection.
Definition 4.6 (Encoders and Parsers) We call an expression e with variables x1, . . . , xn
an encoding expression (or simply encoder) when e = e1| . . . |em and each ei is either a constant,
a variable xj for some j ≤ n, or has the form τ−1(len(xj)) for some integer type τ ∈ TI and
j ≤ n. We call an expression e with a single variable x a parsing expression (or simply parser)
when e = x{to, tl} and to and tl are arithmetic expressions that can contain integer constants,
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len(x), or expressions of the form τ(e′) where e′ is itself a parsing expression with the variable
x and τ ∈ TI . Encoders and parsers are collectively called formatting functions. 
An example of an encoder is conc(x, y) = τ−14u (len(x))|0x01|x|y and an example of a parser
is parse(x) = x{5, τ4u(x{0, 4})}. The definition does not consider an expression of the form
τ−14u (len(x|y))|0x01|x|y to be an encoder, instead such an expression can be viewed as a nested
application of two encoders: x|y and τ−14u (len(x))|0x01|x. Message formats in cryptographic
protocols like SSH or TLS use length fields to delimit parts of the message, so that these
formats are included in our definition. Protocols that use field separators in their messages
(like the newline character used to separate the fields in the HTTP protocol) are currently not
covered by our implementation.
Encoders and parsers are the right level of abstraction because they capture the intent of the
protocol designer and as such possess useful properties that are crucial for the verification of the
protocol. For instance, given appropriate types Tx and Ty it is true that parse(conc(x, y)) = x
for each x ∈ I(Tx) and y ∈ I(Ty) and the functions parse and conc defined as above. No
such property can be formulated for the naked string concatenation operator | since it is not
injective. As another example, if conc′(x, y) = τ−14u (len(x))|0x02|x|y then conc and conc′ have
disjoint ranges, which is often crucial for proving that there are no injection attacks. Facts like
these make up the set Φ that is part of the CryptoVerif model we generate.
Appropriate choice of the typing environment Γ will allow CryptoVerif to prove that certain
bitstring have types of bounded or fixed length. One example where this is important is the
use of encryption that does not hide the length of the plaintext. Secrecy under such encryption
can only be proved if the plaintext is known to be of fixed length. Typing is also important to
make sure that formatting functions are only ever called with values of appropriate types, such
as Tx and Ty above.
Being well-typed is a necessary condition for the soundness of our extracted model. The
only difference between the CryptoVerif and the IML semantics is that execution in CryptoVerif
stops whenever inputs to a function are not of the right type. In lemma 4.9 we show that this
never happens for well-typed processes, and so the notions of IML and CryptoVerif security
coincide. Together with the fact that the extracted CryptoVerif model simulates the IML model
(Q . Q˜) this establishes the soundness of our translation procedure (theorem 4.3) which is the
main result of this chapter.
Example 4.1 To describe our transformation steps, we use the RPC-enc protocol (section 1.1)
as a running example: figure 4.6 shows the initial IML model, while figure 4.7 shows the resulting
CryptoVerif model (some of the symbolic execution that generates the IML model is shown in
section 3.6). Due to space constraints we only show the most important parts of the typing
environment Γ and the fact set Φ and also omit some condition checks in the CryptoVerif
process Q˜. Appendix C shows the complete CryptoVerif model without omissions.
The extracted IML process contains free variables which are bound in the user-provided
environment, as shown in detail in appendix C. The intended meaning of the variables is as
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1 let client =
2 if clientID = xClient then
3 let key1 = lookup(clientID, serverID, db) in
4 new kS seed1: fixed 16;
5 let key2 = kgen(kS seed1) in
6 event client begin(clientID, serverID, request);
7 let msg1 = ”p”|τ−14u (len(request))|request|key2 in |  let msg1 = conc1(request, key2) in
8 new nonce1: fixed 16;
9 let cipher1 = E(msg1, key1, nonce1) in
10 let msg3 = ”p”|τ−14u (len(clientID))|clientID|cipher1 in |  let msg3 = conc2(clientID, cipher1) in
11 out(c out, msg3);
12 in(c in , msg4);
13 assume len(msg4) = (4);
14B if τ4u(msg4) = 1056 then |  if cond1(msg4) then
15 in(c in , cipher2);
16 assume len(cipher2) = τ4u(msg4);
17 let msg6 = D(cipher2, key2) in
18 let injbot(msg7) = msg6 in
19B if len(msg7) = 1024 then |  if cond2(msg7) then
20 event client accept(clientID, serverID, request, msg7);
21
22 let server =
23 in(c in , msg8);
24 assume len(msg8) = 4;
25B if (τ4u(msg8) ≥ 1082) ∧ (τ4u(msg8) ≤ 2106) then |  if cond3(msg8) then
26 in(c in , msg9);
27 assume len(msg9) = τ4u(msg8);
28B if ”p” = msg9{0, 1} then |  if cond4(msg9) then
29B if τ4u(msg9{1, 4}) ≤ 1024 then |  if cond5(msg9) then
30B if τ4u(msg9{1, 4}) = len(xClient) then |  if cond6(msg9, xClient) then
31B if τ4u(msg8)− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4})) ≤ 1077 then |  if cond7(msg8, msg9) then
32 let client2 = msg9{5, τ4u(msg9{1, 4})} in |  let client2 = parse1(msg9) in
33 if client2 = xClient then
34 let key3 = lookup(client2, serverID, db) in
35 let cipher3 = msg9{5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4}), |  let cipher3 = parse2(msg9) in
36 len(msg9)− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4})} in
37 let msg10 = D(cipher3, key3) in
38 let injbot(msg11) = msg10 in
39B if len(msg11) ≤ (τ4u(msg8)− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4})))− 32 then |  if cond8(msg8, msg9) then
40B if len(msg11) ≥ 5 then |  if cond9(msg11) then
41B if τ4u(msg11{1, 4}) = 1024 then |  if cond10(msg11) then
42B if len(msg11) > 5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}) then |  if cond11(msg11) then
43B if ”p” = msg11{0, 1} then |  if cond12(msg11) then
44B if len(response) = 1024 then |  if cond13(response) then
45B if len(msg11)) = (5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4})) = 16 then |  if cond14(msg11) then
46 let var10 = msg11{5, τ4u(msg11{1, 4}))} in |  let var10 = parse3(msg11) in
47 event server reply(client2 , serverID, var10, response);
48 let key4 = msg11{5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}), |  let key4 = parse4(msg11) in
49 len(msg11)− (5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}))} in
50 new nonce2: fixed 16;
51 let msg14 = E(response, key4, nonce2) in
52 out(c out, msg14);
Figure 4.6: The IML model of RPC-enc extracted from the C code. Formatting and auxiliary
test substitutions are shown on the right. Auxiliary tests are marked with B.
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(∗ Types from the template Γ0 ∗)
clientID : bounded1024
E : bounded1045 × fixed16 × fixed16 → bounded1077
...
(∗ Inferred types Γ ∗)
conc1 : fixed1024 × fixed16 → bounded1045
conc2 : bounded1024 × bounded1077 → bitstring
...
(∗ Inferred facts Φ ∗)
forall x1 : fixed1024, x2 : fixed16;
Zbounded1045(conc1(x1, x2)) = Zbounded1045(conc1’(Zfixed1024(x1), Zfixed16(x2))).
forall x1 : fixed1024, x2 : fixed16;
cond14(conc1(x1, x2)) = cond14’(conc1(Zfixed1024(x1), Zfixed16(x2))).
forall x : fixed16; Zfixed16(x) = zerofixed16 .
forall x : fixed1024; Zfixed1024(x) = zerofixed16 .
...
(∗ The model Q˜ ∗)
let client =
in(c in, ());
if clientID = xClient then
let key1 = lookup(clientID, serverID, db) in
new kS seed1: fixed16;
let key2 = kgen(kS seed1) in
event client begin(clientID, serverID, request);
let msg1 = conc1(request, key2) in
new nonce1: fixed16;
let cipher1 = E(msg1, key1, nonce1) in
let msg3 = conc2(clientID, cipher1) in
out(c out, msg3);
in(c in, (msg4: bitstring, cipher2: bitstring));
let msg6 = D(tcastbitstring→bounded1077(cipher2), key2) in
let injbot(msg7) = msg6 in
if cond2(msg7) then
event client accept(clientID, serverID, request, tcastbounded1045→fixed1024(msg7));
yield .
let server =
in(c in, (msg8: bitstring, msg9: bitstring));
let conc2(client2, cipher3) = msg9 in
if client2 = xClient then
let key3 = lookup(client2, serverID, db) in
let msg10 = D(cipher3, key3) in
let injbot(msg11) = msg10 in
if cond14(msg11) then
let conc1(var10, key4) = msg11 in
event server reply(client2, serverID, var10, response);
new nonce2: fixed16;
let msg14 = E(tcastfixed1024→bounded1045(response), key4, nonce2) in
out(c out, msg14); 0 .
Figure 4.7: The CryptoVerif model of RPC-enc. Some auxiliary tests are omitted.
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follows: clientID and serverID are global constants containing the names of an honest client
and an honest server, xClient is the attacker-chosen name of the client that the server should
communicate with, request and response are randomly chosen bitstrings, and db is the key
database used to look up shared keys (some of which may be compromised). The client request
message is sent in line 11 and received in line 26. The server response message is sent in line
52 and received in line 15.
We use uint32 t for all integer variables in the C code. Consistent use of an unsigned type
makes sure that there are no casts from signed to unsigned and back—all the operations in
the example are unsigned. Conditions checked by the C code are simplified by the symbolic
execution, converting them from bitstring facts to integer facts where possible. For instance,
in line 38 the condition checked by the C code is
if msg8 −©τ4u(τ−14u (5) +©τ4u msg9{1, 4}) ≤τ4u τ−14u (1077) then
During symbolic execution the rule (STest) (chapter 3) uses the function simplify (section 3.3)
to turn this into
if τ4u(msg8)− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4})) ≤ 1077 then
Lines 18 and 38 contain pattern matching of the form let injbot(msg7) = msg6 in P . This is
CryptoVerif abbreviation for let msg7 = injbot−1(msg6) in if injbot(msg7) = msg6 then P . In
line 18 msg6 is a result of a decryption and injbot is the natural injection from the type T
of plaintexts into bitstringbot. The function injbot−1 : bitstringbot → T is the identity
function for arguments of type T , and returns an arbitrary value otherwise. Therefore the
construct let injbot(msg7) = msg6 in P checks that the result of the decryption is of the correct
type. In particular, the result is not ⊥, which means that the encryption succeeded.
Part of the model that is not shown in this example is the sending of msg2 by the client
that contains the length of msg3:
let msg2 = τ−14u (5) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(clientID)) +©τ4u τ−14u (len(cipher1)) in
out(c, msg2);
In our implementation we change all such arithmetic expressions to opaque expressions of the
form arithmetic(clientID , cipher1 ) of type bitstring.
Compared to the example in section 3.6 the model here does not make abstract the function
encrypt len that computes the length of the ciphertext based on the length of the plaintext.
Instead, to make the model more concise, we symbolically execute the actual code of the function
and capture what it does concretely, namely add 32 (the encryption overhead) to the length of
the plaintext. This explains why the type of the ciphertext is bounded1077 given that the type
of the plaintext is bounded1045.
The example omits dummy inputs and outputs that are necessary to make inputs and
outputs alternate as well as conditionals originating from null pointer checks. The full model
in appendix C contains all these details 
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The conditions checked by the implementation are of two kinds that need to be treated dif-
ferently. Arithmetic conditions like the one in line 30 are unlikely to be useful for CryptoVerif,
but will be necessary during typechecking to prove that formatting functions are applied cor-
rectly. The expressions in these conditions can be replaced by applications of opaque functions
in the final CryptoVerif model. On the other hand, bitstring comparisons such as the check of
the client identity by the server in line 33 are likely to be crucial for CryptoVerif verification
and thus need to be preserved in the model. We use the following heuristic to distinguish the
two kinds.
Definition 4.7 (Cryptographic and Auxiliary Facts) A cryptographic fact is a fact of the
form f(e1, . . . , en) where f is a cryptographic function or of the form e = e
′ where both e and e′
are bitstring terms of one of the following kinds: a variable, a cryptographic function application,
a substring or a concatenation expression. A fact that is not cryptographic is called auxiliary.
The heuristic is formulated in such a way that the checking of a message tag as in line 28
is considered an auxiliary test since it involves a literal bitstring on one side. Figure 4.6 marks
auxiliary tests in the process with B. In the CryptoVerif model all auxiliary facts are replaced
by opaque function applications of the form cond i(x1, . . . , xn) with variables x1, . . . , xn and
i ∈ N. As we shall see below, in order for the verification to succeed it may be necessary to
prove additional properties of these functions. For instance, in order to prove secrecy of some
of the xi it is usually necessary to make sure that the condition only depends on the length of
the xi, but not on their actual contents.
Formatting Abstraction The first step in our transformation pipeline is bringing the pro-
cess into formatting-normal form in which every parsing and encoding expression occurs in its
own let-binding, except in auxiliary statements which are left unchanged. This step is described
in detail in section 4.3. Our example in figure 4.6 is already in formatting-normal form. The
main purpose of this form is to simplify the presentation (and the implementation) of the other
transformations. Now that expressions of different kinds occur separately, it is straightforward
to abstract away applications of formatting functions and auxiliary statements, as show on the
right of figure 4.6. This rewriting step is formalized in section 4.4.
Type Inference Next we need to decide upon appropriate types for the new function sym-
bols. It turns out that we can infer most of the types automatically since we already have
types for cryptographic functions from the user-provided template. Consider an application
of a concatenation function of a form let x = f(x1, . . . , xn) in P . If x1, . . . , xn are results of
cryptographic functions with result types T1, . . . , Tn and x is used as an argument of a crypto-
graphic function with argument type T then f can be given type f : T1× . . .×Tn → T . If x is an
argument of another formatting function, we cannot decide what type it should have. In these
cases the user can provide an explicit type annotation in C code by inserting a special CVM
instruction, but so far we did not have to use any type annotations for our models. Section 4.5
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describes in detail how we infer the typing environment Γ that we submit to CryptoVerif as
part of the model. The soundness of the method does not depend on this inference step since
the process is typechecked separately during the next step.
In addition to the types bitstring, bitstringbot, and bool that are predefined in Cryp-
toVerif we use types fixedn and boundedn of bitstrings with length exactly or at most n. It is
worth considering the reasons for this particular choice—why don’t we use weaker types (say,
only bitstring) or stronger types (say, bitstrings described by arbitrary logical formulas or
concatenation expressions in the spirit of refinement types of Bengtson et al. [2008])? First,
the types should be strong enough to prove that certain bitstrings are of bounded or fixed
length. For instance, to prove the secrecy of the request and the response we will need to use
the fact that they both have fixed length since our encryption does not hide the length of the
message. On the other hand, more sophisticated types would not be preserved by application
of cryptographic functions. Additionally we need to choose types that are easy to generalise
to arbitrary security parameters so that we can appeal to the asymptotic security result for
models verified with CryptoVerif.
One problem with our choice of types is that they are too weak to give a sound type for
parsers since parsers rely on the internal structure of the input. We deal with this problem
separately in section 4.9 where we replace the parsers by strengthened versions that always
return a value from the return type instead of failing. We verify that the conditions checked by
the implementation are sufficient for such a replacement to be sound. We also argue that all
our facts Φ still hold with respect to the strengthened parsers.
Typechecking During the next step we typecheck the model against the typing environment
Γ that we just inferred. In order to ensure that the process is well-typed it may be necessary
to insert type casts such as the cast of msg7 at the end of the client model in figure 4.7.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to eliminate explicit typecasts by choosing the right
types for our functions since membership of a certain type is typically checked explicitly in the
code. For instance, we cannot give the decryption function D the result type fixed1024 since
the decryption function does not check the length of its result. The length of msg7 is only
checked in line 19 of the IML model (cond2 in the CryptoVerif model), and so the typecast
would not be sound above that line. In section 4.6 we describe a transformation Γ, Q Q˜ that
adds typecasts into the model in such a way that Q . Q˜ and Q˜ is well-typed with respect to Γ.
Fact Inference The final ingredient of our model is the fact set Φ. Equation facts are
interpreted by CryptoVerif as rewriting rules—whenever an expressions matches the left hand
side, it is rewritten according to the equation. An inequality fact gives rise to the rewriting rule
that allows to rewrite an equality check to false. Section 4.7 provides details of how the set of
facts is computed. In summary, we add facts of the following kinds:
• Parsing equations of the form ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : fp(fc(x1, . . . , xn)) = xi.
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• Injectivity equations of the form
∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, y1 : T1, . . . , yn : Tn) : fc(x1, . . . , xn) = fc(y1, . . . , yn)⇒
∧
i≤n
xi = yi.
• Disjointness facts of the form
∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, y1 : T ′1, . . . , ym : T ′m) : fc(x1, . . . , xn) 6= f ′c(y1, . . . , ym).
• Equations that allow to erase arguments of concatenation expressions. For instance, when
CryptoVerif applies the security definition of the symmetric encryption to our model, it re-
places the plaintext msg1 = conc1 (request , key2 ) by Zbounded1045(msg1 ), where Zbounded1045
is the function that sets all bits of the input to 0. We provide CryptoVerif with equa-
tions that allow to push zero functions further down the expression and to prove that
Zbounded1045(msg1 ) does not depend on the values of request and key2 , and so those re-
main secret:
∀(x1 : fixed1024, x2 : fixed16) :
Zbounded1045(conc1 (x1, x2)) = Zbounded1045(conc1
′(Zfixed1024(x1), Zfixed16(x2))).
∀(x : fixed16) : Zfixed16(x) = 0fixed16 .
∀(x : fixed1024) : Zfixed1024(x) = 0fixed1024 .
We use conc1 ′ on the right hand side of the equation to prevent CryptoVerif from infinitely
looping applying the same rule over and over again.
• Equations that allow to erase arguments of conditional expressions. For instance, we can
prove that cond14 when applied to conc1 (x1, x2) depends only on the lengths of x1 and
x2, and so we can replace x1 and x2 by zero bitstrings of corresponding lengths. This is
captured using the following fact:
∀(x1 : fixed1024, x2 : fixed16) :
cond14 (conc1 (x1, x2)) = cond14
′(conc1 (Zfixed1024(x1), Zfixed16(x2))).
Using the fact that our encryption is authenticated (IND-CTXT) CryptoVerif is able
to rewrite the argument msg11 of cond14 to conc1 (var10 , key4 ). Together with the
rewriting rules above this allows us to prove that cond14 (msg11 ) does not depend on
values of var10 and key4 and thus does not interfere with their secrecy.
Parsing Safety Our next transformation strengthens applications of parsers where possible.
It is considered good practice to fully check the format of incoming messages before making
use of any of the fields (one needs to be careful though not to reveal to the attacker too much
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information if the message is malformed, as shown by Albrecht et al. [2009]). CryptoVerif has a
special pattern matching form that allows to represent this kind of check: given a poly-injective
function f a statement of the form let f(x1, . . . , xn) = e in P is an abbreviation for
let x1 = f
−1
1 (e) in ... let xn = f
−1
n (e) in if f(x1, . . . , xn) = e then P
where f−11 , . . . , f
−1
n are the partial inverses of f provided by injectivity. For each parser appli-
cation let x = fp(e) in P we check whether the facts that hold at the point of the application
imply that e is in the range of a particular encoder fc and if so, we replace the parser application
by let fc(. . . , x, . . .) = e in P , where x stands at position i if fp extracts the ith field of fc. The
key ingredient of the transformation is being able to determine whether a given expression is in
the range of a particular encoder. Section 4.8 shows how this can be done and provides further
details of the transformation.
Parsing safety is necessary to prevent collision attacks in some protocols. Consider the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol where first A sends a challenge c1(A,NA) to B, encrypted
with B’s public key, B responds with c2(B,NA, NB), and finally A responds with c3(NB). It
is important to make sure that B never confuses the first and the third message. Suppose we
would implement the third message naively by sending the naked nonce: c3(NB) = NB . The
attacker could then replay NB as the first message in a different session. The parsing error
when trying to parse NB as c1(A,NA) may reveal information about NB to the attacker.
The attack suggests that we must tag both the first and the third message and check the
complete message format, including the tag, before proceeding. The process that receives the
first message must be of the form
let d = D(cipher , key) in
let injbot(m) = d in
let c1(A,NA) = m in
When CryptoVerif applies the IND-CCA2 property of the encryption, it will prove that m can
be an application of c1, or an application of c3, or a message that does not contain sensitive
information. Assuming that Φ contains a disjointness fact c1(. . .) 6= c3(. . .) and using the fact
m = c1(A,NA) obtained from pattern matching CryptoVerif will be able to prove that m cannot
be an application of c3.
Even when the security of the protocol does not depend on parsing safety, CryptoVerif often
works better when we are able to replace applications of parsers by pattern matches. Consider,
for instance, the following fragment of the server model:
let conc2(client2, cipher3) = msg9 in
if client2 = xClient then
let key3 = lookup(client2, serverID, db) in
CryptoVerif will distinguish two cases when verifying the protocol: xClient = clientID and
xClient 6= clientID . In the first case CryptoVerif will be able to rewrite lookup(client2 , . . .)
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into kAB , the honest shared key, using the rewriting rules for the key database provided by
the template (appendix C). This works because the condition check introduces a rewriting rule
client2  xClient . If client2 were defined by a parser application, client2 = parse1 (msg9 ),
this would introduce another rewriting rule, and so CryptoVerif would effectively not know
which rewriting rule to apply. As a result, the application of the lookup function does not get
simplified and CryptoVerif cannot verify the protocol.
Our transformation merges pattern matches of the same expression. For instance, if a
pattern match of the form f(x, ) = e is followed by a pattern match f( , y) = e later on in the
process then we replace the first occurrence by f(x, y) = e.
Soundness Now our model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) is ready for verification with CryptoVerif. The sound-
ness theorem 4.3 in section 4.11 states that insec(QA|Q, ρ) ≤ cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k0) for
any attacker QA, trace property ρ, and a sufficiently large polynomial p. The CryptoVerif imple-
mentation provides a concrete bound on the security of Q˜ in terms of the runtime of QA and the
constants associated with cryptographic assumptions, which immediately gives a concrete bound
on the security of Q. Unfortunately, this feature of CryptoVerif has not been formalized and
Blanchet [2008] only makes an asymptotic statement: the function cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k)
is negligible in k (lemma 4.1). In order to appeal to this statement we need to show that this
function is well-defined for all k ∈ N: we must construct at least one interpretation I˜k for each
k ∈ N such that I˜k|Q˜ |= Γ and I˜k |= Γ. This construction is described in section 4.10.
All the transformations in this chapter are presented for a single well-formed process. This
process will consist of the IML models of the participants (client and server in our example)
embedded into a user-provided environment, given as a CryptoVerif template—an input file
with missing subprocesses. In the implementation we only need to perform the transformations
of the participant processes since the template is already well-typed and does not contain
any formatting expressions. We only use the template to provide types for the cryptographic
functions and free variables of the participant processes (such as clientID in our example).
4.3 Formatting-Normal Form
Our first transformation brings the process into a form that makes the following transformations
easier to formulate and implement. The goal of the transformation is to move each formatting
expression into its own let-binding.
Definition 4.8 A process is in formatting-normal form if
• Formatting expressions occur only in let-bindings.
• There are no cryptographic function applications in auxiliary conditions.
• The expression e in every statement of the form let x = e in P is of one of the following
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kinds: a variable, an encoding expression, a parsing expression, or an expression contain-
ing only cryptographic function applications. 
We transform the process into formatting-normal form by pulling out formatting subexpres-
sions into separate let-bindings, except in auxiliary test conditions, which we leave unchanged.
Example 4.2 Consider the following process (without distinction between integer and binary
terms):
if len(x) ≥ 4 + x{0, 4} then
let msg = hash(x{4, x{0, 4}}, keygen(keyseed)) in
if x{4 + x{0, 4}, len(x) − (4 + x{0, 4})} = msg then
out(c, len(msg)|msg);
The first test gets classified as auxiliary, the second as cryptographic. The process gets
transformed into the following formatting-normal form:
if len(x) ≥ 4 + x{0, 4} then
let v1 = x{4, x{0, 4}} in
let msg = hash(v1, leygen(keyseed)) in
let v2 = x{4 + x{0, 4}, len(x) − (4 + x{0, 4})} in
if v2 = msg then
let v3 = len(msg)|msg in
out(c, v3);
The concatenation expression len(msg)|msg is pulled out of the output statement to satisfy the
requirement that formatting expressions occur only in let-bindings. 
To justify the correctness of the transformation we show that the basic step (pulling an
expression into a separate let binding) is sound.
Lemma 4.2 For an output process P1 let x
′ be a variable that does not occur in P1 and let
P0 = let x = e[e
′/x′] in P1,
P˜0 = let x
′ = e′ in let x = e in P1.
Then P0 . P˜0. 
Proof Let P1, P0, and P˜0 be as in the statement of the lemma. For two executing processes
(η, P ) and (η˜, P˜ ) define (η, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ) if either η˜ = η and P = P0 and P˜ = P˜0 or η˜ = η{x′ 7→ b}
for some b ∈ BS and P = P˜ = P ′, where P ′ is a subprocess of P1. It is straightforward to
check that . satisfies the conditions of definition 2.11. 
4.4 Formatting Extraction
We replace every auxiliary condition and every application of a formatting expression by an
application of a fresh function symbol. This transformation is formalised by the rules in fig-
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e is a formatting expression with variables x1, . . . , xn f is a fresh symbol with I(f) = JeK P  P˜
let x = e in P  let x = f(x1, . . . , xn) in P˜
φ is an auxiliary fact with variables x1, . . . , xn f is a fresh symbol with I(f) = JφK P  P˜
if φ then P  if f(x1, . . . , xn) then P˜
P  P˜
λP  λP˜ 0 0
Figure 4.8: Formatting extraction rules.
ure 4.8. The rules are shown in order of priority so that the last two rules are defaults that
apply the transformation to the subprocess. For an expression e with variables x1, . . . , xn letJeK : BSn⊥ → BS⊥ be the function defined by JeK(b1, . . . , bn) = JeK{x1 7→b1,...,xn 7→bn}.
Example 4.3 In our example in figure 4.6 the following lines introduce new formatting func-
tions:
7 let msg1 = conc1(request, key2) in ...
10 let msg3 = conc2(clientID, cipher1) in ...
32 let client2 = parse1(msg9) in ...
36 let cipher3 = parse2(msg9) in ...
46 let var10 = parse3(msg11) in ...
48 let key4 = parse4(msg11) in ...
with new formatting functions defined as follows:
conc1 (x, y) = conc2 (x, y) = ”p”|τ−14u (len(x))|x|y
parse1 (x) = parse3 (x) = x{5, τ4u(x{0, 4})}
parse2 (x) = parse4 (x) = x{5 + τ4u(x{1, 4}), len(x)− (5 + τ4u(x{1, 4}))}
It is important that every occurrence of a formatting expression gets assigned a distinct function
symbol, even if the expressions are the same, as in the case of conc1 and conc2 . The reason is
that conc1 and conc2 will be assigned different types by the type inference. 
If f(x1, . . . , xn) it is a result of the substitution of an auxiliary condition φ, we shall keep
calling it an auxiliary condition in the remaining sections. When adding f(x1, . . . , xn) as a fact
to the knowledge of our prover, we expand it first, replacing it by φ.
92
4.5 Type Inference
Type inference aims to generate types for the new function symbols added in the previous
transformation. This is done in two stages. First we collect types for the variables in the
process based on how they are generated or used. For instance, if a variable is a result of a
cryptographic function with return type T (as specified in the typing environment Γ0 from the
user-provided template) or bound in a statement new x : T then the variable can be assigned
type T . Alternatively a variable can be given type T if it is used as an argument of a function
with argument type T . Since our input process is in a formatting-normal form, every occurrence
of a formatting function f is of the form let x = f(x1, . . . , xn). Knowledge of the types of
x, x1, . . . , xn allows us to give a type to f . The soundness result does not depend on the
correctness of type inference, as all the types are checked during the next stage (section 4.6).
We shall use the following types:
• for each n ∈ N the type fixedn with I(fixedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}n,
• for each n ∈ N the type boundedn with I(boundedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}≤n,
• the type bitstring with I(bitstring) = BS ,
• the type bitstringbot with I(bitstringbot) = BS⊥,
• the type bool with I(bool) = Bool .
When type inference collects multiple suggestions for the type of a variable, we consolidate those
by taking the intersection of the types. To define the intersection we first define a subtyping
relation v as follows: we let T v T for every type T and additionally
T v bitstringbot for any T T v bitstring for any T 6= bitstringbot
boundedn v boundedm iff n ≤ m fixedn v boundedm iff n ≤ m
boundedn v fixedm iff n = m = 0
Clearly T v T ′ implies I(T ) ⊆ I(T ′). A type T is said to be an intersection of two types T1
and T2 if T = T1 v T2 or T = T2 v T1 (an intersection need not necessarily exist). Given
two typing environments Γ and Γ′ that contain only variables we can unify the information
contained in them by taking type intersection for variables that are present in both Γ and Γ′.
Formally, we define
Γ unionsq Γ′ = {x 7→ Γ(x) | x ∈ dom(Γ) \ dom(Γ′)}
∪ {x 7→ Γ′(x) | x ∈ dom(Γ′) \ dom(Γ)}
∪ {x 7→ Γ(x) u Γ′(x) | x ∈ dom(Γ) ∩ dom(Γ′)} .
IF the type intersection for one of the variables does not exist, we fail.
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T 6= ⊥
x, T  {x 7→ T} x, ⊥ ∅
e, T  Γ
(e : T ),  Γ
Γ0(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T ei, Ti  Γi
f(e1, . . . , en),  
⊔
i Γi
f /∈ dom(Γ0) ei, ⊥ Γi
f(e1, . . . , en),  
⊔
i Γi
e, ⊥ Γ e′, ⊥ Γ′
(e = e′),  Γ unionsq Γ′
Figure 4.9: Type inference rules for
expressions.
typeΓ0(e) 6= ⊥ e, ⊥ Γ P  Γ′
let x = e in P  (Γ unionsq Γ′){x 7→ typeΓ0(e)}
typeΓ0(e) = ⊥ e, ⊥ Γ P  Γ′
let x = e in P  Γ unionsq Γ′
P  Γ
new x : T ;P  Γ{x 7→ T}
P  Γ
in(c[e1, . . . , en], x);P  Γ{x 7→ bitstring}
P  Γ
assume φ; P  Γ
exp(λ) = e1, . . . , en ei,⊥ Γi P  Γ
λP  Γ unionsq Γ1 unionsq . . . unionsq Γn
Figure 4.10: Type inference rules for
processes.
We allow the user to provide explicit type annotations on expressions, that is, we consider
a new form e : T of expressions, with a type T . The annotations are added by a call in the C
program. For instance, a call typehint (buf, len , ”bounded 1024”); will assign type bounded1024
to the bitstring contained in buffer buf of length len. Type hints are picked up and propagated
by symbolic execution. Annotations are only used for type inference, and are erased after that.
In particular, typechecking of the next section does not rely on annotations.
We shall write typeΓ(e) to represent the type of an expression e in typing environment Γ.
This is computed by the following rules, in order of precedence:
typeΓ(e : T ) = T,
typeΓ(x) = Γ(x) if x ∈ dom(Γ),
typeΓ(f(. . .)) = T if f ∈ dom(Γ) and Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T ,
typeΓ(e) = ⊥ otherwise.
The rules of type inference for processes (figure 4.10) are of the form P  Γ meaning that
a process P yields a typing environment Γ that contains types for variables in P . The rules
for expressions (figure 4.9) are of the form e, T  Γ, meaning that an expression e yields an
environment Γ under the assumption that the type of e is T . In the default rule in figure 4.10
we use exp(λ) to denote the expressions of a syntactic form λ. Typing information comes from
several sources: explicit type annotations, applications of cryptographic functions with known
94
types (given by Γ0), use of new x : T , and inputs. We do not derive any type constraints from
bitstring equality tests, and we do not add types for replication indices—those will be assigned
the default type bitstring. Assumptions are ignored for the purpose of type inference.
Definition 4.9 (Type Inference) We say that a typing environment Γ is the result of type
inference of function types from a process P if it is constructed as follows: First obtain a
typing environment Γvar by P  Γvar and complete it by setting Γvar (x) = bitstring for
every variable x of P with x /∈ dom(Γvar ). Next generate the typing environment Γfun with
types of formatting and auxiliary test functions as follows: For each formatting function f that
occurs in a statement let x = f(x1, . . . , xn) set Γfun(f) = Γvar (x1)× . . .× Γvar (xn)→ Γvar (x).
For each auxiliary test function that occurs in a statement if f(x1, . . . , xn) then set Γfun(f) =
Γvar (x1)×. . .×Γvar (xn)→ bool. Finally, let Γ = Γ0unionsqΓfun , where Γ0 is the typing environment
provided by the user that contains types of the cryptographic functions. 
Example 4.4 Consider the application of conc2 in line 10 of figure 4.6: let msg3 = conc2(
clientID, cipher1). The variable clientID is bound in the user-provided template and declared
to be of type bounded1024. The variable cipher1 is the result of an application of the encryption
function E which in the user template has return type bounded1077 (see below for the origin of
the number 1077). Finally, the result msg3 of conc2 is output in line 11, and so is assigned type
bitstring for lack of more precise information. This gives us the type conc2 : bounded1024 ×
bounded1077 → bitstring. The types of the other functions are derived in the same way
(user-provided type annotations are not necessary for RPC-enc). The types we infer for our
formatting functions are
conc1 : fixed1024 × fixed16 → bounded1045
conc2 : bounded1024 × bounded1077 → bitstring
parse1 : bitstring→ bounded1024
parse2 : bitstring→ bounded1077
parse3 : bounded1045 → fixed1024
parse4 : bounded1045 → fixed16
The type fixed16 is the type of keys used by the process and the type fixed1024 is the type
of payloads. It is important that both payloads and keys have fixed types to preserve their
secrecy. The type bounded1045 is the type of concatenations of payload and key, which results
from adding the concatenation overhead of 5 bytes to the sum of payload length of 1024 and
key length of 16. The type bounded1077 is obtained by taking the type bounded1045 and adding
32 bytes of encryption overhead. 
The types we give to our formatting functions are not necessarily sound. In particular,
parsers expect input with a certain internal structure since they use length fields to extract
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the concatenation arguments. We shall deal with this problem in section 4.9 where we check
that the types of encoders are in fact sound and that the parsers can be safely replaced by
strengthened versions that are sound with respect to their types.
4.6 Typechecking
The purpose of the next transformation step is to insert typecasts where necessary to ensure
that the process is well-typed with respect to the typing environment Γ generated by the type
inference. We use the facts that are known to be true at a particular point in order to establish
that this transformation is sound. Facts come from the conditions that are checked by the
process as well as from the types of expressions that have been checked so far. We use facts of
the form intype(e, T ) to record that an expression e has type T . These are defined as follows:
intype(e, fixedn) = (len(e) = n),
intype(e, boundedn) = (len(e) ≤ n),
intype(e, bitstring) = defined(e),
intype(e, bitstringbot) = true .
We never form intype expressions for boolean types. Given a typing environment Γ we let
typefacts(Γ) = {intype(x,Γ(x)) | x ∈ dom(Γ)} .
The typechecking rules use two typing judgements, presented in figure 4.11. The judgement
Γ,Φ ` P  P˜ means that under the assumption that both Φ and typefacts(Γ) are true the
process P can be rewritten to a process P˜ that is well-typed with respect to Γ. The judgement
Γ,Φ, T ` e  e˜ means that under the assumption that both Φ and typefacts(Γ) are true the
expression e can be rewritten to a well-typed expression e˜ of type T . Most of the rules are
straightforward and simply propagate the typing information and facts through the process,
inserting typecasts where necessary and justified. A typecast from a type T to a type T ′ is
performed by a function tcastT→T ′ : T → T ′ such that tcastT→T ′(x) = x for all x ∈ I(T )∩I(T ′)
and for all x /∈ I(T ), and tcastT→T ′(x) is an arbitrary but fixed value of type T ′ otherwise. We
require the value to be fixed since later we make use of the fact that casts are length-regular.
The definition is chosen in such a way that tcastT→T is the identity function, and so can be
omitted.
The rules that rewrite an expression e into tcastT→T ′(e) check that e already belongs to
type T ′ as implied by the context, and so the the resulting expressions evaluates the same as
e. Most of the work is done by the rules (TCVar) and (TCFormat) that prove that variables
and results of formatting function applications belong to the required type. We do not cast
the results of formatting function applications since in formatting-normal form those results
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Γ(x) = Tx Φ ∪ typefacts(Γ) ` intype(x, T )
Γ,Φ, T ` x tcastTx→T (x)
(TCVar)
f is a formatting function Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T
Γ,Φ, Ti ` ei  e˜i Φ ∪ typefacts(Γ) ` intype(expand(f(e1, . . . , en)), T )
Γ,Φ, T ` f(e1, . . . , en) f(e˜1, . . . , e˜n)
(TCFormat)
f is a cryptographic or auxiliary test function
Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → Tf Γ,Φ, Ti ` ei  e˜i Tf v T
Γ,Φ, T ` f(e1, . . . , en) tcastTf→T (f(e˜1, . . . , e˜n))
(TCCrypto)
T = typeΓ(e) unionsq typeΓ(e′) Γ,Φ, T ` e e˜ Γ,Φ, T ` e′  e˜′
Γ,Φ, bool ` (e = e′) (e˜ = e˜′)
(TCEq)
Γ,Φ ` 0 0 (TCNil)
Γ,Φ ` Q Q˜ Γ,Φ ` Q′  Q˜′
Γ,Φ ` Q|Q′  Q˜|Q˜′
(TCPar)
Γ{i 7→ bitstring},Φ ` Q Q˜
Γ,Φ ` !i≤NQ !i≤N Q˜
(TCRepl)
Γ,Φ, typeΓ(e) ` e e˜ Γ{x 7→ typeΓ(e)},Φ ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` let x = e in P  let x = e˜ in P˜
(TCLet)
Γ,Φ, bool ` φ φ˜ Γ,Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` if φ then P  if φ˜ then P˜
(TCIf)
Γ,Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` assume φ; P  assume φ; P˜
(TCAssume)
∀i ≤ n : Γ,Φ, typeΓ(ei) ` ei  e˜i Γ{x 7→ bitstring},Φ ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` in(c[e1, . . . , en], x);P  in(c[e˜1, . . . , e˜n], x); P˜
(TCIn)
T = fixedn Γ{x 7→ T},Φ ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` new x : T ; P  new x : T ; P˜
(TCNew)
∀i ≤ n : Γ,Φ, typeΓ(ei) ` ei  e˜i Γ,Φ, typeΓ(e) ` e e˜ Γ,Φ ` Q Q˜
Γ,Φ ` out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q out(c[e˜1, . . . , e˜n], e˜); Q˜
(TCOut)
∀i ≤ n : Γ,Φ, typeΓ(ei) ` ei  e˜i Γ,Φ ` P  P˜
Γ,Φ ` event ev(e1, . . . , en); P  event ev(e˜1, . . . , e˜n); P˜
(TCEvent)
Figure 4.11: Typechecking rules for expressions and processes.
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are always assigned to variables that can be cast later as needed. Since types inferred for the
formatting functions need not necessarily be sound, as mentioned in the previous section, we do
not trust these types. Instead we expand the definitions of the formatting functions and check
the resulting expressions explicitly: for a formatting function f = JeK where e is a formatting
expression with variables x1, . . . , xn we let expand(f(e1, . . . , en)) = e[e1/x1, . . . , en/xn]. When
adding the fact φ to the set Φ the rule (TCIf) expands applications of auxiliary test functions
in the same way.
The rule (TCEq) casts both operands of an equality test to the union of their types. Given
two types T and T ′ we define T unionsq T ′ in the obvious way, similarly to the way T u T ′ is defined
in section 4.5.
Example 4.5 The inferred type of parse2 in our example is bitstring → bounded1077. The
facts that are checked before applying parse2 to msg9 in line 36 include Φ = {φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4},
where
φ1 = (τ4u(msg8 ) ≥ 1082) ∧ (τ4u(msg8 ) ≤ 2106),
φ2 = len(msg9 ) = τ4u(msg8 ),
φ3 = τ4u(msg9{1, 4}) ≤ 1024,
φ4 = τ4u(msg8 )− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4})) ≤ 1077.
To prove that the result of parsing is of the right type the rule (TCFormat) will check that Φ
implies
intype(expand(parse2 (msg9 )), bounded1077)
= len(msg9{5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4}), len(msg9 )− (5 + τ4u(msg9{1, 4}))}) ≤ 1077.
The fact φ1 is used to show that the substring extraction is within correct bounds, φ3 is necessary
to show that there is no overflow, and φ2 and φ4 together imply the necessary arithmetic
condition. 
We now state several results that capture the soundness of typechecking. In the following we
assume that Γ agrees with Γ0 (the template environment with types for cryptographic functions)
and contains types for all the typecast functions used in the process. The following lemma is
obvious.
Lemma 4.3 (Typechecking of Expressions is Sound) Assume that Γ,Φ, T ` e  e˜. If
η |= Γ and η |= Φ for an environment η then JeKη = Je˜Kη ∈ I(T ). 
Lemma 4.4 (Typechecking of Processes is Sound) Assume that Γ, ∅ ` Q Q˜ for a typ-
ing environment Γ that does not contain variables. Then Q . Q˜. 
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Proof For two executing processes (η, P ) and (η˜, P˜ ) let (η, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ) if η = η˜ and there exists
a set of facts Φ and a typing environment Γ such that η |= Φ and η |= Γ and Γ,Φ ` P  P˜ .
We show that . satisfies the conditions of definition 2.11. Item 1 is fulfilled by assumption
Γ, ∅, Q Q˜ of the lemma. Here it is important that Γ does not contain variables, so that η |= Γ
for any environment η. Items 2 to 5 can be proved by induction on the size of the process. We
shall show the proof for the case of let-expressions, the other cases follow in the same way.
Assume that (η, P ) . (η, P˜ ) and P = let x = e in P ′. By definition of . the rule (TCLet)
must apply, so that P˜ = let x = e˜ in P˜ ′. We therefore need to check that item 5 in defini-
tion 2.11 is satisfied: both executing processes reduce together and still simulate each other
after reduction, that is, (η′, P ′) . (η˜′, P˜ ′), where η′ = η{x 7→ JeKη} and η˜′ = η{x 7→ Je˜Kη}. By
lemma 4.3 applied to the premise of the rule (TCLet) we have JeKη = Je˜Kη ∈ I(typeΓ(e)) so
that η′ = η˜′ and η′ |= Γ{x 7→ typeΓ(e)}. By the rule (TCLet) Γ{x 7→ type(e,Γ)},Φ ` P ′  P˜ ′,
and so (η′, P ′) . (η˜′, P˜ ′).
Finally, condition 6 in definition 2.11 follows from the fact that η = η˜ when (η, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ).
Lemma 4.5 (Typechecked Processes are Well-Typed) If Γ, ∅ ` Q  Q˜ and Q˜′ is the
result of removing inline assumptions from Q˜ then Γ ` Q˜′. 
Proof The statement follows by structural induction on Q and direct comparison of rules
in figure 4.2 with rules in figure 4.11. As an auxiliary statement we prove for expressions: if
Γ,Φ, T ` e e˜ then Γ ` e˜ : T . 
4.7 Fact Inference
This section describes the set of facts Φ that we supply to CryptoVerif as part of the generated
model. The facts encode the properties of our formatting functions and include parsing equa-
tions, disjointness of ranges, injectivity, and length-regularity (the length of the output depends
only on the lengths of the inputs). We shall make use of quantifiers of the form ∀(x : T ) : φ, with
the obvious meaning. For the rest of the section we fix a process Q and a typing environment
Γ and write f : T1 × . . . × Tn → T to mean Γ(f) = T1 × . . . × Tn → T . The environment Γ is
assumed to contain types for all functions used in Q.
Parsing Equations Consider an encoder fc : T1 × . . . × Tn → T defined by an encoding
expression ec with variables x1, . . . , xn and a parser fp : T → Ti for some i ≤ n defined by a
parsing expression ep with a variable x. We can check the result of applying the parser to the
encoder by forming the expression ep[ec/x] and checking whether we can simplify it to xi using
the function simplify defined in section 3.3. Let Φarg = {intype(x1, T1), . . . , intype(xn, Tn)}. If
simplifyΦarg (ep[ec/x]) = xi for some i ≤ n then we add the following fact to Φ:
parseΓ(fp, fc, i) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : fp(fc(x1, . . . , xn)) = xi.
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Example 4.6 In our RPC-enc example we add the following parsing equations:
∀(x : fixed1024, y : fixed16) : parse3 (conc1 (x, y)) = x,
∀(x : fixed1024, y : fixed16) : parse4 (conc1 (x, y)) = y,
∀(x : bounded1024, y : bounded1077) : parse1 (conc2 (x, y)) = x,
∀(x : bounded1024, y : bounded1077) : parse2 (conc2 (x, y)) = y.
We do not add equations for parse3 applied to conc2 and the other way round because the
types do not match. 
Injectivity of Encoders We check which encoders are injective, taking into account the
types of the arguments. A sufficient condition for the encoder to be injective is when there
is at most one argument which is not preceded by its length in the encoding and is not of a
fixed-length type. We record this property for future use.
Definition 4.10 An encoder f : T1× . . .×Tn → T defined by an expression e = e1| . . . |em with
variables x1, . . . , xn is called robustly injective when there is at most one i such that ei = xj for
some j ≤ n, there is no expression len(xj) preceding ei in e, and Tj is not a fixed-length type.
If f is robustly injective, we add the following fact to the set Φ:
inj Γ(f) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, y1 : T1, . . . , yn : Tn) :
f(x1, . . . , xn) = f(y1, . . . , yn)⇒
∧
i≤n
xi = yi.
Example 4.7 Applying our criterion, we see that both conc1 and conc2 in RPC-enc are
injective: there is only one argument variable (the second argument) that is not preceded by
its length. 
CryptoVerif makes use of a stronger notion called poly-injectivity : a function is poly-injective
if it is injective and its inverses are efficiently computable. This is necessary to use the pattern-
matching construct in section 4.8. For our encoders injectivity clearly implies poly-injectivity.
Disjointness of Encoders We establish disjointness of encoders by finding constant tags in
the formatting that are always aligned and have different values. We record this criterion for
future use.
Definition 4.11 Let f : T1 × . . .× Tn → T and f ′ : T ′1 × . . .× T ′n′ → T be two encoders given
by expressions e1| . . . |em and e′1| . . . e′m′ . We say that f and f ′ are robustly disjoint if there
exists k ≤ min(m,m′) such that ek and e′k are constant tag expressions such that neither is a
prefix of the other and ei = e
′
i for all i < k. 
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For every two encoders f and f ′ that are robustly disjoint, we add following fact to the set Φ:
disj Γ(f, f
′) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, y1 : T ′1, . . . , ym : T ′m) : f(x1, . . . , xn) 6= f ′(y1, . . . , ym).
In our example the two encoders are not disjoint since they are identical, but disjointness
will become very important when proving computational soundness conditions in chapter 5.
Equality of Encoders If two encoders f, f ′ have identical types and defining expressions,
we add the following fact to Φ:
eqΓ(f, f
′) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : f(x1, . . . , xn) = f ′(x1, . . . , xn).
This is useful for protocols where the same message is computed in different places. An example
would be a contract-signing protocol in which two participants each compute the same message
(the contract), sign the message with their private keys, and exchange only the signatures.
Cast Equations For every two types T , T ′ such that T v T ′ and Q contains both tcastT→T ′
and tcastT ′→T we add the following fact to Φ:
castΓ(T, T
′) = ∀(x : T ) : tcastT ′→T (tcastT→T ′(x)) = x.
Length-Regularity of Encoders By construction all our encoders are length-regular : the
length of their result depends only on the length of the arguments. This property is impor-
tant to establish the security of RPC-enc, where the client sends the encryption of msg1 =
conc1 (request , key2 ) and we need to prove that this encryption does not leak any information
about key2 . We assume that the encryption only leaks the length of the plaintext, therefore it
is important that the length of msg1 does not depend on the value of key2 .
When CryptoVerif applies the security definition of the symmetric encryption, it replaces
the plaintext msg1 by Zbounded1045(msg1 ) where Zbounded1045 : bounded1045 → bounded1045 is the
function that sets all bits of its input to 0. We need to give enough facts to CryptoVerif so that
it can rewrite Zbounded1045(conc1 (request , key2 )) to a value that does not depend on key2 . This
is done as follows: for each encoder f : T1 × . . .× Tn → T we add the following fact:
regΓ(f) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : ZT (f(x1, . . . , xn)) = ZT (f ′(ZT1(x1), . . . , ZTn(xn))).
We use a fresh symbol f ′ to prevent CryptoVerif from looping when applying the rewriting rule.
For every fixed-length type T we also add the fact
zeroΓ(T ) = ∀(x : T ) : ZT (x) = 0T ,
where 0T is a constant of type T . Our cast functions are defined in such a way that they are
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also length-regular (section 4.6), and so for every function castT→T ′ used in our model we add
the fact regΓ(castT→T ′) as above.
Example 4.8 In RPC-enc we add the equations
∀(x1 : fixed1024, x2 : fixed16) :
Zbounded1045(conc1 (x1, x2)) = Zbounded1045(conc1
′(Zfixed1024(x1), Zfixed16(x2))).
∀(x : fixed16) : Zfixed16(x) = 0fixed16 .
∀(x : fixed1024) : Zfixed1024(x) = 0fixed1024 . 
In order for the functions ZT to be type-safe it is important that our types themselves are
length-regular: if b ∈ I(T ) then also b′ ∈ I(T ) for every bitstring b′ such that |b| = |b′|. In
particular, ZT (b) ∈ I(T ) (an exception is the type bool which is not assumed to be length-
regular, but that is not a problem since bool never occurs as a result or argument type of any
formatting or cast functions in our models). This partially motivates our choice of types—they
are simple enough to be length-regular.
Length-Regularity of Auxiliary Tests Consider a condition of the form if f(x1, . . . , xn)
then P where f : T1 × . . .× Tn → T is a function defined by an expression ef . Without further
help CryptoVerif would not be able to prove secrecy of the variables xi since the control flow
may depend on the value of those variables. However, often the shape of ef is such that it
contains only expressions of the form len(xi) for some i. Alternatively, during CryptoVerif
rewriting an xi may be instantiated to a more structured expression, say, c(y1, y2) with some
concatenation symbol c, and it may be the case that f destructs c(y1, y2) in such a way that the
value of y2 is never accessed. To enable CryptoVerif to prove secrecy in these cases we generate
some additional facts, similar to the facts for length-regularity of encoders described above.
We generate two types of facts, corresponding to the two cases described above. Let us start
with a simpler case where the value of f depends only on lengths of some of the xi or does not
depend on them at all. In order to check this for one of the arguments, say x1, we can introduce
two fresh variables x and x′ and simply use our solver to check whether len(x) = len(x′) implies
ef [x, x2, . . . , xn] = ef [x
′, x2, . . . , xn]. In practice, an even simpler check is enough: we introduce
new variables l, x, and x′, obtain e′f from ef by replacing every occurrence of len(x1) with l
and check whether the expressions e′f [x/x1] and e
′
f [x
′/x1] are syntactically equal. We repeat
this check for every argument xi. If it succeeds, say, for x1, . . . , xk then we generate the fact
regΓ(f) = ∀(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : f(x1, . . . , xn) = f ′(ZT1(x1), . . . , ZTk(xk), xk+1, . . . , xn),
where the functions ZT returns a string of zeroes of equal length to the length of the argu-
ment. The function f ′ is defined exactly like f in the template, its sole purpose is to prevent
CryptoVerif from looping.
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The second case is that we cannot erase one of the arguments xi, but we can erase a
substring of xi if we assume that xi is a result of an encoding operation. During verification
CryptoVerif will often be able to rewrite f(x1, . . . , xn) into, say, f(c(y1, . . . , ym), x2, . . . , xn),
where c : T ′1 × . . .× T ′m → T1 is a concatenation operator defined by an expression ec. We can
now check whether we can erase one of the arguments of c, say, y1 in a way similar to above.
The only additional step is that we simplify the expression. Let
Φ = {intype(y1, T ′1), . . . , intype(ym, T ′m)}
and let e = simplifyΦ(ef [ec[y1, . . . , ym], x2, . . . , xn]) where simplify is our simplification function
defined in section 3.3. Now we can proceed exactly as above—in order to check that we can
erase y1 replace every occurrence of len(y1) in e by a fresh variable l, and let e
′ be the resulting
expression. Now check whether for two fresh variables y and y′ the expressions e′[y/y1] and
e′[y′/y1] are syntactically equal. Repeat for each yi. If the check succeeds for y1, . . . , yk then
we generate the fact
reg ′Γ(f, c) = ∀(y1 : T ′1, . . . , ym : T ′m, x2 : T2, . . . , xn : Tn) :
f ′(c(y1, . . . , ym), x2, . . . , xn) = f ′(c′(ZT ′1(y1), . . . , ZT ′k(yk), yk+1, . . . , ym), x2, . . . , xn).
Example 4.9 Suppose we have identified two concatenation operators c1, c2 : bounded10 ×
bounded20 → bounded100 defined as
c1(y1, y2) = 0x00|τ−14u (len(y1))|y1|y2,
c2(y1, y2) = 0x01|τ−14u (len(y1))|y1|y2,
and consider a condition if f(x1, x2) then P where f : bitstring× bitstring→ bool is
f(x1, x2) = (x1{5, x1{1, 4}} = x2{5, x2{1, 4}}).
It is clear that neither x1 nor x2 can be erased. However, consider what happens when we
substitute x1 by c1(y1, y2). The resulting condition becomes
f(c1(y1, y2)), x2) =
((0x00|τ−14u (len(y1))|y1|y2){5, (0x00|τ−14u (len(y1))|y1|y2){1, 4}}) = x1{5, x1{1, 4}}).
This is simplified as follows:
simplifyΦ(f(c1(y1, y2), x2)) = y1, where Φ = {intype(y1, bounded10), intype(y2, bounded20)}
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This expression does not depend on y2 at all, so we can add a fact
∀(y1 : bounded10, y2 : bounded20, x2 : bitstring) :
f(c1(y1, y2), x2) = f(c1(y1, Zbounded20(y2)), x2).
Altogether we generate 4 such facts—with both c1 and c2 in each of the positions x1 and x2.
4.8 Parsing Safety
An application of a parser fp(e) is called safe if the facts in the context imply that e is in the
range of some encoder f . In such cases, whenever f is injective and fp matches f at posi-
tion i, we can replace let xi = fp(e) in P by let f(x1, . . . , xn) = e in P , which is a CryptoVerif
abbreviation for
let x1 = f
−1
1 (e) in ... let xn = f
−1
n (e) in if f(x1, . . . , xn) = e then P
where f−1i are the partial inverses of f provided by injectivity: if f has type T1 . . . Tn →
T then each f−1i is a function from I(T ) to I(Ti) such that fi(f(b1, . . . , bn)) = bi for all
b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn). As discussed in section 4.2, the use of pattern matching allows
CryptoVerif to succeed more often. This section describes how we check parsing safety and
transform the process to use pattern matching.
We define the following condition that encodes the fact that the value of an expression e that
does not contain variables x1, . . . , xn comes from the range of a function f : T1× . . .× Tn → T :
inrange(e, f) = ∃(x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn) : e = f(x1, . . . , xn).
We say that an application fp(e) of a parser fp : T → T ′ to an expression e safely matches an
encoder f : T1 × . . . × Tn → T at position i in context Φ, if f is injective, T ′ = Ti, and Φ `
inrange(e, f)∧parseΓ(fp, f, i). The condition of injectivity takes the types of the arguments into
account: f only needs to be injective for the arguments of types T1, . . . , Tn. CryptoVerif actually
requires poly-injectivity, that is, the inverse functions of f need to be efficiently computable.
Clearly all our encoders are poly-injective whenever they are injective.
The rules in Figure 4.12 show the transformation that we apply to the process. It may
happen that several encoders are safely matched by a parsing expression if they have overlapping
ranges and equal return types. In that case it is safe to choose one encoder arbitrarily, but
our implementation terminates with an error to alert the user that more distinctive typing of
encoders is necessary. If we cannot show parsing safety for the application of a particular parser,
we leave the parsing unchanged and proceed with the rest of the process.
In section 4.7 we described how to check whether f is injective and whether parseΓ(fp, f, i)
is satisfied. We now show how to check the inrange condition. Given a bitstring b, to check
inrange(b, f) we shall construct an explicit parser for every field of f and check that applications
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fp(e) safely matches f at position i in context Φ
xj unused in P for j 6= i Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` let xi = fp(e) in P  let f(x1, . . . , xn) = e in P˜
Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Φ ` if φ then P  if φ then P˜
Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Φ ` assume φ; P  assume φ; P˜
Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` λP  λP˜
Figure 4.12: Parsing safety rules.
of those parsers to b are well-defined, that the tag fields in b have expected values, and that the
argument fields have expected types. We formalise this idea below.
Given a concatenation function symbol f : T1×. . .×Tn → T with I(f) = JeK for an encoding
expression e with variables x1, . . . , xn, we check the fact inrange(b, f) as follows. First check
that e is well-formed : it is required to be of a form e1| . . . |em, where each of the ei is either a
constant tag, one of the variables x1, . . . , xn or a length of one of these variables. More precisely,
{1, . . . ,m} = Ix ∪ Il ∪ It such that
• for all i ∈ Ix it is ei = xk for some k ≤ n,
• for all i ∈ Il it is ei = τ−1i (len(xk)) for some k ≤ n and τi ∈ TI ,
• for all i ∈ It it is ei = ti for some constant bitstring ti.
We require that each variable occurs at most once among the arguments and at most once
among the lengths, and that
Ix = {i | ei = xj s.t. e contains len(xj)} unionmulti {m},
that is, the expression e contains lengths for all parameters except the last one—the missing
length can then be derived from knowing the total length of the concatenation. Each field
length must precede the field itself: if ei = τ
−1
i (len(xk)) and ej = xk for some k then i < j.
Next we inductively define integer terms l1(x), . . . , lm(x) and bitstring terms p1(x), . . . , pm(x)
that would extract field lengths and fields when applied to an expression in the range of f . We
then apply them to b and check that the results behave as expected. Assume that p1, . . . , pi−1
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and l1, . . . , li−1 are defined. Let
li(x) =

|ti| , if ei = ti ∈ BS ,
len(τi), if ei = τ
−1
i (len(xk)),
τj(pj(x)), if ei = xk and ej = τ
−1
j (len(xk)),
len(x)−∑m−1j=1 lj(x), if i = m
pi(x) = x

i−1∑
j=1
lj(x), li(x)
 .
Using these constructs we can check that the fields of the argument are well-defined. We also
check that the argument fields are of the correct type and that the tag fields have correct value.
Formally, we define
fields(x, f) =
m∧
i=1
defined(pi(x)),
types(x, f) =
∧
i∈Ix
intype(pi(x), Tj), when ei = xj ,
tags(x, f) =
∧
i∈It
pi(x) = ti.
Theorem 4.2 (Parsing Safety) For any well-formed encoder f and bitstring b
fields(b, f) ∧ types(b, f) ∧ tags(b, f)⇐⇒ inrange(b, f). 
Proof Assume that fields(b, f), types(b, f), and tags(b, f) are true (since we use a constant b,
these facts do not contain variables, and so can be evaluated independently of an environment).
We show inrange(b, f) by finding b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn) such that b = JeK(b1, . . . , bn).
For i = 1, . . . ,m let ai = Jpi(b)K. By fields(b, f) each ai is well-defined. By construction of
the parsers pi it is easy to see that b = a1| . . . |am.
For i ∈ Ix such that ei = xj let bj = ai. By types(b, f) we have b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn).
Let η = {x1 7→ b1, . . . , xn 7→ bn}. We show that JeKη = a1| . . . |am by showing JeiKη = ai for all
i ≤ m. Consider the following cases:
• i ∈ It and ei = ti for some constant bitstring ti. By tags(b, f) we have ai = ti as well.
• i ∈ Ix and ei = xj . Then η(xj) = bj = ai.
• i ∈ Il and ei = τ−1i (len(xk)) for some k ≤ n. Let j ∈ Ix such that ej = xk. Expanding
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the definitions of pj and lj we see that pj is of the form
pj(x) = x
{
j−1∑
k=1
lk(x), τi(pi(x))
}
,
so that
JeiKηx =τ−1i (|η(xk)|) = τ−1i (|aj |)
=τ−1i (|Jpj(b)K|) = τ−1i (Jτi(pi(b))K) = τ−1i (τi(Jpi(b)K)) = ai
The reverse implication is straightforward. 
Example 4.10 In our RPC-enc example all parser applications are safe. For instance, consider
application of parse4 in line 48 in figure 4.6. The only encoder that matches the type of parse4
is conc1 : fixed1024 × fixed16 → bounded1045. To check that the argument msg11 of parse4
comes from the range of conc1 we apply the construction above to the defining expression
”p”|τ−14u (len(x))|x|y of conc1 and check that the context at the call site implies the following
conditions:
fields(msg11 , conc1 ) =
defined(msg11{0, 1}) ∧ defined(msg11{1, 4})
∧ defined(msg11{5, τ4u(msg11{1, 4})})
∧ defined(msg11{5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}), len(msg)− (5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}))}),
types(msg11 , conc1 ) =
intype(msg11{5, τ4u(msg11{1, 4})}, fixed1024)
∧ intype(msg11{5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}), len(msg)− (5 + τ4u(msg11{1, 4}))}, fixed16),
tags(msg11 , conc1 ) = (msg11{0, 1} = ”p”). 
It is easy to see that a similar construction can be applied to an arbitrary robustly injective
encoder (definition 4.11). We shall make use of this fact in section 4.10 where we shall create
generalized parsers that always check whether their argument is in the range of some robustly
injective encoder.
We now formalise the soundness of parsing safety analysis.
Lemma 4.6 If ∅, Q Q˜ by the rules in figure 4.12 then Q . Q˜. 
Proof For two executing processes (η, P ) and (η˜, P˜ ) let (η, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ) if η˜ = η ∪ η∗ where all
variables in η∗ do not occur in P˜ and there exists a fact set Φ such that η |= Φ (and therefore
η˜ |= Φ) and Φ ` P  P˜ . We show that . satisfies definition 2.11. The only non-trivial case
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f is a formatting function Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T
Γ,Φ, Ti ` ei  e˜i Φ ∪ typefacts(Γ) ` intype(expand(f(e1, . . . , en)), T )
Γ,Φ, T ` f(e1, . . . , en) tcastbitstringbot→T (f(e˜1, . . . , e˜n))
(TCFormat’)
Figure 4.13: A modified typechecking rule for formatting functions.
corresponds to the rule for let bindings in which
P = let xi = fp(e) in P
′,
P˜ = let f(x1, . . . , xn) = e in P˜
′
= let x1 = f
−1
1 (e) in . . . let xn = f
−1
n (e) in if f(x1, . . . , xn) = e then P˜
′.
The executing process (η, P ) reduces to (η′, P ′) with η′ = η{xi 7→ Jfp(e)Kη}. By the premise
of the rule we have η˜ |= inrange(e, f), so that the test condition in P˜ is true and P˜ reduces to
(η˜′, P˜ ′) with
η˜′ = η˜{x1 7→ Jf−11 (e)Kη˜, . . . , xn 7→ Jf−1n (e)Kη˜}.
By the premise of the rule η |= parseΓ(fp, f, e) so that Jfp(e)Kη = Jf−11 (e)Kη = Jf−11 (e)Kη˜. Thus
η˜′ = η′ ∪ η∗ ∪ {xj 7→ Jf−1j (e)Kη˜ | j ≤ n, j 6= i} .
By the premise of the rule Φ ` P ′  P˜ ′, so that (η′, P ′) . (η˜′, P˜ ′). 
4.9 Type-Safety of Formatting functions
We come back to the problem that we left unresolved in previous sections—making sure that our
formatting functions are type-safe—given inputs of the right type they should always produce
outputs of the right type, as specified by the typing environment Γ inferred in section 4.5.
Using the notation introduced in definition 4.2 we would like to make sure that I, f |= Γ for
each formatting function f . We need to follow different approaches for parsers and encoders.
Encoders are expected to be type-safe without any further modification, so we simply check
that they are. To check that I, f |= T1 × . . .× Tn → T we ask our solver to prove that
{intype(x1, T1), . . . , intype(xn, Tn)} ` intype(expand(f(x1, . . . , xn)), T ),
where expand replaces the application of f by its definition, as explained in section 4.6.
We cannot expect parsers to be type-safe since they rely on the internal structure of the
bitstring that they parse and this structure is not captured by the types we use. Therefore
108
we replace parsers by strengthened versions that coerce their result to the right type. This is
justified by the typechecking we do in section 4.6. Consider the typechecking rules in figure 4.11
with one slight modification to the rule (TCFormat), shown in figure 4.13: when we check an
application f(e1, . . . , en) of a formatting function f : T1 × . . . × Tn → T , we wrap it in a
typecast to become tcastbitstringbot→T (f(e˜1, . . . , e˜n)). It is clear that this change does not
affect the behaviour of the process—the rule checks that f(e1, . . . , en) already belongs to the
type T , and so the typecast leaves the argument unchanged. Thus it is safe replace every parser
f : T1 × . . . × Tn → T by a fresh parser f ′ such that I(f ′) = tcastbitstringbot→T ◦I(f). Such a
strengthening makes all our parsers type-safe.
In addition to preserving the behaviour of the process parser strengthening also preserves
the validity of our fact set Φ inferred in section 4.7. The only facts that refer to parsers are the
parsing equations, and it is easy to see that those hold for the modified parsers as well. The
need to preserve the validity of Φ further justifies different treatment of encoders and parsers:
if we were to strengthen the encoders in the same way, instead of explicitly checking their
type-safety, the facts in Φ would in general not be true any more.
4.10 Generalized Formatting
The verification result of CryptoVerif (theorem 4.1) is formulated with respect to a family of
interpretations I˜k, one for for each value k ∈ N of the security parameter. In this section we
show that given the model (Q,Γ,Φ) and the interpretation I that we constructed so far, we
can generalize I to such a family (I˜k)k∈N in a way that satisfies the conditions of theorem 4.1:
for each k ∈ N the interpretation I˜k agrees with the interpretation I˜ck of the cryptographic
functions and additionally I˜k|Q |= Γ and I˜k |= Φ (lemma 4.7).
In order for the cryptographic functions in I˜ck to satisfy their asymptotic security properties
it must be the case that the sizes of their arguments and outputs grow with k. We shall
therefore make an assumption that for each n ∈ N it is I˜ck(fixedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}kn and
I˜ck(boundedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}≤kn, the sets of bitstrings with lengths equal or at most kn.
The interpretations of types bitstring, bitstringbot, and bool will stay the same across all
values of k.
We start by summarizing the shape of the interpretation that we have constructed in the
previous sections. We shall make one additional assumption that all our encoders are robustly
injective (definition 4.10). This is a reasonable assumption insofar as an encoder that is not
robustly injective should be considered ill-designed. All the encoders we have encountered so
far satisfy this property.
Definition 4.12 (Admissible Interpretations) Given an interpretation I and a CryptoVerif
model (Q,Γ,Φ) we call the tuple (I,Q,Γ,Φ) a constrained interpretation if I|Q |= Γ, and I |= Φ.
A constrained interpretation (I,Q,Γ,Φ) is admissible if
• All types in Γ are bool, bitstringbot, bitstring, fixedn, or boundedn for n ∈ N.
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• Each function f ∈ dom(Γ) is of one of the following kinds:
– A cryptographic function.
– A robustly injective encoder fc with Γ(fc) = T1 × . . . × Tn → T where none of the
types T , T1, . . . , Tn is bool or bitstringbot.
– A parser fp with Γ(fp) = T → T ′ where neither of the types T or T ′ is bool or
bitstringbot.
– An auxiliary test function f such that Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → bool for some types
T1, . . . , Tn.
– A cast function tcastT→T ′ with Γ(tcastT→T ′) = T → T ′.
– A constant 0T with Γ(0T ) = T for some fixed type T .
• Φ only contains facts of the form described in section 4.7, that is, facts of the form
parseΓ(fc, fp, i), inj Γ(fc), disj Γ(fc, f
′
c), eqΓ(fc, f
′
c), regΓ(fc), regΓ(f), reg
′
Γ(f, fc) zeroΓ(T ),
and castΓ(T, T
′) with a parser fp, an encoder fc, an auxiliary test function f , and types
T and T ′. If disj Γ(fc, f
′
c) ∈ Φ then fc and f ′c must be robustly disjoint (definition 4.11).
If eqΓ(c, c
′) ∈ Φ then fc and f ′c must have equal defining expressions. 
There are two reasons why the interpretation I is not suitable for arbitrary security parame-
ters as is. The first reason is that with growing input types the sizes of length fields in encoders
may become too small to hold the length of the inputs. The other reasons is that an encoder
may need to have a fixed-length return type. Since the return type is growing with the security
parameter, so must the length of the encoding. We solve both of these issues by widening each
encoder such that for a security parameter k every tag field is replaced by k copies of itself and
every length field is made k times wider.
Definition 4.13 (Generalized Interpretations) Consider an admissible constrained inter-
pretation (I,Γ,Φ). We define the generalized interpretation I˜k for each k ∈ N as follows:
• I˜k(fixedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}kn and I˜k(boundedn) = {0x00, . . . , 0xFF}≤kn. The in-
terpretations of the types bitstring, bitstringbot, and bool will stay the same as their
interpretation by I.
• For every cryptographic function f let I˜k(f) = I˜ck(f).
• For every encoder fc where I(fc) = Je1| . . . |enK we let I˜k(fc) = Je˜1| . . . |e˜nK where for each
i the field e˜i is defined as follows:
– If ei = t ∈ BS then e˜i = t| . . . |t (k times).
– If ei = τ
−1(len(x)) for a variable x where τ is a (signed or unsigned) integer type of
length l then e˜i = τ˜
−1(len(x)) where τ˜ is an unsigned type of length kl.
– If ei = x for a variable x then e˜i = x as well.
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• For every parser fp with Γ(fp) = T → T ′ let
I˜k(fp) =
bi, if b = c(b1, . . . , bn) for some encoder c and parseΓ(fc, fp, i) ∈ Φ,0T ′ , otherwise.
The check whether b is in the range of an encoder fc can be performed efficiently in the
way described in section 4.8 since we assumed that all the encoders are robustly injective.
• For every auxiliary test function f let I˜k(f) be the function that returns true for every
input.
• The cast functions and zeroes are updated according to the change in the interpretation
of their types:
I˜k(tcastT→T ′) = tcastI˜k(T )→I˜k(T ′) I˜k(0T ) = 0I˜k(T ) 
Example 4.11 Consider an encoder fc with I(fc)(x, y) = τ
−1
4u (len(x))|0x01|x|y. The general-
ization of fc for k = 4 would be I˜4(fc)(x, y) = τ
−1
16u(len(x))|0x01010101|x|y. 
It is straightforward to check that the generalized interpretations still satisfy Φ and Γ, and
so the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4.7 Let (I,Q,Γ,Φ) be an admissible constrained interpretation and let (I˜k)k∈N be the
family of generalized interpretations as in definition 4.13. Then (I˜k)k∈N is an efficient family
such that for each k ∈ N the interpretation I˜k agrees with I˜ck for cryptographic functions and
I˜k |= Φ as well as I˜k|Q |= Γ. 
In definition 4.12 we make some assumptions about the structure of the encoders beyond
what is provided by the fact set Φ. For instance, when two encoders are disjoint according
to Φ, we require that they are robustly disjoint (have tag fields that are always aligned and
neither tag is a prefix of the other—definition 4.11). This is a necessity since our construction
does not preserve disjointness as such. For instance, consider two encoders fc and f
′
c (without
arguments) given by
I(fc)(x) = τ
−1
2u (len(x))|x I(f ′c) = 0b11000000.
It is clear that these two encoders are disjoint: there is no x such that fc(x) = f
′
c. However if
we apply our construction in definition 4.13 then for k = 2 we get
I˜2(fc)(x) = τ
−1
4u (len(x))|x I˜2(f ′c) = 0b1100000011000000
and we see that I˜2(fc)(0b000011000000) = I˜2(f
′
c).
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Definition 4.12 does not require the parsers to be of any particular shape. Instead we define
the behaviour of the parsers based on the parseΓ facts in Φ. This means that the generalization
procedure is fully applicable to the interpretation obtained by strengthening the parsers in
section 4.9.
4.11 Summary and Soundness
We are now ready to prove soundness of our translation from IML processes to CryptoVerif
models. We start by summarizing the translation procedure.
Definition 4.14 (IML to CryptoVerif Translation) Consider a well-formed input IML pro-
cess Q. We say that Q yields a CryptoVerif model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) if there exist processes Q1, . . . , Q4
such that
1. Q1 is the formatting-normal form of Q (section 4.3).
2. Q2 is the formatting abstraction of Q1, that is, Q1  Q2 by the rules in figure 4.8
(section 4.4).
3. Γ is the result of type inference of function types from Q (section 4.5).
4. Q3 is the result of typechecking Q2 with respect to Γ, that is, Γ, ∅ ` Q2  Q3 by the
rules in figure 4.11 (section 4.6).
5. Φ is the result of fact inference (section 4.7).
6. Q4 is the result of parsing safety analysis of Q3, that is, ∅ ` Q3  Q4 by the rules in
figure 4.12 (section 4.8).
7. I, f |= Γ for every encoder f (section 4.9).
8. Q˜ is obtained from Q4 by removing inline assumptions. 
We need to provide a relation between IML security (definition 2.2) and CryptoVerif security
(definition 4.3). The only difference between the IML and the CryptoVerif semantics, as pointed
out in section 4.1 is the fact that CryptoVerif processes are executed with respect to a typing
environment and the execution stops whenever a function is passed an argument of a wrong
type. Thus we shall be able to prove that the CryptoVerif semantics coincides with the IML
semantics for a process Q whenever the process is well-typed (Γ ` Q) and the interpretation is
type-safe (I|Q |= Γ) as in definition 4.2. We start by defining a semantic consequence of these
two conditions: a process is type-safe if no function is ever called with input of a wrong type.
Definition 4.15 (Type-Safe Processes) An executing process (η,Q) is type-safe with re-
spect to a typing environment Γ if for each top-level expression f(e1, . . . , en) in Q:
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• f ∈ dom(Γ).
• If Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T then JeiKη ∈ I(Ti) for all i ≤ n.
An input process Q0 is type-safe with respect to a typing environment Γ if for each semantic
configuration (η, P ),Q reachable from initConfig(Q0) both (η, P ) and each (η,Q) ∈ Q are type-
safe with respect to Γ. 
Lemma 4.8 If a well-formed input CryptoVerif process Q is well-typed with respect to a typing
environment Γ and I|Q |= Γ then Q is type-safe with respect to Γ. 
Proof The proof is straightforward by structural induction on the derivation Γ ` Q, similar
to Blanchet [2008, Appendix B2]. 
Lemma 4.9 If a well-formed input CryptoVerif process Q is well-typed with respect to a typing
environment Γ and I|Q |= Γ then for any trace property ρ we have insec(Q, ρ) = cvinsec(Q, I,Γ, ρ).
Proof Let Q and Γ be as in the statement of the lemma. By lemma 4.8 Q is type-safe with
respect to Γ. Let C be a reachable semantic configuration with respect to IML semantics, let
(η, P ) be an executing process in C (either the output process or one of the input processes)
and e an expression in P . The only difference in the CryptoVerif and the IML semantics are
the rules for expression evaluation. It therefore suffices to show that e, η ⇓ JeKη—then obviously
any reduction of C by the IML semantics will also be a reduction by the CryptoVerif semantics.
We prove the statement by structural induction on e. The case e = x ∈ Var is trivial.
Let e = f(e1, . . . , en). Assume that Γ(f) = T1 × . . . × Tn → T . By type-safety of Q we haveJeiKη ∈ I(Ti) for each i ≤ n. Applying the induction hypothesis we conclude e, η ⇓ JeKη. 
We are now ready to present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 4.3 (IML to CryptoVerif Translation is Sound) Consider a well-formed input
IML process Q that satisfies inline assumptions. Assume that Q yields a CryptoVerif model
(Q˜,Γ,Φ) and CryptoVerif verifies this model against a correspondence property ρ. Assume that
I agrees with I˜ck0 for cryptographic functions. Then
1. For any attacker QA (a well-formed process that is well-typed with respect to Γ and does
not contain events) there is a sufficiently large polynomial p such that
insec(QA|Q, ρ) ≤ cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k0).
2. The function cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) is well-defined for all k ∈ N and is negligible in
k for any attacker QA and a sufficiently large polynomial p. 
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Proof Obtain processes Q1, . . . , Q4 from definition 4.14 and choose a trace property ρ and an
attackerQA. Conversion to formatting-normal form is sound (lemma 4.2) and clearly formatting
abstraction is sound as well, thus Q . Q1 . Q2. By lemmas 4.4 and 4.6 Q2 . Q3 . Q4 and
finally, since Q satisfies inline assumptions, Q4 . Q˜. Thus overall Q . Q˜. By theorems 2.2
and 2.3
insec(QA|Q, ρ) ≤ insec(QA|Q˜, ρ). (4.37)
Condition 7 in the translation makes sure that all encoders f are type-safe: I, f |= Γ. As
described in section 4.9, we can strengthen the parsers to make them type-safe as well. Let
(Q˜∗,Γ∗,Φ∗) be the model in which every parser has been replaced by the strengthened version.
Then I|Q∗ |= Γ∗ and I |= Φ∗ and the behaviour of the process is preserved:
insec(QA|Q˜, ρ) = insec(QA|Q˜∗, ρ). (4.38)
By lemma 4.5 Q˜ is well-typed with respect to Γ, therefore Q˜∗ is well-typed with respect to
Γ∗. The attacker QA is assumed to be well-formed and well-typed with respect to Γ. We can
assume that QA does not use the parsing symbols used by Q˜, therefore QA is well-typed with
respect to Γ∗. Applying lemma 4.9 we get
insec(QA|Q˜∗, ρ) = cvinsec(QA|Q˜∗, I,Γ∗, ρ). (4.39)
Since the interpretation I is efficient (we assume efficiency for cryptographic functions and all
our formatting functions are efficient by construction) there exists a polynomial p such that
cvinsec(QA|Q˜∗, I,Γ∗, ρ) ≤ cvboundp(QA|Q˜∗,Γ∗,Φ∗, ρ, k0). (4.40)
Finally, since the models (Q˜,Γ,Φ) and (Q˜∗,Γ∗,Φ∗) are the same up to renaming of symbols
and use the same cryptographic functions, we have
cvboundp(QA|Q˜∗,Γ∗,Φ∗, ρ, k0) = cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k0). (4.41)
Equations (4.37) to (4.41) together prove statement (1) of the theorem.
In order to show that cvboundp(QA|Q˜,Γ,Φ, ρ, k) is defined for all k ∈ N we need to prove
that there is at least one interpretation for each k ∈ N that satisfies the definition of cvbound.
The tuple (I, Q˜∗,Γ∗,Φ∗) forms an admissible constrained interpretation (definition 4.12). Ap-
plying lemma 4.7 we obtain a family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N such that the interpretation I˜k
satisfies the definition of cvbound for k. Our construction is efficient, so we can choose the
polynomial p large enough to allow each function in I˜k enough time to execute. Statement (2)
of the theorem now follows by lemma 4.1. 
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Theorem 4.3 can be summarized as follows: Assume that an IML process Q translates to
a CryptoVerif model (Q˜,Γ,Φ) and CryptoVerif successfully verifies (Q˜,Γ,Φ) against a trace
property ρ. Then Q is at least as secure as Q˜ with respect to ρ and Q˜ can be made as secure
as necessary simply by increasing k0. The shape of the formatting functions is not relevant as
long as they satisfy Γ and Φ. Section 4.10 shows one way how such formatting functions can
be constructed for every value of the security parameter.
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Chapter 5
Model Verification in Symbolic
Setting
Symbolic models of cryptography view cryptographic messages as abstract terms that possess
no properties except the desired ones [Dolev and Yao, 1983]. For instance, the only way to
extract information from an encrypted message would be to decrypt it, having a valid key. In
other words, symbolic models assume unbreakable cryptography.
ProVerif [Blanchet, 2009, 2014] is a tool that verifies security of processes with respect to a
symbolic model. It inputs a process Q, the desired trace property ρ, and a set R of rewriting
rules that model cryptography in the formal model, such as decrypt(encrypt(m, k), k) = m. It
then checks whether Q symbolically satisfies ρ with respect to R.
We can always take a process resulting from the CryptoVerif translation in chapter 4 and
analyse this process in the symbolic model with ProVerif. What such an analysis implies
about the computational security of the process is a matter of active research. Under some
circumstances it is possible to make a precise computational statement based on a symbolic
result. This chapter shows how to apply a set of computational soundness conditions derived
by Backes et al. [2009] in their CoSP framework in order to obtain such a statement.
We start by reviewing the result of Backes et al. [2009] in section 5.1. Their work defines
a notion of computational execution, called computational pi-execution, which we review in
section 5.1.1. This notion is different from ours in that the attacker is not a process, but
an external machine that interacts with the executing protocol process. The computational
soundness result itself is presented in section 5.1.3. It applies to a set of primitives that include
an IND-CCA2 encryption operation. More interestingly for us, the result lists several properties
that all encoders and parsers in the process must satisfy: the encoders must be defined for all
inputs, the parsers must check correctness of the message format before parsing, and the ranges
of all encoders must be pairwise disjoint.
There are three things that we need to accomplish in order to formulate a security result
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for an IML process. First, we need to transform the process into a pi process that satisfies
some syntactic conditions required by the result of Backes et al. [2009]. This is done by the
transformations described in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Second, we need to make sure that the operations used by the process satisfy the encryption
soundness conditions, so we can apply the soundness result and obtain a security statement
for the computational pi execution. This is described in section 5.5. The condition that the
encoders must be defined for bitstrings of arbitrary length is the most problematic one, as it
cannot be satisfied by implementations that use a fixed-size length field. To deal with this
we specify a relaxed set of soundness conditions that only need to be satisfied for well-typed
inputs. In order to check these conditions, we can make use of a fact set Φ obtained as in
section 4.7. We can generalize the set of primitives that satisfies the relaxed conditions to a set
of primitives that satisfies full conditions in such a way that the generalized primitives agree
with the primitives used by the process for well-typed inputs. We then typecheck the process
(using the same method as in chapter 4) to make sure that formatting inputs in all runs will
indeed be well-typed. Thus if Q is a process that represents our implementation, we show that
we can generalise and strengthen the primitives in Q to yield a process Q∗ that satisfies the
computational soundness conditions such that Q . Q∗.
Finally, we need to show that security in the pi model implies security in the IML model.
We prove this in section 5.6 by demonstrating how to take any attack represented by an IML
process and turn it into an attack against the computational pi execution.
The full translation from IML to ProVerif is summarized in section 5.2 and the remaining
sections fill in the details. The main theoretical result of this chapter is theorem 5.2 (section 5.7).
The theorem states that if an IML process Q successfully translates to a ProVerif model Q˜ and
certain soundness conditions are satisfied then there exists a function f of the security parameter
k such that the insecurity of Q can be bounded from above by f(k0) and f is negligible in k.
The computational result from the ProVerif analysis is both weaker and harder to obtain
than the result we get from using CryptoVerif directly. We are yet to see a protocol that
would support a computational soundness result and not be amenable to direct CryptoVerif
verification. The value of the work presented in this chapter is therefore less practical that in
chapter 4, but we see this work as a validation for applicability of our verification approach:
our process transformations could be adapted to a new setting almost without change.
We feel that ProVerif is more useful in protocol design, where it can be used to rapidly check
ideas for logical flaws. Mature protocols with existing implementations would profit more from
direct verification with CryptoVerif using our method in chapter 4.
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b ∈ BS , x, i ∈ Var , f ∈ Ops
e ∈ PExp ::= expression
x variable
f(e1, . . . , en) constructor/destructor
Q ::= input process
0 nil
!i≤NQ replication
Q|Q′ parallel composition
in(c[e1, . . . , en], x); P input
P ::= output process
new x : nonce; P randomness
out(c[e1, . . . , en], e); Q output
event ev(); P event
if e=⊥ e′ then P [else P ′] conditional
let⊥ x = e in P [else P ′] evaluation
Figure 5.1: The syntax of the applied pi calculus.
5.1 Review—CoSP
5.1.1 The Applied Pi Calculus
We start by reviewing the calculus used by Backes et al. [2009] to formalize their computational
soundness result. It is a variant of the applied pi calculus [Blanchet et al., 2008] understood
by the ProVerif tool [Blanchet, 2009]. The calculus is not a syntactic subset of IML, but in
section 5.2 we shall show how we can embed it within IML by introducing appropriate syntactic
sugar.
The syntax of the calculus is shown in figure 5.1. The main difference from IML is the
changed let-binding rule. The binding is now allowed to have an else-branch which is taken
whenever the expression evaluates to ⊥. We write let⊥ to distinguish this construct (we shall
call it a strong let) from a normal IML let. As usual, the missing else-branch in either if or let
is an abbreviation for else out(yield [i1, . . . , in]; ε); 0 where i1, . . . , in are the replication indices
under which the process occurs. The only form of the conditional expression is e =⊥ e′ that
evaluates to ⊥ if either e or e′ evaluates to ⊥. We shall call =⊥ a strong equality check.
Compared to IML, the following restrictions are necessary to support the computational
soundness result in section 5.1.3:
• We only allow nonces of one special type, nonce. We shall later assume, following Backes
et al. [2009], that the set of nonces is disjoint from the ranges of all the functions in Ops.
Thus in the implementation nonces need to be tagged.
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x ∈ dom(η)JxKpiI,η = η(x)
Je1KpiI,η = b1 ∈ BS . . . JenKpiI,η = bn ∈ BSJf(e1, . . . , en)KpiI,η = I(f)(b1, . . . , bn)
Figure 5.2: The evaluation of pi expressions with respect to an interpretation I. We let JeKpiI,η =
⊥ if neither rule applies.
• Events cannot contain parameters. This is a limitation of the result of Backes et al.
[2009]—events there are fixed bitstrings.
The result of evaluating a pi expression e with respect to an interpretation I and an en-
vironment η will be denoted with JeKpiI,η. The evaluation rules are shown in figure 5.2. We
make explicit the dependence on the interpretation since we shall allow the interpretation to
vary depending on the security parameter. The main difference from the IML evaluation rules
(figure 2.2) is that failures shortcut—the whole expression evaluates to ⊥ whenever any subex-
pression evaluates to ⊥.
The execution of pi calculus is defined with respect to a security parameter k ∈ N and
assumes a family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N (often shortened to I˜ in the following). The evalua-
tion is carried out by a single machine that is supposed to work across all security parameters.
This places additional efficiency conditions on (I˜k)k∈N—it must be implementable by a single
machine for all values of k. This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 5.1 (Uniformly Efficient Interpretations) A family of interpretations (I˜k)k∈N
is uniformly efficient if it is efficient in the sense of definition 4.4 and additionally for each symbol
f ∈ Ops of arity n there exists an efficient algorithm Af that computes I˜k(f)(b1, . . . , bn) given
k, b1, . . . , bn as inputs. 
The evaluation of processes is defined differently from our IML evaluation. Instead of
representing the attacker as a process that runs in parallel with the protocol process, Backes
et al. [2009] makes the attacker external—it is an arbitrary machine that interacts with the
executing process (called an interactive machine). Another difference is that pi evaluation uses
a single global environment and relies on renaming of variables to avoid clashes. The definition
is as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Computational Pi-execution [Backes et al., 2009, Definition 18]) Let
Q0 be a well-formed pi process, I˜ a uniformly efficient family of interpretations, and let A be an
interactive machine called the adversary. We define the computational pi-execution with respect
to I˜ as an interactive machine ExecI˜,Q0(1
k) that takes a security parameter k as argument and
interacts with A:
• Start: Let Q∗ := Q0 (where we rename all bound variables and names such that they
are pairwise distinct and distinct from all unbound ones). Let η be a totally undefined
environment.
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• Main Loop: Send P to the adversary and expect an evaluation context C with one or two
holes from the adversary. Distinguish the following cases:
– Q∗ = C[in(c[. . .], x);Q′]: Request a channel name c′ and a bitstring b from the adver-
sary and if c′ = c, set η := η{x 7→ b} and Q∗ := C[Q′]. Ignore channel parameters.
– Q∗ = C[new x : nonce;Q′]. Pick r ∈ I(nonce) at random and set Q∗ := C[Q′] and
η := η{x 7→ r}.
– Q∗ = C[out(c[. . .], e);Q1][in(c[. . .], x);Q2]: If b = JeKpiI˜k,η 6= ⊥ then set Q∗ :=
C[Q1][Q2] and η := η{x 7→ b}. Ignore channel parameters.
– Q∗ = C[let x = e in Q1 else Q2]: If b = JeKpiI˜k,η 6= ⊥ then set Q∗ := C[Q1] and
η := η{x 7→ b}. Else set Q∗ := C[Q2].
– Q∗ = C[if e = e′ then Q1 else Q2]: Let b = JeKpiI˜k,η and b′ = JeKpiI˜k,η. If b = b′ ∈ BS
then set Q := C[Q1]. Else if b ∈ BS and b ∈ BS but b 6= b′ set Q∗ := C[Q2].
– Q∗ = C[event ev(); Q′]: Set Q∗ := C[Q′] and raise event ev.
– Q∗ = C[!i≤NQ′]: Rename all bound variables of Q′ such that they are pairwise
distinct and distinct from all variables and names in Q and in the domain of η,
yielding a process Q′′. Set Q∗ = C[Q′′|!i≤NQ′]. Ignore the replication index.
– Q∗ = C[out(c[. . .], e);Q′]: If b = JeKpiI˜k,η 6= ⊥ request a channel name c′ from the
adversary and if c′ = c, send b to the adversary and set Q∗ := C[Q′]. Ignore channel
parameters.
– In all other cases do nothing. 
The above leads directly to the definition of security for pi processes.
Definition 5.3 (Pi Security [Backes et al., 2009, Definition 19]) Given a uniformly ef-
ficient family of interpretations I˜, a polynomial-time interactive machine A, a closed pi pro-
cess Q, and a polynomial p, let Events(Q,A, I˜, p, k) be the list of events raised within the
first p(k) computation steps of A(1k) interacting with ExecI˜,Q(1
k) (jointly counted for A(1k)
and ExecI˜,Q(1
k)). For a trace property ρ let insecpi(Q,A, I˜, ρ, p, k) be the probability that
Events(Q,A, I˜, p, k) /∈ ρ. 
Differences from Original Sources The calculus shown in figure 5.1 is a restricted version
of the pi calculus presented in Backes et al. [2009], as we do not need the full generality used
there. Our restrictions are as follows:
• The processes are required to be in alternating input-output form, to match IML syntax.
• The original calculus makes a distinction between variables (results of network inputs)
and names (results of random number generation). We drop this distinction since both
behave identically for the purpose of the computational execution.
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• The original calculus divides the operations in Ops into constructors and destructors.
This is necessary to define the symbolic semantics of the calculus where constructors
create new symbolic terms and destructors are used to rewrite the terms. We drop the
distinction between constructors and destructors since we do not formalize the symbolic
semantics.
• Conditional expressions are not included in the original calculus. However, let-expressions
of the form let⊥ x = e in P else P ′ can be used to conditionally choose based on equality
of bitstrings by assuming that there exists an operation eq ∈ Ops such that I(eq)(b, b) = b
and I(eq)(b, b′) = ⊥ for all b 6= b′.
• We keep replication indices and channel parameters in the syntax, but they are only there
to make our correspondence proof easier to formulate. The computational pi execution
(definition 5.2) makes no use of replication indices or channel parameters.
5.1.2 ProVerif
ProVerif [Blanchet, 2009, 2014] verifies the security of a pi process with respect to symbolic
semantics in which processes create and rewrite terms based on a given set of constructors and
rewriting rules. The rewriting rules also specify the powers of the attacker. Verification proceeds
by transforming the process into a set of Horn clauses that include atoms such as attacker(t)
meaning that the attacker can derive the term t and event(ev(t)) meaning that event ev has been
executed with payload t. Example clauses could have the form attacker(t1)∧. . .∧attacker(tn)⇒
event(ev(t)) meaning that the attacker can force event ev(t) to be executed if it is in possession
of t1, . . . , tn or event(ev(t)) ⇒ attacker(t′) meaning that the attacker can obtain t′ but only
after ev(t) has been executed (all of the ts may contain variables). ProVerif makes a distinction
between the events that may have been executed (those used on the right-hand side of the
clauses) and the events that must have been executed (used on the left-hand side), but we gloss
over this distinction.
To verify a correspondence property ev(t)⇒ ev′(t′), meaning that every event ev′(t′) must
be preceded by an event ev(t) ProVerif runs a resolution algorithm on the set of clauses unifying
clauses with each other until saturation (which may lead to non-termination). If after resolution
each clause with ev′(t′) in the conclusion has ev(t) among the hypotheses then we have proved
the required correspondence.
We do not formalize the symbolic semantics of the calculus. We treat ProVerif together
with the symbolic soundness result described in the next section as a black box—the soundness
result states that if the process symbolically verifies the property under a certain set of rewriting
rules (as verified by ProVerif) then it computationally satisfies the property with respect to
definition 5.3. We refer the reader to Backes et al. [2009]; Blanchet [2009] for a formal definition
of symbolic process semantics and symbolic security properties.
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5.1.3 Computational Soundness For Public-Key Encryption
Backes et al. [2009] provide an example of a set of operations Ops and a set of soundness condi-
tions restricting their implementations that are sufficient to establish computational soundness.
The set Ops contains a public key encryption operation that is required to be IND-CCA2 se-
cure. The soundness result is established for the class of key-safe processes that always use
fresh randomness for encryption and key generation, only use honestly generated decryption
keys and never send decryption keys. We start by listing the function symbols that the sound-
ness result applies to, splitting them into two groups: cryptographic operations and formatting
operations.
Definition 5.4 (Operations for Encryption-Soundness) Let
OpsE = {E/3, ek/1, dk/1, D/2, isenc/1, isek/1, ekof/1, garbage/1, garbageE/2}
be the set of operations that include encryption and decryption functions E and D, functions
ek and dk for generating encryption and decryption keys, a function isenc for testing whether
a bitstring is an encryption, a function isek for testing whether whether a bitstring is an
encryption key, and a function ekof for extracting the encryption key from an encryption. The
functions garbage and garbageE are not meant to be used by the process—their purpose is to
allow additional abilities to the attacker in the symbolic model.
A set of function symbols OpsF is called a formatting set if OpsF = OpsC ∪OpsP such that
for each symbol c ∈ OpsC with arity n the set OpsP contains the symbols c−1i for i = 1, . . . , n.
The result of Backes et al. [2009] includes soundness for signatures, but we omit them to
simplify the presentation (our NSL example in appendix D does use signatures though). The
result of Backes et al. [2009] is presented for a single pairing operation, but in practice protocols
will use a variety of message formats, so we use the obvious generalisation to an arbitrary set
of formatting operations.
Next we outline the soundness conditions that the operations in OpsE∪OpsF need to satisfy.
Definition 5.5 (Encryption-Soundness Conditions) Given a uniformly efficient family of
interpretations I˜ and a formatting set OpsF = OpsC ∪OpsP we say that I˜ is encryption-sound
for OpsE ∪OpsF if for each k ∈ N:
1. For each c ∈ OpsC with arity n and b1, . . . , bn ∈ BS and for each i ≤ n we have
I˜k(c
−1
i )(I˜k(c)(b1, . . . , bn)) = bi. For every b /∈ range(I˜k(c)) and each i ≤ n we have
I˜k(c
−1
i )(b) = ⊥.
2. The sets I˜k(nonce), range(I˜k(E)), range(I˜k(ek)), range(I˜k(dk)), and range(I˜k(c)) for c ∈
OpsC are disjoint and efficiently recognizable.
3. The functions I˜k(E), I˜k(ek), I˜k(dk), and I˜k(c) for c ∈ OpsC are length-regular—the length
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of their result depends only on the lengths of their parameters. All m ∈ I˜k(nonce) have
the same length.
4. range(I˜k(ekof)) ⊆ range(I˜k(ek)).
5. I˜k(ekof)(I˜k(E)(p, x, y)) = p for all p ∈ range(I˜k(ek)), x ∈ BS , and y ∈ I˜k(nonce).
I˜k(ekof)(e) 6= ⊥ for any e ∈ range(I˜k(E)) and I˜k(ekof)(e) = ⊥ for any e /∈ range(I˜k(E)).
6. I˜k(E)(p,m, y) = ⊥ if p /∈ range(I˜k(ek)).
7. I˜k(D)(I˜k(dk)(r),m) = ⊥ if r ∈ I˜k(nonce) and I˜k(ekof)(m) 6= I˜k(ek)(r).
8. I˜k(D)(I˜k(dk)(r), I˜k(E)(I˜k(ek)(r),m, r
′)) = m for all r, r′ ∈ I˜k(nonce).
9. I˜k(isek)(x) = x for any x ∈ I˜k(ek). I˜k(isek)(x) = ⊥ for any x /∈ I˜k(ek).
10. I˜k(isenc)(x) = x for any x ∈ I˜k(E). I˜k(isenc)(x) = ⊥ for any x /∈ I˜k(ek).
Additionally the following two conditions need to be satisfied:
11. We define an encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as follows: KeyGen picks a ran-
dom r in I˜k(nonce) and returns (I˜k(ek)(r), I˜k(dk)(r)). Enc(p,m) picks a random r in
I˜k(nonce) and returns I˜k(E)(p,m, r). Dec(k, c) returns I˜k(D)(k, c). We require that the
defined encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure with respect to the security parameter k.
12. For all e of type encryption key and m ∈ BS the probability that I˜k(E)(e,m, r) =
I˜k(E)(e,m, r
′) for uniformly chosen r, r′ ∈ I˜k(nonce) is negligible in k.
No restrictions are put on the implementations of garbage and garbageE since those symbols
are not used by the process. 
As noted by Backes et al. [2009] any IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme can be trans-
formed into a set of operations satisfying the above conditions by suitable tagging and padding.
It is worth noting that the encryption operation can only be realised using hybrid encryption,
as it has to produce output for all x ∈ BS .
The soundness result of Backes et al. [2009] is proved for a class of key-safe processes. In a
nutshell, key-safe processes always use fresh randomness for encryption and key generation and
only use honestly generated (that is, through key generation) decryption keys for decryption.
Decryption keys may not be sent around (in particular, this avoids the key-cycle problems).
The grammar of key-safe processes is summarised in figure 5.3. We let x, xd, ks, and r stand
for different sets of variables: general purpose, decryption key, signing key, and randomness
variables.
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c ∈ OpsC with arity n
m ::= x | c(m1, . . . ,mn)
e ::= m | c−1i (e) for i ≤ n | isek(e) | isenc(e) | D(xd, e) | ekof(e)
P, P ′ ::= out(c[. . .], x); P | in(c[. . .], x); P | 0 | !i≤NP | (P |P ′)
| new x : nonce; P
| event ev(); P
| let⊥ x = e in P [else P ′]
| if e =⊥ e then P [else P ′]
| new r : nonce; let⊥ x = ek(r) in let⊥ xd = dk(r) in P
| new r : nonce; let⊥ x = E(isek(e1), e2, r) in P
Figure 5.3: The syntax of key-safe processes.
Definition 5.6 (Symbolic Rewriting Rules for Encryption-Soundness) The symbolic
rewriting rules for OpsE ∪OpsF with a formatting set OpsF = OpsC ∪OpsP are
D(dk(t1), E(ek(t1),m, t2)) = m,
isenc(E(ek(t1), t2, t3)) = E(ek(t1), t2, t3),
isenc(garbageE(t1, t2)) = garbageE(t1, t2)
isek(ek(t)) = ek(t),
ekof(E(ek(t1),m, t2)) = ek(t1),
ekof(garbageE(t1, t2)) = t1,
c−1i (c(x1, . . . , xn)) = xi, for c ∈ OpsC i ≤ n = arity(c). 
Theorem 5.1 (Computational Soundness [Backes et al., 2009, Theorem 4]) Assume
that a well-formed key-safe pi process Q uses only operations in OpsE ∪OpsF for some format-
ting set OpsF and there exists a uniformly efficient family of interpretations I˜ that is encryption-
sound for OpsE ∪OpsF . If Q symbolically satisfies a trace property ρ with respect to symbolic
rewriting rules for OpsE ∪ OpsF (definition 5.6) then for all polynomial-time interactive ma-
chines A and all polynomials p the function insecpi(Q,A, I˜, ρ, p, k) is negligible in k. 
5.2 From IML to ProVerif: Summary
Our translation from an IML to a ProVerif model reuses many of the steps from our IML to
CryptoVerif translation (chapter 4). Transforming the process into a formatting-normal form,
formatting abstraction, type inference, and type checking will remain exactly the same. This
section gives a high-level overview of the steps that differ and the remaining sections of this
chapter fill in the details.
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Process Strengthening The first step in the translation is making sure that our process is
a valid pi process. Pi calculus uses strong lets that terminate whenever the evaluation of an
expression results in ⊥. These can be added to IML as syntactic sugar: we define let⊥ x = e in
P to be an abbreviation for if defined(e) then let x = e in P . Every let-binding that evaluates
an expression e can be turned into a strong let-binding if we can prove the fact defined(e) from
the context. This is done in section 5.3.
An additional transformation that is performed in section 5.3 is strengthening of the parsers.
Encryption-soundness conditions require that the parsers are safe: they must evaluate to ⊥
whenever their arguments are not in the range of the encoder that they are intended to match.
To achieve this we can reuse our parsing safety analysis developed in section 4.8. Now instead
of parsing safety being optional, it is required at every parsing site, which allows us to replace
all the parsers by their safe versions.
Erasing Conditionals IML models extracted from cryptographic implementations contain
a lot of auxiliary condition checks (definition 4.7) resulting from if-statements in the C code.
The syntax of key-safe processes (figure 5.3) does not allow for arbitrary condition checks, so
they need to be removed. This is done in section 5.4 by a transformation that is in a way dual
to the strengthening of let-bindings described above. Given a process of the form
if φ then let⊥ x = fp(e) in P
with a safe parser fp, we can remove the condition check if we can prove that the condition φ is
implied by inrange(e, fc), where fc is the encoder matched by fp (see section 4.8 for a discussion
of inrange facts). This transformation, described in section 5.4, is able to remove all auxiliary
condition checks that are used for parsing safety. Unfortunately, most C programs also perform
other types of checks. For instance, any check for the NULL result of a malloc will introduce an
if-statement into the model that cannot be removed. Thus in order to apply the computational
soundness result we need to make an assumption that the program executes with unbounded
memory and malloc calls (as well as any other system calls used by the program) never fail.
We review the extracted model and manually remove the condition checks for which we can
reasonably assume that they always succeed.
Encryption-Soundness In section 5.5 we make sure that our model uses functions that
satisfy the encryption-soundness conditions (definition 5.5). The conditions can be split into
two groups: those speaking about the cryptographic functions OpsE will need to be assumed
since we are not verifying the implementations of the cryptographic functions. On the other
hand, the conditions speaking about the formatting functions OpsF can be checked by our
verification tools. One of the conditions in definition 5.5 is particularly problematic, namely
the requirement that encoding functions should be defined for arguments of arbitrary lengths.
This is unlikely to be satisfied by any practical protocol implementation since message formats
typically use length fields of a fixed length. In order to overcome this problem we show that
126
our formatting functions can be strengthened to handle arguments of arbitrary types yielding
a new formatting set Ops∗F that agrees with OpsF for well-typed arguments (lemma 5.3). We
then argue that if our process is well-typed then we can replace functions from OpsF by their
strengthened versions from Ops∗F—the behaviour of the process will not change since it never
applies formatting functions to arguments of a wrong type.
Our experience suggests that cryptographic security results should always include some
concept of typing since that makes it much easier to apply those results to existing cryptographic
implementations. (Incidentally, Backes et al. [2009] do speak about types, but those refer to
the types of terms in the symbolic model, not to the bitstring types.)
From Pi Security to IML Security Next we prove that computational security in the pi
model implies security in the IML model. To do so we show that any IML attacker process QA
can be transformed into an adversary A (an interactive machine) that interacts with Exec =
ExecI˜,Q0(1
k0) for a process Q0 in the same way as QA interacts with Q0 by the IML rules.
When the IML attacker sends a message on a channel c with channel parameters n1, . . . , nk, we
need to translate the address c, n1, . . . , nk into a context C that A should send to Exec. The
context C is supposed to select the same subprocess in the process Q∗ maintained by Exec as
would be matched by the address c, n1, . . . , nk in the IML semantic configuration. Section 5.6
provides details of the construction.
Failure Propagation and Typing The encryption-soundness conditions do not allow arbi-
trary condition checks and instead require that functions (most notably, parsers) should signal
failure by returning ⊥. This stands in the way of type-safety: now we cannot require that
I|Q |= Γ for a process Q and a typing environment Γ since any function can return ⊥. Instead
we define a weaker notion of type-safety that discards failure.
Definition 5.7 (Failure-Insensitive Type-Safety) Given a function symbol f of arity n
and a typing environment Γ we say that f is type-safe up to failure with respect to Γ, writing
I, f |=⊥ Γ, if the following holds: Let Γ(f) = T1 × . . . × Tn → T be the type of f in Γ (in
particular, f ∈ dom(Γ)). Then for all b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn) and b = I(f)(b1, . . . , bn) either
b = ⊥ or b ∈ I(T ).
Given an IML process Q and a typing environment Γ we say that functions in Q are type-safe
up to failure with respect to Γ, writing I|Q |=⊥ Γ, if I, f |=⊥ Γ for every f in Q.
A function f is called ⊥-propagating if I(f) returns ⊥ when any of the arguments is ⊥. 
Given a pi processQ that is well-typed with respect to Γ, it turns out that if all functions inQ
are type-safe up to failure and ⊥-propagating then that is enough to establish type-safety of Q:
every executing process (η, P ) in a semantic configuration that is reachable from initConfig(Q)
will satisfy η |= Γ. This is intuitively clear since any failure will be propagated to the top level
by ⊥-propagating functions, at which point the process will be stopped if it only uses strong
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lets. Thus we never update the environment with a value of the wrong type. We shall use an
argument of this kind in the proof lemma 5.4.
By construction all the functions used by processes in this chapter will be ⊥-propagating.
When we construct a function for arguments b1, . . . , bn ∈ BS , we imply that it returns ⊥ when
one of the arguments is ⊥.
Interpretation of the Result The soundness result (theorem 5.2) that we prove in sec-
tion 5.7 states that if the translation from an IML process Q to a pi model Q˜ is successful and
the cryptographic functions satisfy certain conditions then we can bound insec(QA|Q, ρ) for
any attacker QA and trace property ρ by a function of the form insecpi(Q˜
∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, p, k) that is
negligible in k. The process Q˜∗ is obtained from Q˜ by strengthening of the formatting functions
as described in section 5.5, the adversary A is constructed from QA as described in section 5.6,
I˜∗ is a suitable family of interpretations that extends the functions used by the implementation
to arbitrary security parameters, and p is some polynomial large enough to give A enough time
to execute any attack performed by QA.
This result is less convincing that the corresponding result in theorem 4.3 that we obtained
for CryptoVerif. The negligible function that provides the upper bound explicitly depends on
the implementations of the functions used by the process (I˜∗), and we cannot exclude that this
function has a particularly high value for k0, since it uses the formatting functions provided by
the implementation for k = k0 and uses “ideal” formatting functions for all values of k 6= k0.
The difference between theorem 4.3 and theorem 5.2 is down to the fact that the pi security
definition (definition 5.3) requires uniform efficiency of the interpretation family that is used
for defining the computational execution. For every function f there must exist a single ma-
chine that is able to execute I˜k
∗(f) for any value of k. This prevents us from using the same
argument as in the proof of lemma 4.1 to define a function that is independent of a particular
interpretation. There we took the least secure interpretation for each security parameter and
combined all those interpretations into a new family, arguing that the insecurity with respect
to that family is still negligible. Now we cannot do so any more since a family constructed in
this way is not necessarily uniformly efficient.
The above suggests that one should prefer non-uniform security definitions. This corre-
sponds well with practice since there is often no expectation that the cryptographic algorithms
should be executable for arbitrary security parameters. For instance, symmetric block ciphers
are very specific to a particular length of the key.
We can still make an informal argument that the function insecpi(Q˜
∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, p, k) is a good
bound since it is more likely to depend on the properties of the cryptographic functions than
on the properties of the formatting functions.
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fp(e) safely matches fc in context Φ
f˜p is a fresh symbol with I(f˜p) = I(fp)|range(fc) Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` let x = fp(e) in P  let⊥ x = f˜p(e) in P˜
Φ ` defined(e) Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` let x = e in P  let⊥ x = e in P˜
Φ ` defined(e) ∧ defined(e′) Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` if e = e then P  if e =⊥ e then P˜
Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Φ ` if φ then P  if φ then P˜
Φ ∪ {φ} ` P  P˜
Φ ` assume φ; P  assume φ; P˜
Φ ` P  P˜
Φ ` λP  λP˜
Figure 5.4: Process strengthening rules.
5.3 Process Strengthening
Unlike CryptoVerif where parsing safety is optional, the soundness conditions in definition 5.5
require that every parser fp is safe, that is, I(fp)(b) = ⊥ whenever b /∈ range(I(fc)) for the
encoder fc matched by fp. We modify our parsing safety analysis from section 4.8 such that
it fails whenever parsing safety is not satisfied. Then we know that at each parsing site the
parsing input will always be in the range of the corresponding encoding function, which allows
us to safely replace every parser fp in the process by a parser f˜p that fails whenever the input
is outside the range. We use the notation f |A to denote a function that returns f(x) for all
x ∈ A and ⊥ otherwise.
In addition to strengthening the parsers we replace let-bindings by strong let-bindings and
equality checks by strong equality checks whenever possible. The transformation rules are
formalised in figure 5.4. The transformation obviously preserves the behaviour of the process,
as stated below.
Lemma 5.1 If ∅, Q Q˜ by the rules in figure 5.4 then Q . Q˜. 
5.4 Erasing Conditionals
Since the syntax for key-safe processes does not allow auxiliary conditions, we erase those condi-
tions when possible by comparing them with the conditions checked by the strong let-bindings.
More precisely, we use the transformations shown in figure 5.5. The first transformation allows
to erase a condition that is implied by the fact defined(e) since that fact is implicitly checked
by the strong let that follows. The second transformation works in the same way, but now it
also uses the fact that a safe parser ensures that its argument is in the range of the matching
encoder. Therefore the condition can be erased when it is implied by inrange(e, fc) (the fact
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defined(e) ` φ
if φ then let⊥ x = e in P  let⊥ x = e in P˜
safe parser fp matches encoder fc inrange(e, fc) ` φ
if φ then let⊥ x = fp(e) in P  let⊥ x = fp(e) in P˜
λ is not an output
if φ then λP  λ (if φ then P )
P  P˜
C[P ] C[P˜ ]
Figure 5.5: Rules for erasing conditionals.
inrange(e, fc) can be expanded using theorem 4.2).
In order to enable the erasing described above we move condition checks down when neces-
sary as shown by the third rule. We have to be careful not to push a condition check past an
output since both an output and a condition failure are observable by the attacker and it can
therefore detect which happened first. The soundness of the transformation relies on the fact
that both the failures of strong let-bindings and the failures of condition checks produce output
on the same dedicated channel yield such that the attacker cannot tell which condition failed
first. The transformations clearly preserve the behaviour of the process, as stated below.
Lemma 5.2 If Q Q˜ by the rules in figure 5.5 then Q . Q˜. 
Example 5.1 Consider the following IML fragment:
1 if defined(D(msg, key)) then
2 let⊥ d = D(msg, key) in
3 if len(d) ≥ 5 then
4 if ptr(malloc(. . .), 0) 6= τ−1ptr (0) then . . .
5 let⊥ x1 = fp(d) in
The first condition is likely to be added by the proxy function for decryption, the second check is
part of ensuring parsing safety by the implementation, and the third check comes from checking
a result of a malloc against being NULL. Assume that the parser fp matches an encoder fc of
the form fc(x1, x2) = 0x01|τ−14u (len(x1))|x1|x2. Then inrange(d, fc) will have the form shown
in example 4.10 (section 4.8) with d in place of msg11 . In particular, inrange(d, fc) will imply
the condition len(d) ≥ 5 checked above the parsing site.
Using our transformations we can erase condition checks in lines 1 and 3. There is nothing
we can do with the check in line 4 except making the assumption that the program runs with
unbounded memory and removing the check manually. 
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5.5 Local Encryption-Soundness
The encryption soundness conditions in definition 5.5 form two groups: conditions 11 and 12
are global—they speak about the security of the encryption function evaluated across all values
of the security parameter. These conditions will have to be assumed for the particular functions
used by our implementation, since no encryption function has been proven IND-CCA2 secure
so far. In contrast, conditions 1 to 10 are local in the sense that they are evaluated separately
for each value of the security parameter. We shall now discuss how we make sure that our
implementation satisfies the local conditions. We start by giving the local encryption soundness
conditions their own definition.
Definition 5.8 (Local Encryption-Soundness) Given a formatting set OpsF we say that
OpsE ∪OpsF is locally encryption-sound if it satisfies conditions 1-10 of definition 5.5 with the
interpretation I in place of I˜k. 
The local encryption soundness conditions can themselves be split into three groups: those
that speak about OpsE , about OpsF , and about the interaction of OpsE and OpsF . Conditions
2-10 require that OpsE on its own is locally encryption sound. Condition 2 requires that certain
functions in OpsE have disjoint ranges from encoders in OpsF . These two condition sets will
have to be assumed, just like conditions 11 and 12 since we do not verify the implementations
of the cryptographic functions.
Conditions 1 to 3 contain the required properties of the formatting set OpsF : all the en-
coding functions must be length-regular and have disjoint ranges and the parsing functions
must correctly extract the arguments of the encoding functions and must fail (return ⊥) when-
ever the argument is not a valid encoding. These conditions can be explicitly checked during
verification—we shall make use of the fact set Φ generated by our fact inference (section 4.7).
An unfortunate property of the soundness conditions is that the parsing equations must be
true for arguments of arbitrary length. This will of course not be satisfied in practice since
implementations use fixed-length fields in message formats. In order to overcome this obstacle
we first formulate a relaxed set of conditions that need to be satisfied only for inputs of the
right type, and then show how we can extend our formatting functions to inputs of all types.
Definition 5.9 (Regular Formatting Sets) A finite formatting set OpsF = OpsC ∪ OpsP
is called regular with respect to a typing environment Γ if for every encoder c ∈ OpsC such
that Γ(c) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T and for each b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn)
1. I(c)(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ I(T ) and T is a bounded type.
2. For each i ≤ n we have I(c−1i )(I(c)(b1, . . . , bn)) = bi.
3. For each b /∈ range(I(c)) and i ≤ n we have I(c−1i )(b) = ⊥.
4. For each c′ ∈ OpsC such that c 6= c′ the ranges of functions I(c) and I(c′) are disjoint.
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5. I(c) is length-regular. 
It is easy to check regularity using the fact set Φ generated by the method in section 4.7.
Condition (2) is satisfied if for each encoder c ∈ OpsC and each parser c−1i for i ≤ arity(c) we
have parseΓ(c, p, i) ∈ Φ. Condition (4) is satisfied if for every two encoders c, c′ ∈ OpsC we have
disj Γ(c, c
′) ∈ Φ. Condition (1) requires that every encoder c is type-safe (I, c |= Γ) and can
be checked as described in section 4.9. Condition (3) is enforced by the parser strengthening
that we perform in section 5.3. Finally, condition (5) is satisfied since all our encoders are
length-regular by construction.
Given a regular formatting set OpsF we shall aim to replace it with a formatting set Ops
∗
F
that satisfies the parsing equations for inputs of arbitrary lengths. The crucial property that
we would like to capture is that OpsF and Ops
∗
F agree for inputs of the correct type. This
motivates the following definition.
Definition 5.10 (Consistent Formatting Sets) Let Γ be a typing environment. Two func-
tions f and f∗ with Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T are called consistent with respect to Γ, denoted
by f ∼Γ f∗, if I(f)(b1, . . . , bn) = I(f∗)(b1, . . . , bn) for all b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , bn ∈ I(Tn).
Two formatting sets OpsF and Ops
∗
F are called consistent with respect to Γ, denoted
OpsF ∼Γ Ops∗F , if each f ∈ OpsF maps one-to-one to f∗ ∈ Ops∗F such that f ∼Γ f∗. 
We now show how to generalise a regular formatting set OpsF to a formatting set Ops
∗
F
that satisfies local encryption soundness conditions. We shall make use of “ideal” formatting
functions (·)c for each c ∈ OpsC and use (b1, . . . , bn)c whenever c(b1, . . . , bn) is not defined. For
parsing a value we shall need to decide whether it was created using (·)c or c. In order to do
so we make use of the assumption that the return types of all the encoders are bounded. Since
OpsF is finite, there exists some maximal length L of the output returned by any encoder. We
shall therefore make (·)c return outputs longer than L, which makes parsing unambiguous. We
start by listing the properties that we require of the ideal formatting functions.
Definition 5.11 Let OpsF = OpsC ∪ OpsP be a formatting set and Γ a typing environment.
A strong encoder family for OpsE ∪OpsF with respect to Γ and L ∈ N is a family of functions
(·)c : BSn → BS for each function c ∈ OpsC of arity n such that
• (b1, . . . , bn)c is computable in polynomial time in
∑
i≤n |bi|.
• (·)c is injective with inverses pic,1, . . . , pic,n. Each inverse is computable in polynomial time
in the length of the input.
• For each c ∈ OpsC and i ≤ arity(c), if b /∈ range((·)c) then pic,i(b) = ⊥.
• All the functions (·)c are length-regular, and have pairwise disjoint ranges.
• |(b1, . . . , bn)c| > L for each c ∈ OpsC and b1, . . . , bn ∈ BS .
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• For each k ∈ N the sets I(nonce), range(I(E)), range(I(ek)), range(I(dk)), and range((·)c)
for c ∈ OpsC are disjoint. 
It is easy to see that strong encoder families exist, but we do not go into details of the
construction. We now show how to use strong encoder families to extend regular formatting
sets to formatting sets that satisfy local encryption soundness conditions.
Definition 5.12 Given a formatting set OpsF we say that OpsE ∪ OpsF locally satisfies dis-
jointness conditions if it satisfies condition 2 of definition 5.5 with I in place of I˜k. 
Lemma 5.3 Let OpsF be a formatting set and Γ a typing environment. Assume that
1. OpsF is regular with respect to Γ.
2. OpsE ∪OpsF locally satisfies disjointness conditions.
3. OpsE is locally encryption-sound.
Then there exists a formatting set Ops∗F such that OpsF ∼Γ Ops∗F and OpsE ∪Ops∗F is locally
encryption-sound. 
Proof Let OpsF = OpsC ∪ OpsP . By regularity assumption there exists L ∈ N such that
I(T ) ⊆ I(boundedL) for each return type T of a formatting function c ∈ OpsC . Let (·)c for
c ∈ OpsC be a strong encoder family for OpsE ∪ OpsF with respect to Γ and L. For each
f ∈ OpsF with Γ(f) = T1 × . . .× Tn → T define f∗ as follows
I(c∗)(b1, . . . , bn) =
I(c)(b1, . . . , bn), if b1 ∈ I(T1), . . . , b1 ∈ I(T1),(b1, . . . , bn)c, otherwise,
I((c−1i )
∗)(b) =
I(c
−1
i )(b), if |b| ≤ L,
pic,i(b), otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that the set Ops∗F = {f∗ | f ∈ OpsF } satisfies the requirements
of the lemma. 
We would like to replace the formatting functions OpsF in a process Q by their strengthened
versions Ops∗F . We can do so whenever Q is type-safe and never calls a function with arguments
of the wrong types. Since OpsF and Ops
∗
F agree for inputs of correct types, the behaviour of
a type-safe process will not change. As discussed in section 5.2, type-safety can be guaranteed
if we assume that Q is well-typed and uses functions that are ⊥-propagating and type-safe up
to failure. The following lemma makes this precise.
Lemma 5.4 Assume that a well-formed pi process Q0 is well-typed with respect to a typing
environment Γ. Assume further that I|Q0 |=⊥ Γ and all functions in Q0 are ⊥-propagating.
Let OpsF be the set of formatting symbols used by Q0 and consider a formatting set Ops
∗
F such
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that OpsF ∼Γ Ops∗F . Let Q∗0 be obtained from Q0 by replacing each formatting symbol f by its
matching symbol f∗ ∈ Ops∗F . Then insec(Q0, ρ) = insec(Q∗0, ρ) for every trace property ρ . 
Proof We show that Q0 ' Q∗0 (meaning both Q0 . Q∗0 and Q∗0 . Q0, as in definition 2.11).
For an environment η and a pi process P let (η, P ) ' (η, P ∗) whenever η|V |= Γ, where V is
the set of free variables of P and P ∗ is obtained from P by replacing each formatting symbol
f ∈ OpsF by its matching symbol f∗ ∈ Ops∗F . We show that ' is a simulation relation both
ways. First, (η,Q0) ' (η,Q∗0) since by assumption Q0 is well-formed and so does not have free
variables.
Let us consider the interesting case of a let-binding. Assume that
(η, let⊥ x = e in P ) ' (η, let⊥ x = e∗ in P ∗)
for some environment η, an expression e, and an output process P , where e∗ and P ∗ are
obtained from e and P by replacing each formatting symbol f by its matching f∗. We need to
show that if either of the sides reduces then both sides reduce the same way and preserve the
invariant. By induction on the structure of e we show that JeKη = Je∗Kη and either JeKη = ⊥ orJeKη ∈ I(typeΓ(e)), where typeΓ is the function that deduces the type of e with respect to the
typing environment Γ, as described in section 4.5. Consider the following cases:
• e = e∗ = x for some variable x. The statement follows since x is a free variable of P and
therefore by assumption η(x) ∈ I(Γ(x)).
• e = f(e1, . . . , en) and e∗ = f(e∗1, . . . , e∗n) with Γ(f) = T1 × . . . × Tn → T . By induction
both e and e∗ evaluate the same. Assume that JeKη 6= ⊥. Then JeiKη 6= ⊥ for all i because
f is assumed to be ⊥-propagating. By induction JeiKη ∈ I(typeΓ(ei)) for each i. Since Q0
is well-typed with respect to Γ, we have Ti = typeΓ(ei) for each i. By assumption that
I|Q0 |=⊥ Γ we conclude JeKη ∈ I(typeΓ(e)).
• The case e = f(e1, . . . , en) and e∗ = f∗(e∗1, . . . , e∗n) where f ∈ OpsF and f∗ ∈ Ops∗F is
treated in the same way. We use the fact that the functions in Ops∗F are ⊥-propagating
by construction. 
5.6 Relating IML and Pi Security
In this section we show that pi security (definition 5.3) implies IML security (definition 2.2).
Given a pi process Q0 and an IML process QA that represents an attack on Q0 we shall construct
an adversary A that carries out the same attack against ExecI˜,Q0(1
k0) (in the following simply
Exec) under the assumption that I˜k0 = I.
To make sure that the state Q∗ maintained by Exec matches the semantic configuration of
IML, we shall require that Q∗ is fully reduced with respect to Q0, as defined below. In a fully
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reduced process all pending internal computations are completed, all replications are unrolled
a sufficient number of times, and all participant subprocess are ready to either receive input or
produce output. Example 5.2 will aim to provide more intuition for this definition.
Definition 5.13 (Fully Reduced Processes) A pi process Q∗ is fully reduced with respect
to a pi process Q if one of the following holds:
• Q = in(c[. . .], x);P and either Q∗ = σ(Q) for some renaming of variables σ or Q∗ is fully
reduced with respect to P .
• Q = out(c[. . .], x);P and either Q∗ = σ(Q) for some renaming of variables σ or Q∗ is fully
reduced with respect to P .
• Q is an output process of the form Q = λP and Q∗ is fully reduced with respect to P .
• Q = Q∗ = 0.
• Q = Q1|Q2 and Q∗ = Q∗1|Q∗2 such that Q∗1 is fully reduced with respect to Q1 and Q∗2 is
fully reduced with respect to Q2.
• Q =!i≤NQ′ and Q∗ = (Q∗1|(Q∗2|(. . . (Q∗n|!i≤NQ′′)))), where n ≥ I(N) and each Q∗i for
i ≤ n is fully reduced with respect to Q′ (we do not assume anything about Q′′). 
In the pi execution the adversary A can always maintain the invariant that the process Q∗
maintained by Exec is fully reduced with respect to Q0.
Given an address c, n1, . . . , nk with a channel c and values of replication indices n1, . . . , nk ∈
N that refers to an input process in an IML run, we shall need to locate the same input process
within Q∗. To enable this, we shall assume that Q0 is regular, defined as follows.
Definition 5.14 (Regular Processes) An IML process is regular if it uses distinct channels
for all inputs (but not necessarily for all outputs) and every input and output that occurs under
replication indices i1, . . . , ik is of the form in(c[i1, . . . , ik], x) or out(c[i1, . . . , ik], x). 
Given an address c, n1, . . . , nk and assuming that Q0 is regular we shall generate a sequence
id(c, n1, . . . , nk) of labels L or R (left or right) that select a subprocess in Q
∗ as follows. Let
Q0, . . . , Qm be a sequence of processes such that Qi+1 is an immediate subprocess of Qi for each
i < m and Qm = in(c[. . .], x);P for some x and P . Assume that Qm occurs under replications
i1 ≤ N1, . . . , ik ≤ Nk in Q0 and nj ≤ I(Nj) for each j ≤ k. If this condition is not satisfied, set
id(c, n1, . . . , nk) = ⊥. For each i < m let
choose(Qi) = L if Qi = (Qi+1|Q′) for some Q′,
choose(Qi) = R if Qi = (Q
′|Qi+1) for some Q′,
choose(Qi) = R
nj−1L if Qi =!ij≤NjQi+1 for some j ≤ k,
choose(Qi) = ε otherwise
135
5. MODEL VERIFICATION IN SYMBOLIC SETTING
Let id(c, n1, . . . , nk) = choose(Q1) . . . choose(Qm−1).
Given a sequence l of labels L or R we write Ql  ∗ Q′ if l selects Q′ within Q, that is, Ql
reduces to Q′ by the following rules:
Qε  Q (Q|Q′)Ll  Ql (Q|Q′)Rl  Q′l
Assuming Ql  ∗ Q′ we let Q[l] be the context C such that Q = C[Q′].
Example 5.2 Assume that Q0 is of the form
Q0 = 0 | (in(c1[], x1); out(c[], x1); new y : T ; !i1≤N1(in(c2[i1], x2); P ))
with some output process P . We shall initialise Exec with Q∗0 = Q0 that is already fully
reduced with respect to Q0. Assume that the attacker QA sends a message b on channel c1.
We translate it into the actions of the adversary A as follows: by definition above id(c1) = R
and so A sends to Exec the execution context Q[R] = (0|[]) followed by c1 and b. The process
Q∗0 is now updated to
Q∗1 = 0 | (out(c[], x1); new y : T ; !i1≤N1(in(c2[i1], x2); P ))
We send the channel c to Exec, receive back a bitstring b and forward it to QA. Now the process
Q∗1 is updated to
Q∗2 = 0 | (new y : T ; !i1≤N1(in(c2[i1], x2); P ))
This process is not fully reduced with respect to Q0. However, assuming that I(N1) = 2, we
can send the context (0|[]) twice to force Q∗2 to become the fully reduced process
Q∗3 = 0 | ((in(c2[i1], x′2); P ′)
| ((in(c2[i1], x′′2); P ′′)
| !i1≤N1(in(c2[i1], x2); P )))
with new variables x′2, x
′′
2 and processes P
′ and P ′′ obtained from P by renaming of variables.
Now if QA wants to send a message to the address c2, 2 we need to send to Exec the context
Q[id(c2,2)] = Q[RRL] = 0 | ((in(c2[i1], x′2); P ′)
| ( []
| !i1≤N1(in(c2[i1], x2); P )))
Below we shall generalize the intuition of this example to arbitrary attackers QA. 
By construction IML processes execute in bounded time: For each Q ∈ IML there exists
an upper bound runtime(Q) ∈ N such that any IML trace of initConfig(Q) can be executed in
at most runtime(Q) steps. We refer to [Blanchet, 2008, Appendix B.5] for a proof that also
applies in our setting.
Lemma 5.5 (Pi Security Implies IML Security) Let Q0 be a well-formed regular pi pro-
cess such that all functions in Q0 are ⊥-propagating. Let I˜ be a uniformly efficient family of
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interpretations such that I˜k0 = I. Then for any IML process QA that does not contain events
there exists a polynomial-time adversary A such that for any trace property ρ
insec(QA|Q0, ρ) ≤ insecpi(Q0, A, I˜, ρ, runtime(QA|Q0), k0). 
Proof Let Q0 be as in the statement of the lemma and let QA be the IML process representing
the attacker. Let Exec = ExecI˜,Q0(1
k0). We shall construct the adversary A as follows: A will
maintain attacker state of the form CE = (η, out(c[e1, . . . , ek], e);Q′A),QA. We obtain the initial
state by allowing initConfig(QA) to reduce until there are no further reductions. We let Q
∗ be
the protocol process maintained by Exec and known to the adversary.
The attacker A starts by interacting with Exec to make Q∗ fully reduced and then iterates
as follows: Given CE in the form above, let n1 = Je1Kη, . . . , nk = JelKη and b = JeKη. Let
l = id(c, n1, . . . , nk) and send Q
∗
[l] followed by c and b to Exec. Interact with Exec to make Q
∗
fully reduced until asked for a channel name (at this point the subprocess in Q∗ that received
input from the attacker is ready to produce output). Let c’ be the channel the output on which
in Q0 occurs under the input on c. Send c
′ to Exec and receive a bitstring b′. Again interact
with Exec to make Q∗ fully reduced. Let
C′E = (η, out(c[e1, . . . , ek], e);Q′A), QA ∪ {(∅, in(c[n1, . . . , nk], x); out(c′[n1, . . . , nk], b′)); 0}
and allow C′E to reduce until there are no further reductions. Repeat.
The construction of A maintains the following invariant: Assume that there is a trace
initConfig(QA|Q0)→∗p (η, PE),Q, where PE descends from the attacker and there is a matching
input process in Q that descends from Q0. Then there exists a state of Exec and A reachable
with probability p and a renaming of variables σ such that if Q∗ and ηQ are the process and the
environment maintained by Exec then Q = QAunionmultiQP such that the attacker state CE maintained
by A is of the form (η, PE),QA and for each (η,QP ) ∈ QP with QP = in(c[i1, . . . , ik], x);PP the
following holds:
• Q∗id(c,Ji1Kη,...,JikKη) = σ(QP ).
• For each x ∈ dom(η) we have ηQ(σ(x)) = η(x).
The importance of the assumption that all functions in Q0 are ⊥-propagating is in the fact
that for such functions the pi and the IML evaluation of expressions coincide: JeKpiη,I = JeKη for
any expression e in Q0 and environment η. 
5.7 Summary and Soundness
We now prove soundness of our translation from IML processes to ProVerif models. We start
by summarizing the translation procedure.
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Definition 5.15 (IML to Pi Translation) Consider a well-formed input IML process Q.
We say that Q yields a pi model Q˜ with formatting set OpsF and a typing environment Γ
if there exist processes Q1, . . . , Q5 such that
1. Q1 is the formatting-normal form of Q (section 4.3).
2. Q2 is the formatting abstraction of Q1, that is, Q1  Q2 by the rules in figure 4.8
(section 4.4).
3. Γ is the result of type inference of function types from Q (section 4.5).
4. Q3 is the result of typechecking Q2 with respect to Γ, that is, Γ, ∅ ` Q2  Q3 by the
rules in figure 4.11 (section 4.6).
5. Φ is the result of fact inference (section 4.7).
6. Q4 is the result of process strengthening of Q3, that is, ∅ ` Q3  Q4 by the rules in
figure 5.4 (section 5.3).
7. Q5 is the result of erasing conditionals from Q4, that is, Q4  Q5 by the rules in figure 5.5
(section 5.4).
8. I, f |= Γ for every encoder f (section 4.9).
9. Φ implies that the set OpsF of the formatting operations used byQ5 is a regular formatting
set, as described in definition 5.8.
10. Q˜ is obtained from Q5 by removing inline assumptions.
11. Q˜ is a key-safe pi process. 
We are now ready to present the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 5.2 (IML to Pi Translation is Sound) Assume that a well-formed regular IML
process Q that satisfies inline assumptions yields a pi model Q˜ with formatting set OpsF and a
typing environment Γ. Assume that Q˜ symbolically satisfies a trace property ρ with respect to
symbolic rewriting rules for OpsE ∪OpsF (definition 5.6).
Assume that there exists a uniformly efficient family of interpretations I˜ = (I˜k)k∈N that is
encryption-sound for OpsE ∪ OpsF such that I˜k0 agrees with I for function symbols in OpsE.
Assume that OpsE ∪ OpsF locally satisfies disjointness conditions (definition 5.12). Assume
that for all f ∈ OpsE the function I(f) is ⊥-propagating and I, f |=⊥ Γ.
Then there exists an efficient family of interpretations I˜∗ and a pi process Q˜∗ such that
1. For any IML process QA that does not contain events there exists a polynomial-time
adversary A such that
insec(QA|Q, ρ) ≤ insecpi(Q˜∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, runtime(QA|Q), k0).
138
2. The function insecpi(Q˜
∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, p, k) is negligible in k for all polynomial-time adversaries
A and all polynomials p. 
Proof Obtain processes Q1, . . . , Q5 from definition 5.15 and choose a trace property ρ. The
translation steps up to Q3 are the same as in definition 4.14. Applying the same argument as
in theorem 4.3 we get Q . Q3. By lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 Q3 . Q4 . Q5 and finally, since Q
satisfies inline assumptions, Q5 . Q˜. Thus overall Q . Q˜. Thus by theorems 2.2 and 2.3 for
every attacker QA
insec(QA|Q, ρ) ≤ insec(QA|Q˜, ρ). (5.1)
Since I˜ is assumed to be encryption-sound for OpsE ∪ OpsF , it is in particular encryption
sound for OpsE . By assumption I˜k0 agrees with I for function symbols in OpsE , thus OpsE is
locally encryption-sound (definition 5.8). Applying lemma 5.3 we obtain strengthened versions
Ops∗F of the formatting functions such that OpsE ∪Ops∗F is locally encryption-sound. We can
now construct I˜∗ by combining I˜ (after renaming formatting functions to their strengthened
counterparts) with the interpretations of OpsE ∪Ops∗F by I:
I˜k
∗(f∗) = I˜k(f), for all f ∈ OpsF and k 6= k0,
I˜k
∗(f) = I˜k(f), for all f ∈ OpsE and k 6= k0,
I˜k
∗(f) = I(f), for all f ∈ OpsE ∪Ops∗F and k = k0.
Clearly I˜∗ is encryption-sound.
We now apply lemma 5.4 to replace OpsF by Ops
∗
F in Q˜. The conditions of the lemma are
satisfied as follows: By lemma 4.5 Q3 is well-typed with respect to Γ. This property is clearly
not broken by any subsequent transformations, thus Q˜ is well-typed with respect to Γ. By
assumption of the lemma I, f |=⊥ Γ for all f ∈ OpsE . By item 8 I, f |= Γ for all encoders f and
by construction in section 5.3 I, f |=⊥ Γ for all parsers used by Q4 (and thus also by Q˜). Thus
overall I|Q˜ |=⊥ Γ. By assumption every function in OpsE is ⊥-propagating, and this is true by
construction for all our formatting functions, so that all functions in Q˜ are ⊥-propagating. We
can now apply lemma 5.4 to obtain a process Q˜∗ that uses functions in OpsE ∪Ops∗F such that
for every attacker QA
insec(QA|Q˜, ρ) = insec(QA|Q˜∗, ρ). (5.2)
Statement (1) of the theorem now follows from (5.1) and (5.2) together with lemma 5.5 and
statement (2) follows from theorem 5.1 together with the observation that if Q˜ symbolically
satisfies a trace property with respect to symbolic rewriting rules for OpsE ∪ OpsF then Q˜∗
satisfies the same property with respect to rewriting rules OpsE ∪ Ops∗F , since both inputs to
ProVerif are the same up to renaming of function symbols. 
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Theorem 5.2 can be summarised as follows. Suppose we translate an IML process Q to
a pi model Q˜ that uses formatting operations in OpsF . Suppose further that we supply the
tuple (Q˜, R, ρ) to ProVerif where ρ is a correspondence property and R is the set of symbolic
rewriting rules for OpsE∪OpsF (definition 5.6). If ProVerif returns a positive verification result
then under appropriate assumptions on the cryptographic functions in OpsE we can conclude
that for any attacker QA the function insec(QA|Q, ρ) is bounded from above by the negligible
function insecpi(Q˜
∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, p, k) evaluated in k = k0. We can therefore make Q as secure as
necessary by simply increasing k0.
As discussed in section 5.2, the last sentence of the preceding paragraph needs to be con-
sidered with care since the definition of I˜∗ itself depends on k0—we choose the formatting
functions used by the implementation for k = k0 and ideal formatting functions for all other
security parameters. However, we can informally argue that insecpi(Q˜
∗, A, I˜∗, ρ, p, k) should
mostly depend on the properties of the cryptographic functions and not on the properties of
the formatting functions.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and Experiments
We implemented our approach in about 12000 lines of OCaml code. Figure 6.1 shows a list
of protocol implementations from the Csec Challenge repository [Aizatulin et al., 2011a] that
we used to test our method. We list some statistics regarding the sizes of the different stages
of the translation: the size of the original C code, the number of generated CVM instructions,
the number of lines in the extracted IML model, the sizes of the CryptoVerif and the ProVerif
templates written by the user (containing the environment process and the cryptographic as-
sumptions), and the sizes of the automatically generated CryptoVerif and ProVerif processes.
The total size of the CryptoVerif input file also includes the automatically generated type dec-
larations and facts about parsing and auxiliary functions (Γ and Φ in the notation of chapter 4)
(for instance, the total size of the CryptoVerif input file for RPC-enc is 665 lines), but we feel
that the size of the generated process alone is a better measure of the complexity of the model.
As we shall see in appendix C the bulk of the generated CryptoVerif process comprises of triv-
ial auxiliary tests that do not play any interesting role in the verification. Figure 6.1 also lists
execution times for the CryptoVerif verification (verification with ProVerif is always at least
as fast) and analysis outcomes. Most of the times CryptoVerif terminates in under a second.
A notable exception is the NSL protocol for which CryptoVerif takes more than a minute to
complete. This is not surprising since NSL is the only protocol among the ones we analysed in
which the client and the server exchange a total of 3 messages.
Simple MAC This is a protocol in which a single payload is concatenated with its MAC.
We successfully verify the authenticity of the payload. In CryptoVerif this assumes that MAC
is unforgeable against chosen-message attack (UF-CMA).
Simple XOR This is the one-time pad example from figure 1.1, but now including both sides
of the protocol. CryptoVerif successfully proves secrecy of the payload. We did not analyse the
protocol in ProVerif, because properties of XOR are difficult (and in general impossible [Unruh,
2010]) to model within symbolic cryptography.
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C LOC CVM LOC IML LOC CV LOC PV LOC Time Result
Simple MAC ∼ 250 7K 78 71 + 38 30 + 15 4s CP
Simple XOR ∼ 100 4K 56 55 + 13 — 3s C
RPC ∼ 600 56K 125 85 + 60 28 + 25 13s FCP
RPC-enc ∼ 700 21K 171 159 + 75 60 + 29 9s CP
CSur ∼ 600 27K 278 — — 5s F
NSL ∼ 450 25K 232 160 + 102 118 + 34 10s + 1m16s FCP∗
Metering(1) ∼ 1000 66K 421 171 + 128 — 31s + 2s FC
Metering(3) — 95K 621 171 + 220 — 1m21s + 50s FC
Figure 6.1: Summary of the analysed implementations. For CryptoVerif and ProVerif we list
the sum of the sizes of the user-provided environment (left) and the automatically generated
process (right), excluding the sizes of automatically generated function type declarations and
facts. When runtime of CryptoVerif is not negligible we split the time column into the execution
time of our tools (left) and the execution time of CryptoVerif (right). F—found and fixed
flaws, C—verified with CryptoVerif, P—verified with ProVerif, P∗—verified with ProVerif and
computational soundness applies.
RPC This protocol is an implementation of the MAC-based remote procedure call described
by Bengtson et al. [2008] and developed and verified by Dupressoir et al. [2014]. We found
several flaws in the implementation:
• The functions for sending and receiving network messages take an argument containing
the length of the message of type size t . Internally these functions call OpenSSL func-
tions that take an argument of type int . The implementation did not check for integer
truncation.
• The function for parsing a message did not check that the message contains enough bytes
before trying to extract fields from it (at the end of this section we discuss a similar issue
that occurred in another implementation).
• The implementation did not impose any bound on the lengths of the request and the
response. This was flagged during our verification because we could not prove that the
length field does not overflow.
The verification method described by Dupressoir et al. [2014] does not descend into the
implementations of functions for constructing and parsing messages, which explains why these
flaws remained unnoticed. Upon fixing the flaws we verified the authenticity of the client request
and the server response under the assumption that MAC is UF-CMA.
RPC-enc This is our running example—a version of the remote procedure call protocol that
uses authenticated encryption, described in detail in section 1.1. We verified the authentic-
ity of the request and the response, and the secrecy of the payloads (which is not protected
by the MAC-based RPC). In CryptoVerif this assumes authenticated encryption that is in-
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r e a d ( conn fd , temp , 1 2 8 ) ;
// BN hex2bn e xp e c t s a zero−t e rm ina t ed s t r i n g
temp [ 1 2 8 ] = 0 ;
BN hex2bn(& c i p h e r 2 , temp ) ;
// de c r yp t and pa r s e c i p h e r 2 to ob t a i n message f i e l d s
Figure 6.2: A flaw in the CSur example: input may be too short.
distinguishable against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and provides ciphertext integrity
(INT-CTXT). Full CryptoVerif input for this protocol is shown in appendix C.
CSur This implementation is developed and analysed in a predecessor paper on C verifica-
tion [Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes, 2005]. It is an implementation of a protocol similar
to Needham-Schroeder-Lowe. During our verification attempt we discovered a flaw, shown in
figure 6.2: The received message in buffer temp is being converted to a BIGNUM structure
cipher 2 without checking that enough bytes were received. Later a BIGNUM structure derived
from cipher 2 is converted to a bitstring without checking that the length of the bitstring is suf-
ficient to fill the message buffer. In both cases the code does not make sure that the information
in memory actually comes from the network, which makes it impossible to prove authentication
properties. The CSur example has been verified by Goubault-Larrecq and Parrennes [2005], but
only for secrecy, and secrecy is not affected by the flaw we discovered. The code reinterprets
network messages as C structures (an unsafe practise due to architecture dependence), which
is not yet supported by our analysis and so we were not able to verify a fixed version of it.
NSL This is our implementation of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. We first verified it
using ProVerif and applied the computational soundness result of Backes et al. [2009] to obtain
a security statement in the computational model, as described in chapter 5. Appendix D shows
the extracted ProVerif model.
The computational soundness result assumes that all cryptographic material, including the
nonces, is tagged. In general it is difficult to tell whether an assumption of this kind is important
or is just an artefact of the soundness proof. When verifying the protocol with CryptoVerif, we
discovered that it is most likely the former. Removing the assumption led to the discovery of
a potential flaw: If the third message (B’s nonce) is sent out without any tagging, it can be
decrypted and parsed as the first message of the protocol (an encoding of the concatenation of
A’s nonce and A’s identity). The failure of the parsing may reveal information about the nonce
to the attacker (this issue is also discussed in section 4.2). The NSL protocol is often presented
without making this point explicit. Once we fixed the problem by explicitly tagging the third
message, CryptoVerif successfully verified the protocol.
Metering This example is an implementation of a privacy-friendly protocol for smart elec-
tricity meters [Rial and Danezis, 2010] developed at Microsoft Research. We were able to
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unsigned char s e s s i o n k e y [ 2 5 6 / 8 ] ;
. . .
// Use the 4 f i r s t b y t e s as a pad to enc r yp t the r e a d i n g
e n c r y p t e d r e a d i n g = ( ( unsigned i n t ) ∗ s e s s i o n k e y ) ˆ ∗ r e a d i n g ;
Figure 6.3: A flaw in the metering code: only one byte of the pad is used.
analyse the protocol without modifying its source code. The model that we obtained uncovered
a flaw shown in figure 6.3: incorrect use of pointer dereferencing results in three bytes of each
four-byte reading being sent unencrypted. This bug is particularly interesting because both the
faulty and the fixed dereferencing order have legitimate uses and are not wrong as such. The
only way to classify one of them as a bug is by reference to the high-level secrecy property that
it violates.
We found two further flaws: one could result in contents of uninitialised memory being sent
on the network, the other could lead to 0 being sent (and accepted) in place of the actual
number of readings. All flaws have been acknowledged and fixed. An F# implementation of
the protocol has been previously verified by Swamy et al. [2010], which highlights the fact that
C implementations can be tricky and can easily introduce new bugs, even for correctly specified
and proven protocols.
The protocol relies on a number of cryptographic primitives: a signature scheme that is un-
forgeable against chosen-message attack (UF-CMA), a Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme,
XOR, and a hash function that needs to be collision-resistant to prove authentication. Secrecy
could only be proved under the assumption that the hash function is a random oracle. Cryp-
toVerif shows that whenever the consumer accepts a reading, it does indeed originate from the
meter, and that the readings remain secret.
The protocol implementation works with an arbitrary number of messages, that are all
batched and signed together. Neither our symbolic execution nor CryptoVerif can deal with
loops, so we unroll the main loop of the protocol and only analyse it for a fixed number of
messages. The table of results contains numbers for the verification with one and three messages.
When trying to verify the protocol for more than one message, we uncovered another potential
security flaw that led to a fix in the code. Given two readings r1 and r2, the protocol would
generate commitments C1 and C2 by using calls to bignum operations of the OpenSSL crypto
library. It would then concatenate the commitments without using their lengths as “tag”|C1|C2.
Since bignums in OpenSSL can have arbitrary length, this could lead to a collision where two
different bignums C ′1 and C
′
2 concatenate to the same string and lead to the same signature.
Due to the use of XOR and modular exponentiation in the protocol, both of which are
difficult to model symbolically, we did not apply ProVerif to the protocol.
Parsing and Integer Overflow in RPC-enc We give an account of a particular verification
experience with our tools which suggests that getting message parsing right is very error-prone.
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1 i f ( m s g l e n < 5 | | m s g l e n > MAX MSG1 LENGTH) e x i t ( 1 ) ) ;
2 r e c v (&( c t x→c o n n f d ) , msg , m s g l e n ) ;
3 unsigned char ∗p = msg ;
4 i f (memcmp( ”p” , p , 1 ) ) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
5 p += 1 ;
6 c t x→o t h e r l e n = ∗ ( ( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) p ) ;
7 i f ( m s g l e n <= 1 + s i z e o f ( u i n t 3 2 t ) + c t x→o t h e r l e n ) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
8 // e x t r a c t the name o f the c l i e n t from the message
Figure 6.4: Message parsing in RPC-enc.
Our running example RPC-enc uses message formats of the form c(x, y) = ”p”|τ−14u (len(x))|x|y.
Our first attempt at writing the parsing routine for this format started as shown in figure 6.4. We
first check that the expected length of the message is at least 5 bytes (which would correspond
to an encoding of two empty bitstrings) and that the message is not too long as prescribed by
the protocol. We then receive the message from the network and place it in the buffer pointed
to by msg. We create a pointer p used for parsing, check the tag of the message and advance
p to point to the length field. We extract the length field and check that it matches the total
length of the message before extracting the payloads (not shown here).
This version of the code did not verify because the symbolic execution could not prove that
the expression 1 + sizeof ( uint32 t ) + ctx→other len in line 7 does not overflow. In general,
failures of the symbolic execution are rather easy to interpret since we can display the prob-
lematic symbolic expression together with the line of C code in which every subexpression has
been computed.
The overflow issue can be fixed by moving 1 + sizeof ( uint32 t ) to the left side of the in-
equality. Our fix was to check early enough that the first field of the message, which happens
to be the identity of the client, does not exceed the maximum allowed length. We added the
following line before line 7 in the code:
i f ( c t x→o t h e r l e n > MAX PRINCIPAL LENGTH) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
Summary We were able to verify six protocols in the computational model, findings flaws in
externally written protocol implementations without modifying their code (we were, of course,
developing our own tools as we went along).
The choice of the protocols to study was intended to be representative of the protocols used
in practice. NSL is a classic protocol, widely studied in cryptographic literature, as well as
being the foundation of the widely deployed Kerberos protocol. RPC and RPC-enc are variants
of the protocol that has recently been studied using alternative techniques by Bengtson et al.
[2008] and Dupressoir et al. [2014], so it was useful for comparing the methods. We included
the CSur protocol since it was the first ever example of a C implementation that got verified
for security and it allows us to demonstrate how we improve upon that original attempt.
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Our biggest verified protocol, smart metering, supports two claims. First, cryptographic
protocols most often have linear structure and are thus supported by our method. Second, our
tools are highly automated—we did not need to modify the code of the protocol at all, except
for fixing the bugs we found.
In retrospect the fact that the source code of the smart metering protocol is not public made
it a poor choice since it makes our experiments not reproducible. We hope to rectify this this
by applying our tools to a major open-source protocol, such as PolarSSL.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
7.1 Multipath Symbolic Execution
The main weakness of our method is that it only considers a single path through the program.
We would like to make a first step towards full multipath analysis. We follow the approach of
CryptoVerif in which verification is a series of transformations that take the original program
to an obviously correct one and propose to establish a series of transformations starting from C
code. The first step is to generalise our symbolic execution to a program transformation that
takes C programs with control flow and removes all pointer manipulation.
The resulting program will still contain destructive updates and will in general have the
same control flow structure as the original program. We believe that dealing with these is
best left for future work. There are two reasons: First, we would like our method to be
usable with a variety of verification backends. Different backends will use different modelling
languages, so any further program transformations will depend on the backend. However we
do not know of any security verification backend that would use pointers in its language, so a
pointer-removing transformation like the one we propose would be generally useful. Second,
many of the complexities in transformed programs will be out of reach of the current security
verification tools like CryptoVerif. For instance, the TLS protocol uses a counter for each
message of the record layer that serves to preserve the order of the messages. This counter is
incremented in a loop, and either CryptoVerif would need to be extended in order to treat this
accurately, or appropriate approximations need to be made. In each case, it seems appropriate
to first simplify several protocol implementations using symbolic execution to see what further
theoretical developments would be necessary.
An immediate outcome of our work would be that for the protocols that we analysed so
far we would be able to prove absence of non-trivial branching instead of assuming it, thus
providing a stronger security guarantee.
The two languages that we translate between are shown in figure 7.1. For simplicity we omit
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C IML
e ∈ CExp, sI is a symbolic state
P ::= program
0 nil
c; P C statement
whilesI (e){P}; P ′ loop with invariant
if (e){P1}{P2}; P ′ conditional
e ∈ IExp
P ::= program
0 nil
c; P IML statement
while e do P ; P ′ loop
if e then P1 else P2 conditional
Figure 7.1: The syntax of C and IML.
JeKη = true
(η,while e do P ;P ′),Q −→1 (η, P ; while e do P ;P ′),Q
(IWhileTrue)
JeKη = false
(η,while e do P ;P ′),Q −→1 (η, P ′),Q
(IWhileFalse)
Figure 7.2: The execution of IML loops.
the translation step from C to CVM (section 3.1) and show symbolic execution as if operating
on C programs directly. For now we also ignore the distinction between input and output
processes. We start with a C program and translate it into an intermediate model language
(IML), similar to the one described in section 2.1, but with an additional loop construct (we
do not allow replication inside loops). The execution of IML loops is shown in figure 7.2 (cf.
figure 2.4). Both the source and the target language allow the same control flow, the difference
lies in the type of expressions and statements. In C the expressions can include reading and
writing through pointer variables, whereas in IML all variables hold (arbitrary-length) bitstrings
and there is no dereferencing. For the purpose of this section we drop the restriction that input
and output processes should alternate.
In chapter 3 we have shown how to define symbolic execution for single C statements, here
we would like to show how we intend to generalise it to arbitrary control flow. We shall use
a simple solution in which all the paths are unrolled and represented explicitly as a tree of
conditionals. This way a C program with 3 conditionals in a row can give rise to an IML
program with 7 conditionals. In general this transformation can lead to an exponential increase
in the size of the program, but we expect it to work well for protocol implementations because
most of the control flow there deals with configuration. Once the configuration parameters are
set, most of the conditions in if-statements will become constants, and so branching can be
removed. This is done by the rules we describe below.
The symbolic execution that we are about to define starts from a C program P and an
initial symbolic state s, defined as in section 3.5, and generates an IML program P˜ and a set of
symbolic states S′ with each s′ ∈ S′ representing an outcome of a single path in P . Formally
we write JP Ks = (P˜ , S′).
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J0Ks = (0, {s}) (SNil)
J exit ();P Ks = (out(yield , ()); 0, {s}) (SYield)
(s, c;P )
λ−→ (s′, P ) as in figure 3.10 JP Ks′ = (P˜ , S′)Jc;P Ks = (λP˜ , S′) (SStmt)
JeKs = falseJwhilesI (e){P};P ′Ks = JP ′Ks (SWhileFalse)
JeKs = trueJwhilesI (e){P};P ′Ks = JP ; whilesI (e){P};P ′Ks (SWhileTrue)
sI v s JP K(s u JeKs) = (P˜ , S′) ∀s′ ∈ S′ : sI v s′JwhilesI (e){P}Ks = (while JeKs do P˜ , {sI u (¬JeKs)}) (SWhile)
J if (e){P1}{P2};P ′Ks = J if (e){P1;P ′}{P2;P ′}Ks (SSeqIf)
JeKs = true JP1Ks = (P˜1, S′1)J if (e){P1}{P2}Ks = (P˜1, S′1) (SIfTrue)
JP1Ks = (P˜1, S′1) JP2Ks = (P˜2, S′2)J if (e){P1}{P2}Ks = (if JeKs then P˜1 else P˜2, S′1 ∪ S′2) (SIf)
Figure 7.3: The generalised symbolic execution.
The generalised symbolic execution rules are presented in figure 7.3. The first two rules
(SNil) and (SYield) deal with termination. We do not analyse the process that follows an exit
statement and replace it by the nil process. The rule (SStmt) lifts the rules of our single-path
execution described in section 3.5 into multipath setting. We need to make one change to the
algorithm in section 3.5: in order to capture the action of loops in IML we treat C memory
locations as IML variables and transform each C operation that updates the memory into an
IML assignment. Memory locations are represented by pointer bases (figure 3.7), and so every
time a C program writes through the pointer with base pb we add a statement of the form
let pb = e in . . . to the IML model. The models will therefore contain destructive updates that
change values of already assigned variables. We shall call pb a location variable in the following.
The location variables only need to be updated once at the end of each branch in each loop—this
can be achieved by a separate simplifying transformation.
The next three rules deal with loops. If the condition of a loop is statically known to be
false or true, the loop is unrolled by the rules (SWhileTrue) and (SWhileFalse). This will be
especially useful when symbolically executing library initialisation routines that typically iterate
over statically known arrays of configuration parameters. For a C expression e we write JeKs to
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denote the IML expression that results from symbolically executing e in a state s.
The rule (SWhile) executes arbitrary loops and relies on a user-provided invariant, which
is just a symbolic state sI . We check that the invariant sI is an under-approximation of
each state s that results from executing the loop, denoted by sI v s. For two symbolic states
s = (Φ,As,Ms, Ss) and s′ = (Φ′,As′,Ms′, Ss′) we let s v s′ whenever 1) Φ′ |= Φ, 2) As ⊆ As′ 3)
Ss = Ss′ = [], and 4) dom(Ms) ⊆ dom(Ms′) and for all pb ∈ dom(Ms) either Ms(pb) = Ms′(pb)
or Ms(pb) = pb. Condition 1 requires that all facts in s must also be satisfied in s′. Condition
2 requires that the allocation tables agree. This condition implies a limitation—a memory
location that is allocated in a loop is only accessible in the same iteration. In particular, a buffer
allocated by a malloc inside a loop is not accessible outside the loop. Condition 3 requires that
the loop execution must finish with an empty stack—this is always the case because we only
use the stack to store intermediate values when evaluating expressions. Finally, condition 4
requires that each memory location should either remain untouched by the loop, or be replaced
by a location variable. The IML model of the loop body would contain an assignment to the
location variable, as described above in the discussion of the rule (SStmt). The rule (SWhile)
is based on the conventional reasoning rule for loops. Given a boolean IML expression e and a
symbolic state s we write s u e to denote the result of adding e to the facts in s.
In practice the user does not need to provide the full description of the invariant state sI .
Instead, the user provides a formula φ that may mention location variables. We then construct
sI by taking the pre-loop state s and replacing memory locations mentioned in φ by location
variables. More precisely, we obtain sI from s as follows:
• Remove all facts from s that mention location variables contained in φ. These location
variables are expected to be updated by the loop, and so the facts about them may no
longer hold.
• For each location variable pb mentioned in φ set Ms(pb) := pb.
The rule (SIf) deals with conditionals and is straightforward. If we know the condition to be
always true, we can apply the pruning rule (SIfTrue) to remove one of the branches. There is
also the corresponding rule for false conditions, which we omit here. The rule (SSeqIf) performs
the unrolling of the conditionals that we mentioned above. In general this rule can lead to an
exponential increase in the size of the program, but we expect the pruning rules to remove most
of the newly introduced branches.
Our treatment of exit statements introduces an over-approximation. For instance, a C
program
whi le (TRUE){ out ( ” h e l l o ” ) ; e x i t ( ) ; }
would yield the model
while true do (out(”hello”); out(yield , ()); 0)
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char ∗ buf = m a l l o c ( l e n ) ;
s i z e t r e c e i v e d = 0 ;
i f ( buf == NULL) e x i t ( ) ;
whi le sI ( r e c e i v e d < l e n )
r e c e i v e d += r e c v ( buf + r e c e i v e d , l e n − r e c e i v e d ) ;
e n c r y p t ( ebuf , buf , l e n ) ; . . .
let buf = ε in
let received = 0 in
while (received < len) do {
in(tmp);
let buf = buf | tmp in
let received = received + len(tmp) in 0 }
let ebuf = encrypt(buf) in ...
Figure 7.4: An example C fragment together with the extracted model. Location variables
are given meaningful names that correspond to C variable names. We use the loop invariant
sI = (received = len(buf )) ∧ (received ≤ len).
that may output “hello” more than once. Such an exit statement introduces an indirect jump
in the control flow graph (not to be confused with non-local jumps in C) that is not dealt
with by the symbolic execution presented here. The same reason prevents us from analysing
C programs with goto-statements. To account for that we could formulate the generalised
symbolic execution for control flow graphs with indirect jumps, or we could transform the C
program to only contain while loops without indirect jumps. We leave this for future research.
In order to ensure that IML processes execute in polynomial time, we need to prove that
all loops in the C program terminate in polynomial time as well. This is a separate concern
and we leave it for future research. The techniques used in the Terminator tool by Cook et al.
[2006] could possibly be adapted to our setting.
Example 7.1 An example of a translation is shown in figure 7.4. In the original C program
the call to recv updates the memory through the pointer buf + received. In the model the
update is performed on values instead. Even though the extracted model is not significantly
shorter in this case, it is much simpler to reason about—we do not have to deal with issues of
pointer aliasing and memory layout. A further program transformation could show that the
loop in the IML model can be replaced by a single input statement that has the same effect.
The soundness of the multipath symbolic execution can be expressed using the simulation
relation developed in section 2.3 as follows:
Theorem 7.1 (Multipath Symbolic Execution is Sound) Assume that JP Ks0 = (P˜ , S′)
for some C program P , IML process P˜ , the initial symbolic state s0, and a set of symbolic states
S′. Then P . P˜ . 
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Proof (Sketch) Following section 3.7 we define the state correspondence relation c ∼η s
between concrete C states c and symbolic states s with respect to an environment η. The
relation states that s agrees with c when each symbolic expression in s is evaluated using J·Kη.
We then define the simulation relation between an executing process (η, c, P ) of the C
program and an executing process (η˜, P˜ ) of the IML process as follows: (η, c, P ) . (η˜, P˜ ) when
η = η˜ and there exists a symbolic state s such that c ∼η s and JP Ks = (P˜ , S′) for some set S′
of symbolic states.
We sketch the proof of the simulation property (condition 5 in definition 2.11) for loops.
Assume that (η, c, whilesI (e){P};P ′) . (η, while(e˜){P˜}; P˜ ′). First consider the case JeKη =
true, such that the C process reduces to (η, c, P ; whilesI (e){P};P ′). We obtain the symbolic
state s from the definition of the simulation relation and show that
JP ; whilesI (e){P};P ′Ks = (P˜ ; while(e˜){P˜}; P˜ ′, S′)
for some set S′ of symbolic states. To do this we “unroll” the symbolic execution rule (SWhile).
This establishes that both executing processes reduce to processes that still simulate each other.
The case JeKη = false and the other symbolic execution rules are dealt with similarly. 
7.2 Observational Equivalence
Our work so far only considers trace properties that either hold or do not hold for every single
trace. These include properties like authentication (if a participant accepts a message then the
message has been sent by another honest participant) and weak secrecy (the attacker never
learns the whole secret). In future we would like to add treatment of observational equivalence
properties that speak about sets of traces. Two processes are considered observationally equiva-
lent if they cannot be distinguished by any context with non-negligible probability. This allows
to formulate the property of strong secrecy—the attacker should not be able to distinguish
between two copies of a process that run with different values of the secret.
Following Blanchet [2008] we can define observational equivalence with respect to the Cryp-
toVerif semantics as follows: let Pr[Q 0]k be the probability that the process Q outputs 0 on
a special channel guess when executed with respect to the security parameter k. Two processes
Q and Q′ are observationally equivalent, denoted by Q ∼ Q˜, if for every context C the value
diffCV (Q, Q˜, C, k) = |Pr[C{Q} 0]k−Pr[C{Q˜} 0]k| is negligible in the security parameter.
We define diffIML in the same way, except that in IML semantics the security parameter is
fixed.
In order to define strong secrecy CryptoVerif uses a special construct find that allows one
process to directly access the variables of another process. This way, a process Q preserves the
secrecy of a variable x if Qx|Q ∼ Q′x|Q, where Qx is the process that upon request reveals the
value of x in Q (retrieving it using find) and Q′x reveals garbage instead.
It is easy to see that our simulation relation developed in section 2.3 is well-suited for proving
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observational equivalence for IML processes: if Q . Q˜ and Q˜ . Q then for every context C
each trace of C{Q} can be mapped to a trace of C{Q˜} of the same probability and vice versa,
therefore diffIML(Q, Q˜, C) = 0. The problem comes from the interaction of the find construct
with our simulation relation: being able to look inside another process breaks the invariance of
simulation against embedding. If a context C can directly access variables inside Q then Q . Q˜
does not necessarily imply C{Q} . C{Q˜}.
CryptoVerif deals with this issue be defining observational equivalence with respect to a set
of public variables that may be accessed by the context. A similar approach could work for our
simulation relation. Another option would be not to use find in full generality and only allow
a limited set of primitives that allow to model strong secrecy and do not break the simulation
relation.
Multipath analysis brings additional challenges for observational equivalence. The algo-
rithm that we propose in section 7.1 may yield models with different control flow when an exit
statement is executed inside a loop. An example shown in section 7.1 would be the program
while(TRUE){out(”hello”); exit ();} such that the extract model can print “hello” multiple times
and would therefore not be observationally equivalent. We leave the best way of dealing with
these situations for future research.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
We presented a method that proves authentication and weak secrecy properties of C protocol
implementations. In order to formalise the security properties and prove soundness of our
method we develop a theoretical framework in which C programs are embedded in a context
written in a process calculus. The context allows to describe both the environment in which the
protocol participants execute and the attacker. Our analysis method works by extracting models
Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n from the source code Q1, . . . , Qn of each protocol participant, and then showing that
for any context C the process Q = C{Q1, . . . , Qn} is simulated by Q˜ = C{Q˜1, . . . , Q˜n}, which
implies that Q satisfies all the security properties of Q˜. We then show conditions under which
Q˜ can be simplified enough to be analysed with CryptoVerif or ProVerif.
Overall, our work supports the following thesis:
Process calculus embedding combined with model extraction is an appropriate tool for
analysing security of C programs.
Below we discuss several aspects of the approach that we believe makes it appropriate.
Formalising security properties by embedding C programs in a process calculus context is
precise. All we need is to describe the semantics of the process calculus and the source language.
This is done in a fully formal fashion. The attacker is itself just a process that runs in parallel
with the protocol and interacts with the protocol using the communication primitives provided
by the process calculus. Thus there is no vagueness about the threat model. We believe that
all our definitions and proofs would be rather straightforward to formalise in a theorem prover
like Isabelle [Paulson, 1994] or Coq [The Coq development team, 2004].
A popular alternative approach is to define the attacker as an arbitrary machine that inter-
acts with the protocol. The rules of the interaction are then described in a natural language,
as in the definition used by Backes et al. [2009] and reviewed in section 5.1.1. Initially we
followed the same approach, but found it much harder to use, because for all practical purposes
an arbitrary machine cannot be written down explicitly. This introduces a lot of informal ar-
guments about how the machines interact. In our approach we can explicitly write down an
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attacker, as demonstrated by the examples in section 2.1. The interaction rules are given by
the communication rules of the process calculus, which makes them amenable to fully formal
treatment.
The simulation relation that we develop for proving security properties (section 2.3) is con-
venient. Simulation is a local property in that it can be checked by considering each participant
process in isolation, and is very well suited for proofs by induction on the structure of the par-
ticipant. At the same time simulation implies strong global properties for arbitrary interactions
of the protocol participants with the attacker.
The use of a process calculus for formalisation builds upon abundant prior work on verifying
security of process calculi. This allows us to reuse CryptoVerif and ProVerif with relative ease,
as our security definitions are chosen to be compatible with theirs.
The use of model extraction for verifying security properties achieves high automation.
There is no need for the user to provide a protocol specification, as for most industrial protocols
such a specification does not exist. Symbolic execution as a tool for model extraction does not
impose any restrictions on the coding style and can readily be applied to code that was not
written with verification in mind, as demonstrated by our analysis of the metering protocol
(chapter 6). Currently we restrict our analysis to a single path through the code, but we
believe that it can be generalised to cover multiple paths as demonstrated in section 7.1.
Symbolic versus Computational Verification When we first extracted models from the
C code, we decided to verify them with ProVerif first, as it is simpler to use. We quickly
discovered that transferring the result of the ProVerif verification to the computational setting
is quite challenging—the computational result that we used requires the tupling and projection
operations to fulfil rather strict criteria that are typically not satisfied in practice, such as the
requirement that the tupling operations should be defined for bitstrings of arbitrary length.
Proving security with ProVerif required quite a bit of additional argumentation, as described
in chapter 5. When we later verified our models with CryptoVerif, we found it a much more
natural match for the computational semantics of C that we use. Currently all the results that
we obtained with ProVerif are subsumed by the results that we get by applying CryptoVerif
directly. It is an interesting question whether there is a protocol that supports a computational
soundness result, but cannot be verified with CryptoVerif directly.
ProVerif is still very useful, if one is willing to accept an interpretation with respect to
a symbolic model of cryptography, as in Dupressoir et al. [2014]. In this interpretation the
attacker is weaker—it is restricted to use only the operations that are allowed by the rewriting
rules of the symbolic model. Furthermore the properties are guaranteed to hold only for those
traces in which there are no collisions, that is, where syntactically distinct symbolic expressions
both on the attacker and the protocol side evaluate to different bitstrings.
Coverage of the Method We conclude with a short summary of what our method achieves—
what kinds of security flaws are currently covered and what kinds are out of reach. The main
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weakness of the current implementation is that it provides a verification statement only for
a single path in the code. It easy to manually check whether the single path assumption is
satisfied: our security theorems apply exactly to protocol code that contains no loops, and in
which at least one branch of every conditional contains an exit-statement that is not preceded
by an attacker-observable output. The types of flaws that are caught by such an analysis include
• Memory safety and integer overflow errors. Even though we do not target denial of service
attacks directly, many denial of service attacks exploit memory safety violations, and so
would be prevented by our verification.
• Incorrect use of pointers that leads to errors like the one in the metering protocol, where
only a single byte of the key is used instead of four bytes.
• Errors in formatting and parsing of messages. For instance, in the metering protocol
we discovered a potentially dangerous violation of injectivity in the format of a tupling
operation—two different pairs of payloads may be tupled leading to the same result and
producing the same signature. When developing our own implementations we found
that message parsing code is prone to subtle integer overflow bugs. The reason for this
complexity is that we use the information contained in the (potentially malicious) message
to parse the message itself.
• Logical flaws in the protocol structure, such as the famous flaw in the NSL protocol that
enables the attack by Lowe [1995].
Some classes of bugs occur only in programs that are currently not covered by our method.
These include
• The OpenSSL bug in which a certificate is not properly checked, even though subsequent
code assumes that it is [CVE, a]. To catch this bug we would need to analyse the certificate
checking function, but we cannot do it because the function is recursive.
• Problems related to the state maintained by the protocol, such as the reinitialisation flaw
discovered in the TLS protocol in 2009 [CVE, b]. This is a limitation of CryptoVerif and
ProVerif: they do not support stateful protocols. Arapinis et al. [2011] show how to apply
ProVerif to verify a certain class of protocols with state in their tool StatVerif.
• Information leaks due to error messages, such as the leak exploited by Albrecht et al.
[2009]. Protocols that terminate with an error message are currently not analysed, but
we expect that the generalisation proposed in section 7.1 will cover those.
• Bugs in protocols that use message formats not covered by our encoding expressions. This
mostly affects protocols like HTML that use explicit delimiters to separate fields. We are
not aware of a cryptographic protocol that would use this style of formatting.
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• Bugs in protocols that use integer overflow intentionally, say, to implement a message
counter. Our solving algorithm currently prohibits all integer overflow, as described in
section 3.2.
• Timing attacks [Kocher, 1996].
We trust the correctness of CIL, so that the link between C and CVM is made only infor-
mally. We also trust the user input that describes the assumptions about the cryptographic
primitives used by the implementation and the environment in which the implementation exe-
cutes. This input includes
• The proxy functions that link the arguments of C functions to the arguments of the
cryptographic primitives in the model.
• The CryptoVerif or ProVerif template that describes the types and assumed properties
of the cryptographic primitives, and the environment in which the protocol participants
execute.
• Special function calls in the C code that specify where an event is raised or an environment
variable is read.
Given that the problem we are dealing with is in general undecidable, the quality of the
method needs to be evaluated by applying it to a wide range of protocol implementations.
Unfortunately, we are not able to release the source code of our largest experimental example—
the Microsoft Research metering code—due to licensing restrictions. Next we would like to
apply our method to a major open source implementation, such as PolarSSL, to enable a more
detailed public scrutiny of our verification.
Who should be using our tools? To an industrial user a “proof of security” is of little
interest—it is very difficult for a non-expert to understand what exactly is being proven, and
protocols that have been proven correct are sometimes broken in practice later because of the
mismatch of the proof model and the reality. There is often lack of incentive to provide security
and the most prevalent security flaws are much shallower than the ones we study in this thesis—
many businesses are prone to much simpler social attacks. We would therefore expect hackers
to be the most likely early adopters of our technology, which may in turn raise awareness and
interest among protocol designers. For that to happen, it is still important to demonstrate that
our tools are effective in finding security flaws—we hope that analysing PolarSSL allows us to
find interesting vulnerabilities.
Adoption of software verification is difficult because it is a niche branch of research and the
potential user base is very limited. However, the symbolic execution presented in chapter 3 is of
a more general interest: it provides the user with an explanation of how values in memory are
computed, which is useful even without respect to security. We would therefore like to separate
the symbolic execution part and integrate it into a general-purpose verifier such as Frama-C.
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This is made easier by the fact that both our tools and Frama-C are written in OCaml, and
Frama-C has an extensible modular architecture.
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Appendix A
Proxy Function Examples
We show several examples of proxy functions to showcase how we support various important
primitives that are likely to be used by most protocol implementation such as network inputs
and outputs, randomness generation, or bitstring comparisons. We also include all the functions
used by our example in figure 1.1 that lead to the CVM translation shown in figure 3.2.
The functions send proxy and recv proxy emit instructions Output and Input. These are
abbreviations and result in two CVM instructions being executed. The instruction Output
generates the sequence WriteEnv x; Out x, and the instruction Input generates the sequence
In x; ReadEnv x, both with a fresh variable x.
We expect the functions send proxy and recv proxy to send and receive their arguments all
at once. This does not quite correspond to the standard semantics in which the functions are
allowed to process only part of the string (in which case they return the length of the string
that has been processed). In order to handle this semantics correctly, these functions would
need to be wrapped in a loop that keeps trying to send or receive until the whole message is
delivered. We leave accurate treatment of such loops to future work—figure 7.4 in section 7.1
shows how this can be done.
The function cmp that is generated by the memcmp proxy call is treated specially by our
solver: there is a rewriting rule that transforms τint(cmp(e1, e2)) = 0 into the expression e1 = e2
(the rule (R8) in section 3.2). This is where most of the bitstring comparisons in our models
come from.
The function RAND bytes proxy encodes an assumption that the function terminates upon
failure. We need this assumption since we do not currently capture the dependence between
the bitstring placed by the function into the buffer and the return code of the function. This
problem will resolve once we transition to the multipath setting.
vo id LoadBuf ( vo id ∗ buf ; s i z e t l e n ) a t t r i b u t e ( ( n o t i n s t r u m e n t e d ) ) {
cvm( ” Load ” ) ;
}
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vo id S t o r e B u f ( vo id ∗ buf ) a t t r i b u t e ( ( n o t i n s t r u m e n t e d ) ) {
cvm( ” S t o r e ” ) ;
}
vo id Val ( b o o l i s s i g n e d , s i z e t width ){
char cmd [ 1 0 0 ] ;
s p r i n t f (cmd , ” Apply Val(%b , %l d ) ” , i s s i g n e d , width ) ;
cvm(cmd ) ;
}
vo id a s s u m e l e n ( const unsigned char ∗ l e n , b o o l i s s i g n e d , s i z e t width )
{
cvm( ”Dup” ) ;
cvm( ” Len ” ) ;
LoadBuf ( l e n , width ) ;
Val ( i s s i g n e d , width ) ;
cvm( ” Apply E q I n t /2” ) ;
cvm( ”Assume” ) ;
}
vo id ∗m a l l o c p r o x y ( s i z e t s i z e ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
vo id ∗ r e t = m a l l o c ( s i z e ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
LoadBuf(& s i z e , s i z e o f ( s i z e ) ) ;
cvm( ” Mal loc ” ) ;
S t o r e B u f (& r e t ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
i n t memcmp proxy ( vo id ∗ a , vo id ∗ b , s i z e t l e n ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
i n t r e t = memcpy ( a , b , l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
LoadBuf ( a , l e n ) ;
LoadBuf ( b , l e n ) ;
cvm( ” Apply cmp/2” ) ;
s i z e t l e n = s i z e o f ( r e t ) ;
a s s u m e l e n (& l e n , FALSE , s i z e o f ( l e n ) ) ;
S t o r e B u f (& r e t ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
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vo id ∗memcpy proxy ( vo id ∗ dest , vo id const ∗ s r c , s i z e t l e n ){
vo id ∗ r e t = d e s t ;
mute cvm ( ) ;
r e t = memcpy ( dest , s r c , l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
LoadBuf ( s r c , l e n ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( d e s t ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
s i z e t r e c v p r o x y ( vo id ∗buf , s i z e t l e n ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
s i z e t r e t = n e t r e c v ( ctx , buf , l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
r e t = l e n ;
LoadBuf(& l e n , s i z e o f ( l e n ) ) ;
cvm( ” I n p u t ” ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( buf ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
s i z e t s e n d p r o x y ( vo id ∗buf , s i z e t l e n ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
s i z e t r e t = n e t s e n d ( ctx , buf , l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
r e t = l e n ;
LoadBuf ( buf , r e t ) ;
cvm( ” Output ” ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
vo id ∗ o t p p r o x y ( s i z e t l e n ){
mute cvm ( ) ;
vo id ∗ r e t = otp ( l e n ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
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LoadBuf(& l e n , s i z e o f ( l e n ) ) ;
cvm( ” Mal loc ” ) ;
cvm( ”Dup” ) ;
cvm( ” Apply n u l l /0” ) ;
cvm( ” Apply !=/2” ) ;
cvm( ” Apply t r u t h /1” ) ;
cvm( ”Assume” ) ;
S t o r e B u f (& r e t ) ;
cvm( ”ReadEnv pad ” ) ;
a s s u m e l e n (& l e n , FALSE , s i z e o f ( l e n ) ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( r e t ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
i n t RAND bytes proxy ( vo id ∗ buf , i n t num)
{
mute cvm ( ) ;
i n t r e t = RAND bytes ( buf , num ) ;
unmute cvm ( ) ;
// Al low the a t t a c k e r to choose the r e t u r n v a l u e
s i z e t r e t l e n = s i z e o f ( r e t ) ;
LoadBuf(& r e t l e n , s i z e o f ( r e t l e n ) ) ;
cvm( ” I n ” ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( r e t ) ;
// RAND bytes ( ) r e t u r n s 1 on succe s s , 0 o t h e rw i s e .
i f ( r e t != 1) e x i t ( 1 ) ;
LoadBuf(&num , s i z e o f (num ) ) ;
cvm( ”New” ) ;
S t o r e B u f ( buf ) ;
re tu rn r e t ;
}
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Extended Solving Example
We demonstrate a typical case of overflow analysis. Imagine that we consider the value x to be
a concatenation of the form x = τ−11u (len(x1))|’p’|x1|x2 and would like to prove that the value
of x2 is equal to a particular bitstring, say, ”secret”. We would then try to prove the fact
x{1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}), len(x )− (1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
The conditions checked by a C implementation would typically involve bitstring operations and
might look something like this:
x{τ1u(castτ1s→τ1u(τ−11s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))),
τ1u(τ
−1
1u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”,
truth(x{1, 1} ≤τ1u τ−11u (100)),
truth(τ−11u (len(x )) ≥τ1u τ−11u (200)).
This mix of signed and unsigned representations is quite typical in cases where an implementa-
tion uses unsigned types like size t to store lengths, but calls the OpenSSL library which uses
the signed type int for lengths.
Below we show the application of our rewriting procedure to all 4 involved facts. This has
been automatically generated by inserting callbacks into the rewriting procedure to record each
step.
1 truth(τ−11u (len(x )) ≥τ1u τ−11u (200))
 τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200))
 defined(τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ defined(τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
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 (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(1) ∧ defined(len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(τ−11u (len(x ))) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (len(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(len(x )) ∧ defined(0) ∧ (len(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (len(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(25) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(len(x )) ∧ defined(256− 1) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(25) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x ))))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(20) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = 1)
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ defined(1)
∧ defined(len(τ−11u (200))) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ defined(τ−11u (200))
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (200 ≥ 0) ∧ (200 ≤ (256− 1))
166
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ defined(200) ∧ defined(0)
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ defined(200) ∧ defined(256− 1)
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200))) ∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
 (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (200)))
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(6) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = 1)
∧ (τ1u(τ−11u (len(x ))) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(20) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (len(x ) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(25) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (leny(x ) ≥ τ1u(τ−11u (200)))
(6) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ 200)
2 truth(x{1, 1} ≤τ1u τ−11u (100))
 τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100))
 defined(τ1u(x{1, 1})) ∧ defined(τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 (1 = len(x{1, 1})) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(1) ∧ defined(len(x{1, 1})) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(len(x{1, 1})) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1})) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x{1, 1}) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1})) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 (len(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(len(x )) ∧ defined(1 + 1) ∧ (len(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (len(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
(25) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(1) ∧ defined(0) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
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∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(1) ∧ defined(0) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
(24) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = 1) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(1) ∧ defined(len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100))) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(τ−11u (100)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (100 ≥ 0) ∧ (100 ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100))) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(100) ∧ defined(0) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ defined(100) ∧ defined(256− 1)
∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100))) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
 defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (100)))
∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
(5) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 = 1) ∧ (τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
(24) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ τ1u(τ−11u (100)))
(5) defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ 100)
3 x{τ1u(castτ1s→τ1u(τ−11s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
(7, 8, 9) x{τ1s(τ−11s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
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(10, 11, 12) x{τ1s(τ−11s (2)) + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
(13) x{2 + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
(14, 15, 16) x{2 + τ1u(x{1, 1}), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
(24) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
(17, 18, 19) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), τ1u(τ−11u (len(x )))− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})}
= ”secret”
(20) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), len(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})} = ”secret”
(25) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})} = ”secret”
(21, 22, 23) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (τ1u(τ−11u (2)) + τ1u(x{1, 1}))}
= ”secret”
(26) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
(24) x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
4 x{1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}), len(x )− (1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
(24) x{1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), len(x )− (1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
(25) x{1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (1 + 1 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
(24) x{1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”
5 defined(τ−11u (100))
 (100 ≥ 0) ∧ (100 ≤ (256− 1))
6 defined(τ−11u (200))
 (200 ≥ 0) ∧ (200 ≤ (256− 1))
7 τ1s(τ
−1
1s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(10, 11, 12) (τ1s(τ−11s (2)) + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1)
(13) (2 + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1)
(14, 15, 16) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
8 τ1s(τ
−1
1s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(10, 11, 12) (τ1s(τ−11s (2)) + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0
(13) (2 + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0
(14, 15, 16) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
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(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
9 defined(castτ1s→τ1u(τ
−1
1s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})))
 (1 = len(τ−11s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})))
(12) (1 = 1)
10 (τ1s(τ
−1
1s (2)) + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (128− 1)
(13) (2 + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (128− 1)
(14, 15, 16) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (128− 1)
(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (128− 1)
11 (τ1s(τ
−1
1s (2)) + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≥ −(128)
(13) (2 + τ1s(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))) ≥ −(128)
(14, 15, 16) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ −(128)
(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ −(128)
12 defined(τ−11s (2) +©τ1s castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))
 (1 = len(τ−11s (2))) ∧ (1 = len(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})))
(13) (1 = 1) ∧ (1 = len(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1})))
(16) (1 = 1)
13 defined(τ−11s (2))
 (2 ≥ −(128)) ∧ (2 ≤ (128− 1))
14 τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ (128− 1)
(24) τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ (128− 1)
15 τ1u(x{1, 1}) ≥ −(128)
(24) τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≥ −(128)
16 defined(castτ1u→τ1s(x{1, 1}))
 (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
(24) (1 = 1)
17 (τ1u(τ
−1
1u (len(x )))− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(20) (len(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(25) (leny(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(21, 22, 23) (leny(x )− (τ1u(τ−11u (2)) + τ1u(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1)
(26) (leny(x )− (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1)
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(24) (leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1)
18 (τ1u(τ
−1
1u (len(x )))− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(20) (len(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(25) (leny(x )− τ1u(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(21, 22, 23) (leny(x )− (τ1u(τ−11u (2)) + τ1u(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0
(26) (leny(x )− (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0
(24) (leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0
19 defined(τ−11u (len(x )) −©τ1u (τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))
 (1 = len(τ−11u (len(x )))) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))
(20) (1 = 1) ∧ (1 = len(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1}))
(23) (1 = 1)
20 defined(τ−11u (len(x )))
 (len(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
(25) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (len(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
(25) (leny(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1))
21 (τ1u(τ
−1
1u (2)) + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(26) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1)
22 (τ1u(τ
−1
1u (2)) + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(26) (2 + τ1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
(24) (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0
23 defined(τ−11u (2) +©τ1u x{1, 1})
 (1 = len(τ−11u (2))) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
(26) (1 = 1) ∧ (1 = len(x{1, 1}))
(24) (1 = 1)
24 defined(x{1, 1})
 (len(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0)
(25) (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0)
25 defined(x )
26 defined(τ−11u (2))
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 (2 ≥ 0) ∧ (2 ≤ (256− 1))
Following our procedure for collecting rewritten facts (omitting conditions that are already
present in the conjunction that is being rewritten, as permitted by (R3)) and applying theo-
rem 3.1 we see that we need to ask Yices to discharge the following implication:
((φ1 ⇒ ψ1) ∧ (φ2 ⇒ ψ2) ∧ (φ3 ⇒ ψ3)) =⇒ ψ,
where
φ1 = true
ψ1 = (len
y(x ) ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (200 ≥ 0) ∧ (200 ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (1 = 1) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ 200)
φ2 = true
ψ2 = defined(x ) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0) ∧ (100 ≥ 0) ∧ (100 ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ (1 = 1)
∧ (τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ 100)
φ3 = ((2 + τ
y
1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (128− 1)) ∧ ((2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ −(128))
∧ (2 ≥ −(128)) ∧ (2 ≤ (128− 1)) ∧ (τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ (128− 1))
∧ (τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≥ −(128))
∧ ((leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))) ≤ (256− 1))
∧ ((leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0) ∧ (leny(x ) ≥ 0)
∧ (leny(x ) ≤ (256− 1)) ∧ ((2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≤ (256− 1))
∧ ((2 + τy1u(x{1, 1})) ≥ 0) ∧ (1 = 1) ∧ (2 ≥ 0) ∧ (2 ≤ (256− 1))
∧ (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x )
ψ3 = (x{2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”)
ψ = (leny(x ) ≥ (1 + 1)) ∧ (1 ≥ 0) ∧ defined(x )
∧ (x{1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}), leny(x )− (1 + 1 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))} = ”secret”)
We see that overflow safety conditions can be quite subtle. For instance, if we were to
check truth(τ−11u (len(x )) ≥τ1u τ−11u (100)) (using 100 instead of 200) then the implication would
not hold: since we only know τy1u(x{1, 1}) ≤ 100 from ψ2, we would not be able to prove
(leny(x )− (2 + τy1u(x{1, 1}))) ≥ 0 in φ3.
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Appendix C
CryptoVerif Model of RPC-enc
This section shows the full input that we present to CryptoVerif for verification of the RPC-enc
example described in section 3.6. The parts marked by (USER) are provided by the user in a
template file. The rest of the input is automatically generated and added to the template.
The example highlights two different types of secrecy that we can prove: for the request we
ask CryptoVerif to prove strong secrecy. We are then able to claim that the original C code
satisfies unconditional weak secrecy of the request. The secrecy of the response is conditional
on the client being honest, therefore we cannot ask CryptoVerif to prove strong secrecy, and
have to model weak secrecy directly as a correspondence property instead. This is done using
a sentinel process that runs in parallel with the server and generates an event if the server
response has been leaked.
Names of the form fixed 1024 payload correspond to our fixed1024, the name part after
the number is allowed for readability, but ignored by our tools. The notation (len(arg0))ˆ[u,4]
corresponds to our τ−14u (len(x1)) and (len(arg0)) [u,4] corresponds to our τ4u(len(x1))
Conditions like cond56 that apply to many arguments are a result of NULL checks of malloc
results—our models make explicit the dependency of a malloc result on all the preceding calls
of malloc, as described in section 3.5.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) RPC−enc protocol.
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
param N.
channel c in, c out.
type nondet [fixed].
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(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) IND−CPA INT−CTXT encryption
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
type fixed 16 keyseed [fixed, large].
(∗
Must be bounded because the security definition refers
to time(kgen).
∗)
type fixed 16 key [bounded].
type fixed 16 seed [fixed, large].
(∗ 1045 = 1024 for payload + 16 for key + 4 for payload length + 1 for tag ∗)
type bounded 1045 plaintext [bounded].
(∗
Encryption adds 32 bytes to the message.
∗)
type bounded 1077 ciphertext [bounded].
proba Penc.
proba Pencptxt.
proba Pencctxt.
expand IND CPA INT CTXT sym enc(fixed 16 keyseed, fixed 16 key, bounded 1045 plaintext,
bounded 1077 ciphertext, fixed 16 seed,
kgen, E, D, injbot, Zbounded 1045 plaintext, Penc, Pencctxt).
fun inverse injbot(bitstringbot): bounded 1045 plaintext.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) Key lookup
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
type keydb.
type bounded 1024 id.
(∗ the ids of a designated pair of honest participants ∗)
const clientID: bounded 1024 id.
const serverID: bounded 1024 id.
(∗ key database operations ∗)
fun add honest(fixed 16 key, keydb): keydb.
(∗ Returns some fixed default value if key not in the database. ∗)
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fun lookup(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, keydb): fixed 16 key.
forall k: fixed 16 key, db: keydb;
lookup(clientID, serverID, add honest(k, db)) = k.
(∗ a host id that carries along the fact that it is compromised ∗)
fun badHost(bounded 1024 id): bounded 1024 id [compos].
(∗
It is important that in the bad host branch we remove the mention of the honest key,
so we can show that it isn’t leaked anywhere.
∗)
forall h:bounded 1024 id, k: fixed 16 key, db: keydb;
lookup(badHost(h), serverID, add honest(k, db)) = lookup(badHost(h), serverID, db).
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) Misc
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
type fixed 1024 payload [fixed, large].
(∗ The port that the server is listening to. ∗)
const port: bitstring.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Formatting Functions
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
(∗ conc1 := ”p”|(len(arg0))ˆ[u,4]|arg0|arg1 ∗)
fun conc1(fixed 1024 payload, fixed 16 key): bounded 1045 plaintext [compos].
(∗ conc2 := ”p”|(len(arg0))ˆ[u,4]|arg0|arg1 ∗)
fun conc2(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1077 ciphertext): bitstring [compos].
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Parsing Equations
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
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Arithmetic Functions
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
(∗ arithmetic1 := CastToInt((((1)ˆ[u,8] + (4)ˆ[u,8]) + (len(arg0))ˆ[u,8]) + (len(arg1))ˆ[u,8]) ∗)
fun arithmetic1(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1077 ciphertext): bitstring.
(∗ arithmetic2 := (len(arg0))ˆ[u,4] ∗)
fun arithmetic2(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bitstring.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Auxiliary Tests
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
(∗ cond1 := Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1) <>
0 ∗)
fun cond1(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond10 := Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1, len
(arg5), len(arg6), len(arg6) + 1) <> 0 ∗)
fun cond10(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id):
bool.
(∗ cond11 := ((arg0) [s,4] <> 0) ∗)
fun cond11(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond12 := (Truth of bs(arg0)) ∗)
fun cond12(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond13 := (len(arg0) <> len(arg1)) ∗)
fun cond13(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond14 := Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1, len
(arg5), len(arg6), len(arg6) + 1, len(arg7)) <> 0 ∗)
fun cond14(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond16 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg6), len(arg6) + 1, len(arg7), 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond16(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
(∗ cond17 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
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len(arg7), len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, len(arg6), 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9), 1 + 4 + len(arg7)
+ 32 + 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond17(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
(∗ cond19 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
fun cond19(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bool.
(∗ cond20 := ((arg0) [u,4] < 1056) ∗)
fun cond20(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond21 := ((arg0) [u,4] > 1056) ∗)
fun cond21(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond22 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg7), len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, len(arg6), 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9), 1 + 4 + len(arg7)
+ 32 + 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9), (arg10) [u,4]) = 0) ∗)
fun cond22(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond23 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg7), len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, len(arg6), 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9), 1 + 4 + len(arg7)
+ 32 + 1 + len(arg8) + 4 + len(arg9), (arg10) [u,4], (arg10) [u,4] − 32) = 0) ∗)
fun cond23(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond24 := (len(arg0) > ((arg1) [u,4] − 32)) ∗)
fun cond24(bounded 1045 plaintext, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond25 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
fun cond25(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond26 := (len(arg0) < 1024) ∗)
fun cond26(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond27 := Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1)
<> 0 ∗)
fun cond27(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond29 := (len(arg0) >= 256) ∗)
fun cond29(bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond30 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
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fun cond30(bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond31 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond31(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond32 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1) = 0) ∗)
fun cond32(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond33 := ((arg0) [s,4] <> 0) ∗)
fun cond33(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond34 := ((arg0) [s,4] <> 0) ∗)
fun cond34(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond35 := ((arg0) [u,4] < (1040 + 4 + 1 + 32 + 4 + 1)) ∗)
fun cond35(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond36 := ((arg0) [u,4] > (1040 + 4 + 1 + 32 + 1024 + 4 + 1)) ∗)
fun cond36(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond37 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg6) [u,4]) = 0) ∗)
fun cond37(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond38 := ”p” = arg0{0, 1} ∗)
fun cond38(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond39 := ((arg0{1, 4}) [u,4] > 1024) ∗)
fun cond39(bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond4 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
fun cond4(bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond40 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg6) [u,4], (arg7{1, 4}) [u,4]) = 0) ∗)
fun cond40(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring):
bool.
(∗ cond41 := (((arg0) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (arg1{1, 4}) [u,4])) > (1040 + 4 + 1 + 32)) ∗)
fun cond41(bitstring, bitstring): bool.
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(∗ cond42 := ((arg0{1, 4}) [u,4] <> len(arg1)) ∗)
fun cond42(bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond43 := Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1, len
(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg6) [u,4], (arg7{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg8)) <> 0 ∗)
fun cond43(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring,
bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond44 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg7) [u,4], (arg8{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg6), (arg7) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (
arg8{1, 4}) [u,4] + 32)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond44(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bitstring, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond45 := (len(arg0) > ((arg1) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (arg2{1, 4}) [u,4] + 32))) ∗)
fun cond45(bounded 1045 plaintext, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
(∗ cond46 := (len(arg0) < (1 + 4)) ∗)
fun cond46(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond47 := ((arg0{1, 4}) [u,4] > 1024) ∗)
fun cond47(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond48 := ((arg0{1, 4}) [u,4] < 1024) ∗)
fun cond48(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond49 := (len(arg0) <= (1 + 4 + (arg0{1, 4}) [u,4])) ∗)
fun cond49(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond5 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1, len(
arg5)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond5(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond50 := ”p” = arg0{0, 1} ∗)
fun cond50(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond51 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg7) [u,4], (arg8{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg6), (arg7) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (
arg8{1, 4}) [u,4] + 32), (arg9{1, 4}) [u,4]) = 0) ∗)
fun cond51(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond52 := ((len(arg0) − (1 + 4 + (arg0{1, 4}) [u,4])) <> 16) ∗)
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fun cond52(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond53 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg7) [u,4], (arg8{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg6), (arg7) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (
arg8{1, 4}) [u,4] + 32), (arg9{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg9) − (1 + 4 + (arg9{1, 4}) [u,4])) = 0) ∗)
fun cond53(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
(∗ cond56 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1,
len(arg5), len(arg5) + 1, (arg7) [u,4], (arg8{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg6), (arg7) [u,4] − (1 + 4 + (
arg8{1, 4}) [u,4] + 32), (arg9{1, 4}) [u,4], len(arg9) − (1 + 4 + (arg9{1, 4}) [u,4]), 32 + len(
arg10)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond56(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id,
bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
(∗ cond57 := (len(arg0) > (32 + len(arg1))) ∗)
fun cond57(bounded 1077 ciphertext, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
(∗ cond58 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
fun cond58(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bool.
(∗ cond6 := (len(arg0) = 0) ∗)
fun cond6(bounded 1024 id): bool.
(∗ cond7 := (Malloc(len(arg0) + 1, len(arg1) + 1, len(arg2) + 1, len(arg3) + 1, len(arg4) + 1, len(
arg5), len(arg6)) = 0) ∗)
fun cond7(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id):
bool.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Zero Functions
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
fun Zbitstring(bitstring): bitstring.
fun Zbitstring prime(bitstring): bitstring.
fun Zbounded 1024 id(bounded 1024 id): bounded 1024 id.
fun Zbounded 1024 id prime(bounded 1024 id): bounded 1024 id.
(∗ Zbounded 1045 plaintext is already defined in the template ∗)
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fun Zbounded 1045 plaintext prime(bounded 1045 plaintext): bounded 1045 plaintext.
fun Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bounded 1077 ciphertext.
fun Zbounded 1077 ciphertext prime(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bounded 1077 ciphertext.
fun Zfixed 1024 payload(fixed 1024 payload): fixed 1024 payload.
fun Zfixed 1024 payload prime(fixed 1024 payload): fixed 1024 payload.
fun Zfixed 16 key(fixed 16 key): fixed 16 key.
fun Zfixed 16 key prime(fixed 16 key): fixed 16 key.
fun Zfixed 16 keyseed(fixed 16 keyseed): fixed 16 keyseed.
fun Zfixed 16 keyseed prime(fixed 16 keyseed): fixed 16 keyseed.
fun Zfixed 16 seed(fixed 16 seed): fixed 16 seed.
fun Zfixed 16 seed prime(fixed 16 seed): fixed 16 seed.
const zero fixed 1024 payload: fixed 1024 payload.
const zero fixed 16 key: fixed 16 key.
const zero fixed 16 keyseed: fixed 16 keyseed.
const zero fixed 16 seed: fixed 16 seed.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Primed Functions
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
fun cond7 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond6 prime(bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond58 prime(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bool.
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fun cond57 prime(bounded 1077 ciphertext, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
fun cond56 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
fun cond53 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
fun cond51 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
fun cond5 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun conc1 prime(fixed 1024 payload, fixed 16 key): bounded 1045 plaintext.
fun cond46 prime(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
fun cond45 prime(bounded 1045 plaintext, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
fun cond44 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
fun cond43 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring,
bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond42 prime(bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond40 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring,
bitstring): bool.
fun cond4 prime(bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun conc2 prime(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1077 ciphertext): bitstring.
fun cond37 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id, bitstring):
bool.
fun cond32 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond31 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond30 prime(bounded 1024 id): bool.
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fun cond29 prime(bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond27 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
fun cond26 prime(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
fun cond25 prime(bounded 1045 plaintext): bool.
fun cond24 prime(bounded 1045 plaintext, bitstring): bool.
fun cond23 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload, bitstring): bool.
fun cond22 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload, bitstring): bool.
fun cond19 prime(bounded 1077 ciphertext): bool.
fun cond17 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
fun cond16 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 16 key, fixed 1024 payload): bool.
fun cond14 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond13 prime(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond10 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bounded 1024 id,
bounded 1024 id): bool.
fun cond1 prime(bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring, bitstring): bool.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Typecasting
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
fun cast bitstring bounded 1077 ciphertext(bitstring): bounded 1077 ciphertext [compos].
fun cast bounded 1045 plaintext fixed 1024 payload(bounded 1045 plaintext): fixed 1024 payload [
compos].
fun cast fixed 1024 payload bounded 1045 plaintext(fixed 1024 payload): bounded 1045 plaintext [
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compos].
forall x: fixed 1024 payload;
cast bounded 1045 plaintext fixed 1024 payload(cast fixed 1024 payload bounded 1045 plaintext(x
)) = x.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Auxiliary Facts
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
forall arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring,
arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond7(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6) = cond7 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(
arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg6)).
forall arg0: bounded 1024 id;
cond6(arg0) = cond6 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0)).
forall arg0: bounded 1077 ciphertext;
cond58(arg0) = cond58 prime(Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(arg0)).
forall arg1: fixed 1024 payload, arg0: bounded 1077 ciphertext;
cond57(arg0, arg1) = cond57 prime(Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(arg0), Zfixed 1024 payload(
arg1)).
forall arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5:
bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg10: fixed 1024 payload, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond56(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9, arg10) = cond56 prime(
Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), arg7, arg8, arg9, Zfixed 1024 payload(arg10))
.
forall x510: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x509: bounded 1024 id, arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg7:
bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2:
bitstring, arg10: fixed 1024 payload, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond56 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2(x509, x510), arg9, arg10) =
cond56 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(
x509), Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x510)), arg9, arg10).
forall x513: fixed 16 key, x512: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6:
bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg10:
fixed 1024 payload, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond56 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1(x512, x513), arg10) =
cond56 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1 prime(
Zfixed 1024 payload(x512), Zfixed 16 key(x513)), arg10).
forall arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5:
bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond53(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9) = cond53 prime(Zbitstring(
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arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(
arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), arg7, arg8, arg9).
forall x537: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x536: bounded 1024 id, arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg7:
bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2:
bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond53 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2(x536, x537), arg9) =
cond53 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x536
), Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x537)), arg9).
forall x540: fixed 16 key, x539: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6:
bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond53 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1(x539, x540)) =
cond53 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1 prime(
Zfixed 1024 payload(x539), Zfixed 16 key(x540))).
forall x544: fixed 16 key, x543: fixed 1024 payload;
cond52(conc1(x543, x544)) = cond52(conc1 prime(Zfixed 1024 payload(x543), Zfixed 16 key(
x544))).
forall arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5:
bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond51(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9) = cond51 prime(Zbitstring(
arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(
arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), arg7, arg8, arg9).
forall x567: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x566: bounded 1024 id, arg9: bounded 1045 plaintext, arg7:
bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2:
bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond51 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2(x566, x567), arg9) =
cond51 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x566
), Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x567)), arg9).
forall x570: fixed 16 key, x569: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6:
bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond51 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1(x569, x570)) =
cond51 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, conc1 prime(
Zfixed 1024 payload(x569), Zfixed 16 key(x570))).
forall x574: fixed 16 key, x573: fixed 1024 payload;
cond50(conc1(x573, x574)) = cond50(conc1 prime(Zfixed 1024 payload(x573), Zfixed 16 key(
x574))).
forall arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bitstring;
cond5(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5) = cond5 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1),
Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5)).
forall x590: fixed 16 key, x589: fixed 1024 payload;
cond49(conc1(x589, x590)) = cond49(conc1 prime(Zfixed 1024 payload(x589), Zfixed 16 key(
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x590))).
forall x594: fixed 16 key, x593: fixed 1024 payload;
cond48(conc1(x593, x594)) = cond48(conc1 prime(Zfixed 1024 payload(x593), Zfixed 16 key(
x594))).
forall x598: fixed 16 key, x597: fixed 1024 payload;
cond47(conc1(x597, x598)) = cond47(conc1 prime(Zfixed 1024 payload(x597), Zfixed 16 key(
x598))).
forall arg0: bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond46(arg0) = cond46 prime(Zbounded 1045 plaintext(arg0)).
forall arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond45(arg0, arg1, arg2) = cond45 prime(Zbounded 1045 plaintext(arg0), arg1, arg2).
forall x610: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x609: bounded 1024 id, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond45 prime(arg0, arg1, conc2(x609, x610)) = cond45 prime(arg0, arg1, conc2 prime(
Zbounded 1024 id(x609), Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x610))).
forall arg8: bitstring, arg7: bitstring, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring,
arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond44(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8) = cond44 prime(Zbitstring(arg0),
Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), arg7, arg8).
forall x632: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x631: bounded 1024 id, arg7: bitstring, arg6:
bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond44 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2(x631, x632)) =
cond44 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x631
), Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x632))).
forall arg8: bounded 1024 id, arg7: bitstring, arg6: bitstring, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring,
arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond43(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8) = cond43 prime(Zbitstring(arg0),
Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
arg6, arg7, Zbounded 1024 id(arg8)).
forall x653: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x652: bounded 1024 id, arg8: bounded 1024 id, arg6:
bitstring, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring,
arg0: bitstring;
cond43 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, conc2(x652, x653), arg8) =
cond43 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x652),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x653)), arg8).
forall arg1: bounded 1024 id, arg0: bitstring;
cond42(arg0, arg1) = cond42 prime(arg0, Zbounded 1024 id(arg1)).
forall x659: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x658: bounded 1024 id, arg1: bounded 1024 id;
cond42 prime(conc2(x658, x659), arg1) = cond42 prime(conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x658)
, Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x659)), arg1).
forall x668: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x667: bounded 1024 id, arg0: bitstring;
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cond41(arg0, conc2(x667, x668)) = cond41(arg0, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x667),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x668))).
forall arg7: bitstring, arg6: bitstring, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2:
bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond40(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7) = cond40 prime(Zbitstring(arg0),
Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
arg6, arg7).
forall x688: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x687: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bitstring, arg5:
bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond40 prime(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, conc2(x687, x688)) = cond40 prime(
arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x687),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x688))).
forall arg0: bounded 1024 id;
cond4(arg0) = cond4 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0)).
forall x694: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x693: bounded 1024 id;
cond39(conc2(x693, x694)) = cond39(conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x693),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x694))).
forall x698: bounded 1077 ciphertext, x697: bounded 1024 id;
cond38(conc2(x697, x698)) = cond38(conc2 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(x697),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(x698))).
forall arg6: bitstring, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond37(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6) = cond37 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(
arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5), arg6).
forall arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bitstring;
cond32(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5) = cond32 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1),
Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5)).
forall arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bitstring;
cond31(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5) = cond31 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1),
Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5)).
forall arg0: bounded 1024 id;
cond30(arg0) = cond30 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0)).
forall arg0: bounded 1024 id;
cond29(arg0) = cond29 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0)).
forall arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond27(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4) = cond27 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1),
Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4)).
forall arg0: bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond26(arg0) = cond26 prime(Zbounded 1045 plaintext(arg0)).
forall arg0: bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond25(arg0) = cond25 prime(Zbounded 1045 plaintext(arg0)).
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forall arg1: bitstring, arg0: bounded 1045 plaintext;
cond24(arg0, arg1) = cond24 prime(Zbounded 1045 plaintext(arg0), arg1).
forall arg9: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: fixed 16 key, arg7: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bounded 1024 id,
arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg10: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond23(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9, arg10) = cond23 prime(
Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), Zbounded 1024 id(arg7), Zfixed 16 key(arg8),
Zfixed 1024 payload(arg9), arg10).
forall arg9: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: fixed 16 key, arg7: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bounded 1024 id,
arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg10: bitstring, arg1:
bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond22(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9, arg10) = cond22 prime(
Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), Zbounded 1024 id(arg7), Zfixed 16 key(arg8),
Zfixed 1024 payload(arg9), arg10).
forall arg0: bounded 1077 ciphertext;
cond19(arg0) = cond19 prime(Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(arg0)).
forall arg9: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: fixed 16 key, arg7: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bounded 1024 id,
arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bitstring;
cond17(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9) = cond17 prime(Zbitstring(
arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(
arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), Zbounded 1024 id(arg7), Zfixed 16 key(arg8),
Zfixed 1024 payload(arg9)).
forall arg9: fixed 1024 payload, arg8: fixed 16 key, arg7: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bounded 1024 id,
arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0:
bitstring;
cond16(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9) = cond16 prime(Zbitstring(
arg0), Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(
arg5), Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), Zbounded 1024 id(arg7), Zfixed 16 key(arg8),
Zfixed 1024 payload(arg9)).
forall arg7: bounded 1024 id, arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3:
bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond14(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6, arg7) = cond14 prime(Zbitstring(arg0),
Zbitstring(arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
Zbounded 1024 id(arg6), Zbounded 1024 id(arg7)).
forall arg1: bounded 1024 id, arg0: bounded 1024 id;
cond13(arg0, arg1) = cond13 prime(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0), Zbounded 1024 id(arg1)).
forall arg6: bounded 1024 id, arg5: bounded 1024 id, arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring,
arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond10(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, arg6) = cond10 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(
arg1), Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4), Zbounded 1024 id(arg5),
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Zbounded 1024 id(arg6)).
forall arg4: bitstring, arg3: bitstring, arg2: bitstring, arg1: bitstring, arg0: bitstring;
cond1(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4) = cond1 prime(Zbitstring(arg0), Zbitstring(arg1),
Zbitstring(arg2), Zbitstring(arg3), Zbitstring(arg4)).
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Zero Facts
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
forall arg1: bounded 1077 ciphertext, arg0: bounded 1024 id;
Zbitstring(conc2(arg0, arg1)) = Zbitstring prime(conc2(Zbounded 1024 id(arg0),
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(arg1))).
forall arg1: fixed 16 key, arg0: fixed 1024 payload;
Zbounded 1045 plaintext(conc1(arg0, arg1)) = Zbounded 1045 plaintext prime(conc1(
Zfixed 1024 payload(arg0), Zfixed 16 key(arg1))).
forall x: bitstring;
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext(cast bitstring bounded 1077 ciphertext(x)) =
Zbounded 1077 ciphertext prime(cast bitstring bounded 1077 ciphertext(Zbitstring(x))).
forall x: bounded 1045 plaintext;
Zfixed 1024 payload(cast bounded 1045 plaintext fixed 1024 payload(x)) =
Zfixed 1024 payload prime(cast bounded 1045 plaintext fixed 1024 payload(
Zbounded 1045 plaintext(x))).
forall x: fixed 1024 payload;
Zbounded 1045 plaintext(cast fixed 1024 payload bounded 1045 plaintext(x)) =
Zbounded 1045 plaintext prime(cast fixed 1024 payload bounded 1045 plaintext(
Zfixed 1024 payload(x))).
forall x: fixed 1024 payload;
Zfixed 1024 payload(x) = zero fixed 1024 payload().
forall x: fixed 16 keyseed;
Zfixed 16 keyseed(x) = zero fixed 16 keyseed().
forall x: fixed 16 key;
Zfixed 16 key(x) = zero fixed 16 key().
forall x: fixed 16 seed;
Zfixed 16 seed(x) = zero fixed 16 seed().
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) <Query>
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
event client begin(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 1024 payload).
event client accept(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 1024 payload, fixed 1024 payload).
event server reply(bounded 1024 id, bounded 1024 id, fixed 1024 payload, fixed 1024 payload).
event bad(bounded 1024 id).
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(∗ Authentication of the server to the client ∗)
query hClient: bounded 1024 id, hServer: bounded 1024 id, x: fixed 1024 payload, y:
fixed 1024 payload;
event client accept(hClient, hServer, x, y) ==> server reply(hClient, hServer, x, y).
(∗ Authentication of the client to the server ∗)
query hClient: bounded 1024 id, hServer: bounded 1024 id, x: fixed 1024 payload, y:
fixed 1024 payload;
event server reply(hClient, hServer, x, y) ==> client begin(hClient, hServer, x) || bad(hClient).
(∗ Strong secrecy of the request ∗)
query secret request.
(∗ Weak conditional secrecy of the response ∗)
event leaked(bounded 1024 id, fixed 1024 payload).
query hClient: bounded 1024 id, resp: fixed 1024 payload;
event leaked(hClient, resp) ==> bad(hClient).
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Model
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
let client =
in(c in, ());
if cond1(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4) then
if cond4(clientID) then
if cond5(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, clientID) then
if cond6(serverID) then
if cond7(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, clientID, serverID) then
if cond10(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, clientID, serverID) then
out(c out, (port, serverID));
in(c in, net connect result1: bitstring);
if cond11(net connect result1) then
if cond12(net connect result1) then
if cond13(clientID, xClient) then
if cond14(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, clientID, serverID, xClient) then
if clientID = xClient then
let key1 = lookup(clientID, serverID, db) in
new kS seed1: fixed 16 keyseed;
let key2 = kgen(kS seed1) in
event client begin(clientID, serverID, request);
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if cond16(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, clientID, serverID, xClient, key2, request) then
if cond17(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, clientID, key2, request) then
let msg1 = conc1(request, key2) in
new nonce1: fixed 16 seed;
let cipher1 = E(msg1, key1, nonce1) in
if cond19(cipher1) then
let msg2 = arithmetic1(clientID, cipher1) in
let msg3 = conc2(clientID, cipher1) in
out(c out, (msg3, msg2));
in(c in, (msg4: bitstring, cipher2: bitstring));
if cond20(msg4) then
if cond21(msg4) then
if cond22(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, clientID, key2, request, msg4) then
if cond23(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, clientID, key2, request, msg4) then
let injbot(msg6) = D(cast bitstring bounded 1077 ciphertext(cipher2), key2) in
if cond24(msg6, msg4) then
if cond25(msg6) then
if cond26(msg6) then
event client accept(clientID, serverID, request, cast bounded 1045 plaintext fixed 1024 payload(
msg6));
yield .
let server =
in(c in, ());
if cond27(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4) then
if cond29(serverID) then
if cond30(serverID) then
if cond31(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID) then
if cond32(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID) then
new nondet1: nondet;
out(c out, (port, serverID));
in(c in, (net bind result1: bitstring, var7: bitstring, net accept result1: bitstring, msg7: bitstring,
msg8: bitstring));
if cond33(net bind result1) then
new nondet2: nondet;
if cond34(net accept result1) then
if cond35(msg7) then
if cond36(msg7) then
if cond37(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, msg7) then
if cond38(msg8) then
if cond39(msg8) then
if cond40(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, msg7, msg8) then
if cond41(msg7, msg8) then
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if cond42(msg8, xClient) then
if cond43(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, msg7, msg8, xClient) then
let conc2(client2, cipher3) = msg8 in
if client2 = xClient then
let key3 = lookup(client2, serverID, db) in
if cond44(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, msg7, msg8) then
let injbot(msg9) = D(cipher3, key3) in
if cond45(msg9, msg7, msg8) then
if cond46(msg9) then
if cond47(msg9) then
if cond48(msg9) then
if cond49(msg9) then
if cond50(msg9) then
if cond51(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, msg7, msg8, msg9) then
if cond52(msg9) then
if cond53(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, msg7, msg8, msg9) then
let conc1(var18, key4) = msg9 in
event server reply(client2, serverID, var18, response);
if cond56(argv0, argv1, argv2, argv3, argv4, serverID, xClient, msg7, msg8, msg9, response) then
new nonce2: fixed 16 seed;
let msg12 = E(cast fixed 1024 payload bounded 1045 plaintext(response), key4, nonce2) in
if cond57(msg12, response) then
if cond58(msg12) then
let msg11 = arithmetic2(msg12) in
out(c out, (msg12, msg11)); 0 .
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(USER) <Environment>
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
let client’ =
in(c in, (argv0: bitstring,
argv1: bitstring,
argv2: bitstring,
argv3: bitstring,
argv4: bitstring));
out(c out, ());
in(c in, xClient: bounded 1024 id);
(∗
For proving correspondences it may be more convincing to let the attacker choose
the payloads, but we need to generate them randomly to check secrecy.
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∗)
new request: fixed 1024 payload;
out(c out, ());
client .
(∗ The sentinel used in formulating weak secrecy of the response ∗)
let sentinel =
in(c in, response’: fixed 1024 payload);
if response’ = response then
event leaked(xClient, response);
yield .
let server’ =
in(c in, (argv0: bitstring,
argv1: bitstring,
argv2: bitstring,
argv3: bitstring,
argv4: bitstring));
out(c out, ());
in(c in, xClient: bounded 1024 id);
new response: fixed 1024 payload;
if xClient = clientID then
out(c out, ());
( server | sentinel )
else
let badHost(xClient’) = xClient in
event bad(xClient);
out(c out, ());
( server | sentinel ) .
process
! N(
(∗ get a key database and the payloads from the attacker ∗)
in(c in, adb: keydb);
(∗ generate and insert the honest key ∗)
new kAB seed: fixed 16 keyseed;
let kAB = kgen(kAB seed) in
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let db = add honest(kAB, adb) in
out(c out, ());
((! N client’) | (! N server’))
)
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Appendix D
ProVerif Model of NSL
The ProVerif model for the NSL protocol is shown below. The processes A and B as well as
the symbolic rules for the new encoding and parsing expressions conci and parsei are generated
automatically from the source IML process. The rules for encryption and decryption, the query,
and the environment process (including A′ and B′) are specified by hand.
We use signatures to model a key server that accepts keys from the attacker, thus allowing
key compromise. When a host h is compromised the key server executes the event bad(h). Our
correspondence properties are then formulated with respect to the condition that the host is
not compromised: a query of the form
query
ev:endB(x, y) ==> ev:beginA(x, y) | ev:bad(x).
means that whenever the event endB(x, y) occurs, either the event beginA(x, y) or the event
bad(x) occurred before.
The model is key-safe: neither signing nor decryption keys are being sent. Signing and
decryption uses honestly generated keys with fresh randomness. The computational soundness
result does not allow event parameters, but it applies to the coarser model in which event
parameters are removed.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Needham−Schroeder−Lowe protocol.
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
free c.
fun true/0.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Public−key encryption
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∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
(∗
NB! The soundness result in CoSP assumes that we can encrypt messages of any length,
which means that a correct implementation of E must use hybrid encryption.
∗)
fun ek/1.
fun dk/1.
fun E/3.
reduc
D(E(x, ek(a), r), dk(a)) = x.
reduc
isek (ek(a)) = ek(a).
(∗ We do not add rewriting for garbage since we are not using ekof and isenc. ∗)
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Signatures
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
fun sk/1.
fun vk/1.
fun sig/3.
(∗ Just a pairing function ∗)
data cert/2.
(∗
check key performs signature verification together with
bitstring comparison, so it is covered by the soundness result .
∗)
reduc
check key(host, key, sig (sk(r), cert (key, host), r’) , vk(r)) = true.
(∗ We do not add rewriting for garbage since we are not using vkof. ∗)
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Names of the honest participants
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
fun hostA/0.
fun hostB/0.
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(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Concatenation and Parsing
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
data conc1/3.
data conc3/1.
data conc8/2.
data conc15/1.
reduc
parse3(conc8(x0, x1)) = x1.
reduc
parse4(conc3(x0)) = x0;
parse4(conc8(x0, x1)) = x0.
reduc
parse5(conc15(x0)) = x0.
reduc
parse7(conc1(x0, x1, x2)) = x0.
reduc
parse8(conc1(x0, x1, x2)) = x2.
reduc
parse9(conc1(x0, x1, x2)) = x1.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
<Query>
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
query
ev:endB(x, y) ==> ev:beginA(x, y) | ev:bad(x).
query
ev:endA(x, y) ==> ev:beginB(x, y) | ev:bad(y).
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
Model
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
let A =
in(c, msg1);
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in(c, msg2);
let msg3 = D(msg2, skB) in
if check key(parse3(msg3), pkX, sigX, pkS) = true then
event beginB(parse3(msg3), hostB);
new nonce1;
new nonce2;
let msg4 = conc3(E(conc1(parse4(msg3), nonce1, hostB), isek(pkX), nonce2)) in
out(c, msg4);
in(c, msg5);
in(c, msg6);
let var1 = parse5(D(msg6, skB)) in
if var1 = nonce1 then
event endB(parse3(msg3), hostB); 0.
let B =
if check key(hostX, pkX, sigX, pkS) = true then
event beginA(hostA, hostX);
new nonce1;
new nonce2;
let msg1 = conc3(E(conc8(nonce1, hostA), isek(pkX), nonce2)) in
out(c, msg1);
in(c, msg2);
in(c, msg3);
let msg4 = D(msg3, skA) in
let var1 = parse7(msg4) in
if var1 = nonce1 then
let var2 = parse8(msg4) in
if var2 = hostX then
new nonce3;
let msg5 = conc3(E(conc15(parse9(msg4)), isek(pkX), nonce3)) in
out(c, msg5);
event endA(hostA, hostX); 0.
(∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
<Environment>
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗)
let A’ =
in(c, (pkX, hostX, sigX));
A .
let B’ =
in(c, (pkX, hostX, sigX));
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B .
let keyServer =
in(c, (h, k));
new r3;
if h = hostA then
out(c, (pkA, h, sig (skS, cert (pkA, h), r3)))
else if h = hostB then
out(c, (pkB, h, sig (skS, cert (pkB, h), r3)))
else
event bad(h);
out(c, (k, h, sig (skS, cert (k, h), r3))) .
process
! (
new A seed;
new B seed;
let pkA = ek(A seed) in
let skA = dk(A seed) in
let pkB = ek(B seed) in
let skB = dk(B seed) in
new rkS;
let pkS = vk(rkS) in
let skS = sk(rkS) in
out(c, (pkA, pkB, pkS));
(! A’ | ! B’ | ! keyServer)
)
199
D. PROVERIF MODEL OF NSL
200
References
The verified software initiative: A manifesto. http://qpq.csl.sri.com/vsr/manifesto.pdf/
view, 2007. 13
Mart´ın Abadi. Secrecy by typing in security protocols. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 46(5):
749–786, 1999. 14
Mart´ın Abadi and Jan Ju¨rjens. Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation.
In TACS ’01: Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of
Computer Software, pages 82–94, London, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-540-42736-8.
14
Mart´ın Abadi and Phillip Rogaway. Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational
soundness of formal encryption). In IFIP TCS, volume 1872 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 3–22. Springer, 2000. ISBN 3-540-67823-9. 14
Mihhail Aizatulin, Henning Schnoor, and Thomas Wilke. Computationally sound analysis of
a probabilistic contract signing protocol. In ESORICS, volume 5789 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 571–586. Springer, 2009. ISBN 978-3-642-04443-4. 14
Mihhail Aizatulin, Franc¸ois Dupressoir, Andrew D. Gordon, and Jan Ju¨rjens. Verifying cryp-
tographic code in C: Some experience and the Csec challenge. In Formal Aspects of Security
and Trust (FAST 2011), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2011a. 5, 141
Mihhail Aizatulin, Andrew D. Gordon, and Jan Ju¨rjens. Extracting and verifying cryptographic
models from C protocol code by symbolic execution. In 18th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS 2011), 2011b. Full version available at http://arxiv.
org/abs/1107.1017. iii, 5
Mihhail Aizatulin, Andrew D. Gordon, and Jan Ju¨rjens. Computational verification of C
protocol implementations by symbolic execution. In ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 712–723, 2012. iii, 5
Martin R. Albrecht, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Gaven J. Watson. Plaintext recovery attacks
against SSH. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 16–26, 2009. 3, 89, 157
201
REFERENCES
Jose´ Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Jorge Sousa Pinto, and Ba´rbara Vieira. Deductive
verification of cryptographic software. In NASA Formal Methods Symposium 2009, 2009. 4
Jose´ Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, and Franc¸ois Dupressoir. Certified
computer-aided cryptography: efficient provably secure machine code from high-level imple-
mentations. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communi-
cations security, pages 1217–1230. ACM, 2013. 14, 16
Jose´ Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Jean-Christophe Filliaˆtre, Jorge Sousa Pinto, and
Ba´rbara Vieira. Caoverif: An open-source deductive verification platform for cryptographic
software implementations. Science of Computer Programming, 91:216–233, 2014. 17
Joa˜o Antunes and Nuno Ferreira Neves. Building an automaton towards reverse protocol engi-
neering. In INFORUM, 2009. 17
Myrto Arapinis, Eike Ritter, and Mark Dermot Ryan. StatVerif: Verification of stateful pro-
cesses. In CSF, pages 33–47. IEEE Computer Society, 2011. 157
Alessandro Armando, David A. Basin, Yohan Boichut, Yannick Chevalier, Luca Compagna,
Jorge Cue´llar, Paul Hankes Drielsma, Pierre-Cyrille He´am, Olga Kouchnarenko, Jacopo Man-
tovani, Sebastian Mo¨dersheim, David von Oheimb, Michae¨l Rusinowitch, Judson Santiago,
Mathieu Turuani, Luca Vigano`, and Laurent Vigneron. The AVISPA tool for the automated
validation of internet security protocols and applications. In CAV, volume 3576 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 281–285. Springer, 2005. ISBN 3-540-27231-3. 14
Domagoj Babic´. Exploiting Structure for Scalable Software Verification. PhD thesis, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 2008. 12
Domagoj Babic´ and Alan J. Hu. Calysto: Scalable and Precise Extended Static Checking.
In 30th International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2008, Proceedings, pages
211–220, New York, NY, USA, May 2008. ACM. ISBN 978-1-60558-079-1. doi: http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/1368088.1368118. 12
Michael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz, and Dominique Unruh. CoSP: A general framework for
computational soundness proofs. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 66–78, 2009. Preprint on IACR ePrint 2009/080. 6, 14, 117, 118, 119, 120,
121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 143, 155
Thomas Ball, Byron Cook, Vladimir Levin, and Sriram K. Rajamani. SLAM and static driver
verifier: Technology transfer of formal methods inside Microsoft. In IFM, pages 1–20, 2004.
9, 13
Thomas Ball, Ella Bounimova, Byron Cook, Vladimir Levin, Jakob Lichtenberg, Con McGar-
vey, Bohus Ondrusek, Sriram K. Rajamani, and Abdullah Ustuner. Thorough static analysis
202
REFERENCES
of device drivers. In EuroSys ’06: Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European
Conference on Computer Systems 2006, pages 73–85, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM. ISBN
1-59593-322-0. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1217935.1217943. 13
Manuel Barbosa, David Castro, and Paulo F Silva. Compiling cao: From cryptographic speci-
fications to c implementations. In Principles of Security and Trust, pages 240–244. Springer,
2014. 17
Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Gre´goire, and Santiago Zanella Be´guelin. Formal certification of code-
based cryptographic proofs. In Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
symposium on Principles of programming languages, POPL ’09, pages 90–101, New York,
NY, USA, 2009. ACM. ISBN 978-1-60558-379-2. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1480881.
1480894. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1480881.1480894. 14
Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Gre´goire, Sylvain Heraud, and Santiago Zanella Be´guelin. Computer-
aided security proofs for the working cryptographer. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
2011, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2011. 14
Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Chanathip Namprempre. Breaking and provably repairing
the SSH authenticated encryption scheme: A case study of the encode-then-encrypt-and-mac
paradigm. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 7:206–241, 2004. 3
Jesper Bengtson, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Ce´dric Fournet, Andrew D. Gordon, and Sergio
Maffeis. Refinement types for secure implementations. In CSF ’08: Proceedings of the 2008
21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pages 17–32. IEEE Computer Society,
2008. ISBN 978-0-7695-3182-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2008.27. 15, 87, 142, 145
Dirk Beyer, Thomas Henzinger, Ranjit Jhala, and Rupak Majumdar. The software model
checker Blast. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT), 9
(5-6):505–525, October 2007a. doi: 10.1007/s10009-007-0044-z. URL http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s10009-007-0044-z. 13
Dirk Beyer, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Grgory Thoduloz. Configurable Software Verification:
Concretizing the Convergence of Model Checking and Program Analysis. In Computer Aided
Verification, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 504–518. Springer, 2007b. 13
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Ce´dric Fournet, Andrew D. Gordon, and Stephen Tse. Verified inter-
operable implementations of security protocols. In CSFW ’06: Proceedings of the 19th IEEE
workshop on Computer Security Foundations, pages 139–152. IEEE Computer Society, 2006.
ISBN 0-7695-2615-2. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2006.32. 15
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Ce´dric Fournet, Ricardo Corin, and Eugen Za˘linescu. Cryptographi-
cally verified implementations for TLS. In CCS ’08: Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, pages 459–468, Alexandria, VA, October 2008.
ACM. 15
203
REFERENCES
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Ce´dric Fournet, and Andrew D. Gordon. Modular verification of secu-
rity protocol code by typing. In ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
(POPL’10), pages 445–456, 2010. 10
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Ce´dric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo Pironti, and Pierre-Yves
Strub. Implementing TLS with verified cryptographic security. In IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy (Oakland), pages 445–462, 2013. 4, 15
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cdric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo Pironti, Pierre-Yves Strub,
and Santiago Zanella-Bguelin. Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is). Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2014/182, 2014. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 4, 15
Bruno Blanchet. A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 5(4):193–207, October–December 2008.
1, 5, 14, 19, 24, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 90, 113, 136, 152
Bruno Blanchet. Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols. Journal of
Computer Security, 17(4):363–434, 2009. ISSN 0926-227X. 1, 5, 14, 117, 119, 122
Bruno Blanchet. Automatic verification of security protocols in the symbolic model: The verifier
proverif. In Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, pages 54–87. Springer, 2014.
14, 117, 122
Bruno Blanchet, Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot, Je´roˆme Feret, Laurent Mauborgne, Antoine
Mine´, David Monniaux, and Xavier Rival. A static analyzer for large safety-critical software.
CoRR, abs/cs/0701193, 2007. 12
Bruno Blanchet, Mart´ın Abadi, and Ce´dric Fournet. Automated verification of selected equiv-
alences for security protocols. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 75(1):3–51,
February–March 2008. 119
Manuel Blum and Silvio Micali. How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-
random bits. SIAM J. Comput., 13(4):850–864, 1984. ISSN 0097-5397. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1137/0213053. 5
Chiara Bodei, Mikael Buchholtz, Pierpaolo Degano, Flemming Nielson, and Hanne Riis Nielson.
Static validation of security protocols. J. Comput. Secur., 13(3):347–390, 2005. ISSN 0926-
227X. 14
J. Burnim and K. Sen. Heuristics for scalable dynamic test generation. In ASE ’08: Proceedings
of the 2008 23rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering,
pages 443–446. IEEE Computer Society, 2008. ISBN 978-1-4244-2187-9. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1109/ASE.2008.69. 42
204
REFERENCES
Juan Caballero, Heng Yin, Zhenkai Liang, and Dawn Song. Polyglot: automatic extraction
of protocol message format using dynamic binary analysis. In CCS ’07: Proceedings of the
14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 317–329, New York,
NY, USA, 2007. ACM. ISBN 978-1-59593-703-2. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1315245.
1315286. 17
Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dunbar, and Dawson Engler. KLEE: Unassisted and automatic gener-
ation of high-coverage tests for complex systems programs. In USENIX Symposium on Op-
erating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI 2008), San Diego, CA, December 2008.
2, 10, 13, 16, 41
David Cade´ and Bruno Blanchet. From computationally-proved protocol specifications to im-
plementations. In International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES
2012), 2012. 16
David Cade´ and Bruno Blanchet. From computationally-proved protocol specifications to im-
plementations and application to ssh. Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Com-
puting, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), 4(1):4–31, 2013a. 16
David Cade´ and Bruno Blanchet. Proved generation of implementations from computationally
secure protocol specifications. In Principles of Security and Trust, pages 63–82. Springer,
2013b. 16
Sagar Chaki and Anupam Datta. ASPIER: An automated framework for verifying security
protocol implementations. In Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 172–185,
2009. doi: 10.1109/CSF.2009.20. 16
Edmund M. Clarke and E. Allen Emerson. Design and synthesis of synchronization skeletons
using branching-time temporal logic. In Logic of Programs, Workshop, pages 52–71, London,
UK, 1982. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-540-11212-X. 12
Edmund M. Clarke, Orna Grumberg, Somesh Jha, Yuan Lu, and Helmut Veith.
Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement. In CAV ’00: Proceedings of the 12th In-
ternational Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages 154–169, London, UK, 2000.
Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-540-67770-4. 13
Ernie Cohen, Markus Dahlweid, Mark Hillebrand, Dirk Leinenbach, Micha l Moskal, Thomas
Santen, Wolfram Schulte, and Stephan Tobies. VCC: A practical system for verifying concur-
rent C. In Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs 2009), volume 5674 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Munich, Germany, 2009. Springer. Invited paper, to appear. 12
Byron Cook, Andreas Podelski, and Andrey Rybalchenko. Terminator: Beyond safety. In CAV,
pages 415–418, 2006. 151
205
REFERENCES
Ricardo Corin and Felipe Andres Manzano. Efficient symbolic execution for analysing cryp-
tographic protocol implementations. In International Symposium on Engineering Secure
Software and Systems (ESSOS’11), LNCS. Springer, 2011. 16
Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a unified lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of fixpoints. In Conference Record
of the Fourth Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages, pages 238–252, Los Angeles, California, 1977. ACM Press, New York, NY. 12
Weidong Cui, Marcus Peinado, Karl Chen, Helen J. Wang, and Luis Irun-Briz. Tupni: au-
tomatic reverse engineering of input formats. In CCS ’08: Proceedings of the 15th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pages 391–402, New York, NY, USA,
2008. ACM. ISBN 978-1-59593-810-7. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1455770.1455820. 17
CVE. CVE-2008-5077, 2008a. Available at http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2008-5077. 1, 157
CVE. CVE-2009-3555, 2009b. Available at http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2009-3555. 157
CVE. CVE-2014-0160, 2014c. Available at http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-2014-0160. 1
T. Dierks and E. Rescorla. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. RFC
5246 (Proposed Standard), August 2008. URL http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt. 1
Will Dietz, Peng Li, John Regehr, and Vikram Adve. Understanding integer overflow in C/C++.
In Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE 2012,
pages 760–770, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2012. IEEE Press. ISBN 978-1-4673-1067-3. URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2337223.2337313. 30
D. Dolev and A.C. Yao. On the Security of Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 29(2):198–208, 1983. 5, 117
Vijay D’Silva, Daniel Kroening, and Georg Weissenbacher. A survey of automated techniques
for formal software verification. IEEE Trans. on CAD of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 27
(7):1165–1178, 2008. 13
F. Dupressoir, A.D. Gordon, and J. Ju¨rjens. Verifying authentication properties of C security
code using general verifiers. In Fourth International Workshop on Analysis of Security APIs
(ASA-4 FLOC 2010, 2010. Presentations only. 16
Franc¸ois Dupressoir, Andrew D Gordon, Jan Ju¨rjens, and David A Naumann. Guiding a
general-purpose c verifier to prove cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security,
22(5):823–866, 2014. 10, 16, 142, 145, 156
206
REFERENCES
Bruno Dutertre and Leonardo De Moura. The Yices SMT Solver. Technical report, Computer
Science Laboratory, SRI International, 2006. 8, 42, 47
Limor Fix. Fifteen years of formal property verification in Intel. In 25 Years of Model Check-
ing: History, Achievements, Perspectives, pages 139–144. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2008. ISBN 978-3-540-69849-4. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69850-0 8. 13
Cormac Flanagan, K. Rustan M. Leino, Mark Lillibridge, Greg Nelson, James B. Saxe, and
Raymie Stata. Extended static checking for Java. In PLDI ’02: Proceedings of the ACM
SIGPLAN 2002 Conference on Programming language design and implementation, pages
234–245, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM. ISBN 1-58113-463-0. doi: http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/512529.512558. 12
Robert W. Floyd. Assigning meanings to programs. In J. T. Schwartz, editor, Proceedings
of a Symposium on Applied Mathematics, volume 19 of Mathematical Aspects of Computer
Science, pages 19–31, Providence, 1967. American Mathematical Society. URL http://www.
eecs.berkeley.edu/~necula/Papers/FloydMeaning.pdf. 12
Riccardo Focardi. Static analysis of authentication. In FOSAD, volume 3655 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 109–132. Springer, 2004. ISBN 3-540-28955-0. 14
Ce´dric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Pierre-Yves Strub. Modular code-based cryptographic
verification. In 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
2011), 2011. 10
Frama-C. http://frama-c.cea.fr/, 2009. 9, 10, 12, 158
Patrice Godefroid, Michael Y. Levin, and David A. Molnar. Automated whitebox fuzz testing.
In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2008. The
Internet Society, 2008. 2, 13, 41
S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sci-
ences, 28:270–299, 1984. 5
Andrew D Gordon and Alan Jeffrey. Authenticity by typing for security protocols. Journal of
computer security, 11(4):451–519, 2003. 14
Jean Goubault-Larrecq and Fabrice Parrennes. Cryptographic protocol analysis on real C
code. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking
and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI’05), volume 3385 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 363–379. Springer, 2005. 15, 143
C. A. R. Hoare. An axiomatic basis for computer programming. Commun. ACM, 12(10):
576–580, 1969. 12
207
REFERENCES
Tony Hoare. The verifying compiler: A grand challenge for computing research. J. ACM, 50
(1):63–69, 2003. ISSN 0004-5411. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/602382.602403. 13
Gerard J. Holzmann. The model checker SPIN. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., 23(5):279–295, 1997.
ISSN 0098-5589. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/32.588521. 12
ISO. ISO C Standard 1999. Technical report, 1999. URL http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/
sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1124.pdf. ISO/IEC 9899:1999 draft. 30, 35, 48, 49, 55, 56
Alan Jeffrey and Ruy Ley-Wild. Dynamic model checking of C cryptographic protocol imple-
mentations. In Proceedings of Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security and Automated
Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis, 2006. 16
J. Ju¨rjens. Security analysis of crypto-based Java programs using automated theorem provers.
In ASE ’06: Proceedings of the 21st IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated
Software Engineering, pages 167–176. IEEE Computer Society, 2006. ISBN 0-7695-2579-2.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ASE.2006.60. 15
Jan Ju¨rjens. Code security analysis of a biometric authentication system using automated
theorem provers. In Computer Security Applications Conference, 21st Annual, pages 10–pp.
IEEE, 2005a. 16
Jan Ju¨rjens. Verification of low-level crypto-protocol implementations using automated theorem
proving. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on Formal Methods
and Models for Co-Design, pages 89–98. IEEE Computer Society, 2005b. 16
Jan Ju¨rjens and Mark Yampolskiy. Code security analysis with assertions. In Proceedings
of the 20th IEEE/ACM international Conference on Automated software engineering, pages
392–395. ACM, 2005. 16
James C. King. Symbolic execution and program testing. Commun. ACM, 19(7):385–394, 1976.
2, 13
James Cornelius King. A program verifier. PhD thesis, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 1970. 12
Paul C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other
systems. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances
in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’96, pages 104–113, London, UK, UK, 1996. Springer-Verlag. ISBN
3-540-61512-1. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646761.706156. 158
R. Ku¨sters and T. Truderung. Reducing protocol analysis with XOR to the XOR-free case in
the horn theory based approach. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 46(3):325–352, 2011. 6
Ralf Ku¨sters, Tomasz Truderung, and Ju¨rgen Graf. A Framework for the Cryptographic Ver-
ification of Java-like Programs. In IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF
2012. IEEE Computer Society, 2012. 9, 15, 74
208
REFERENCES
Ralf Ku¨sters, Tomasz Truderung, Bernhard Beckert, Daniel Bruns, Ju¨rgen Graf, and Christoph
Scheben. A hybrid approach for proving noninterference and applications to the cryptographic
verification of java programs. Grande Region Security and Reliability Day, 2013. 15
Ralf Ku¨sters, Enrico Scapin, Tomasz Truderung, and Ju¨rgen Graf. Extending and applying a
framework for the cryptographic verification of java programs. In Principles of Security and
Trust, pages 220–239. Springer, 2014. 15
Chris Lattner. LLVM: An Infrastructure for Multi-Stage Optimization. Master’s thesis, Com-
puter Science Dept., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. 10, 42
Xavier Leroy. A formally verified compiler back-end. J. Autom. Reason., 43:363–446, December
2009. ISSN 0168-7433. doi: 10.1007/s10817-009-9155-4. URL http://portal.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1666192.1666216. 42
Zhiqiang Lin, Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, and Xiangyu Zhang. Automatic protocol format re-
verse engineering through context-aware monitored execution. In Proceedings of the Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2008, San Diego, California, USA, 10th
February - 13th February 2008. The Internet Society, 2008. 17
List of Tools. Static source code analysis tools for C. http://spinroot.com/static/, 2009.
12
Gavin Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Inf.
Process. Lett., 56:131–133, November 1995. ISSN 0020-0190. doi: 10.1016/0020-0190(95)
00144-2. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=219887.219895. 1, 157
The Coq development team. The Coq proof assistant reference manual. LogiCal Project, 2004.
URL http://coq.inria.fr. Version 8.0. 155
John McCarthy. A basis for a mathematical theory of computation. In Computer Programming
and Formal Systems, pages 33–70. North-Holland, 1963. 12
George C. Necula, Scott McPeak, Shree Prakash Rahul, and Westley Weimer. CIL: Intermediate
Language and Tools for Analysis and Transformation of C Programs. In Proceedings of the
11th International Conference on Compiler Construction, CC ’02, pages 213–228, London,
UK, 2002. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-540-43369-4. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=647478.727796. 8, 10, 42
Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large
networks of computers. Commun. ACM, 21(12):993–999, 1978. 13
Nicholas O’Shea. Using Elyjah to analyse Java implementations of cryptographic protocols.
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s0237477/papers.html, 2008. 15
209
REFERENCES
Kenneth G. Paterson and Gaven J. Watson. Plaintext-dependent decryption: A formal security
treatment of ssh-ctr. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/095, 2010. http://eprint.
iacr.org/. 3
L. C. Paulson. Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol. In CSFW ’97:
Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations, page 84. IEEE
Computer Society, 1997. ISBN 0-8186-7990-5. 17
Lawrence C. Paulson. Isabelle - A Generic Theorem Prover (with a contribution by T. Nipkow),
volume 828 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 1994. ISBN 3-540-58244-4. 155
Lawrence C. Paulson. Inductive analysis of the internet protocol TLS. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst.
Secur., 2(3):332–351, 1999. 17
Birgit Pfitzmann, Matthias Schunter, and Michael Waidner. Cryptographic security of reactive
systems (extended abstract). In Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science. Electronic,
2000. 14
Project EVA. Security protocols open repository, 2007. http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/
spore/. 10
Jean-Pierre Queille and Joseph Sifakis. Specification and verification of concurrent systems in
CESAR. In Proceedings of the 5th Colloquium on International Symposium on Programming,
pages 337–351, London, UK, 1982. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-540-11494-7. 12
Alfredo Rial and George Danezis. Privacy-friendly smart metering. Technical Report MSR–
TR–2010–150, Microsoft Research, 2010. 5, 143
David A. Schmidt. Data flow analysis is model checking of abstract interpretations. In POPL
’98: Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of program-
ming languages, pages 38–48, New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM. ISBN 0-89791-979-3. doi:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/268946.268950. 13
Nikhil Swamy, Juan Chen, Ce´dric Fournet, Karthikeyan Bharagavan, and Jean Yang. Security
programming with refinement types and mobile proofs. Technical Report MSR–TR–2010–
149, 2010. 144
Alan M. Turing. Checking a large routine. In Report on a Conference on High Speed Automatic
Computation, June 1949, pages 67–69, Cambridge, UK, 1949. University Mathematical Lab-
oratory, Cambridge University. URL http://www.turingarchive.org/browse.php/B/8. A
corrected version is printed by F.L. Morris and C.B. Jones in Annals of the History of Com-
puting, (Vol. 6, Apr. 1984). 12
Octavian Udrea, Cristian Lumezanu, and Jeffrey S. Foster. Rule-based static analysis of network
protocol implementations. Inf. Comput., 206(2-4):130–157, 2008. ISSN 0890-5401. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2007.05.007. 17
210
REFERENCES
Dominique Unruh. The impossibility of computationally sound XOR, July 2010. Preprint on
IACR ePrint 2010/389. 6, 141
Zhi Wang, Xuxian Jiang, Weidong Cui, Xinyuan Wang, and Mike Grace. Reformat: Automatic
reverse engineering of encrypted messages. In ESORICS, volume 5789 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 200–215. Springer, 2009. ISBN 978-3-642-04443-4. 17
Christoph Weidenbach, Uwe Brahm, Thomas Hillenbrand, Enno Keen, Christian Theobald,
and Dalibor Topic´. Spass version 2.0. In Automated DeductionCADE-18, pages 275–279.
Springer, 2002. 16
Gilbert Wondracek, Paolo Milani Comparetti, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. Auto-
matic Network Protocol Analysis. In 15th Symposium on Network and Distributed System
Security (NDSS), 2008. 17
Thomas Y. C. Woo and Simon S. Lam. A semantic model for authentication protocols. In
SP ’93: Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, page 178. IEEE
Computer Society, 1993. 14
Andrew C. Yao. Theory and application of trapdoor functions. In SFCS ’82: Proceedings of the
23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 80–91. IEEE Computer
Society, 1982. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1982.95. 5
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick. The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture. RFC 4251 (Proposed
Standard), January 2006. URL http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt. 1
211
REFERENCES
212
Notation
JeKη Evaluation of an IML expression e w.r.t an environment η . . . . . . . . . 20
JeKpiI,η Evaluation of a ProVerif expression e w.r.t an environment η and
interpretation I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
b|b′ Concatenation of bitstrings b and b′ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
b{no, nl} Substring of a bitstring b starting at offset no of length nl . . . . . . . . . 20
τ(b) Integer value of a bitstring b w.r.t. an integer type τ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
τ−1(n) Bitstring encoding of an integer n w.r.t. an integer type τ . . . . . . . . . 20
insec(Q, ρ) Insecurity of an IML process Q w.r.t a trace property ρ . . . . . . . . . . . 25
cvinsec(Q, I,Γ, ρ) Insecurity of a CryptoVerif process Q w.r.t. a trace property ρ, an
interpretation I, and a typing environment Γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Q . Q˜ Simulation relation between IMLC processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
η |= ψ A fact ψ is true w.r.t. an environment η . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
ψ |= ψ′ A fact ψ implies a fact ψ′ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
ψ ` e e˜ Solver rewriting rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
I, f |= Γ A function f is type-safe w.r.t. a typing environment Γ. . . . . . . . . . . . 75
I, f |=⊥ Γ A function f is type-safe up to failure w.r.t. a typing environment Γ. .
127
213
Notation
I|Q |= Γ All functions of a process Q are type-safe w.r.t. a typing environment
Γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
I|Q |=⊥ Γ All functions of a process Q are type-safe up to failure w.r.t. a typing
environment Γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
η |= Γ All variables in environment η satisfy their types in typing
environment Γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Γ ` e A CryptoVerif expression e is well-typed w.r.t. a typing environment
Γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Γ ` Q A CryptoVerif process Q is well-typed w.r.t. a typing environment Γ .
75
I |= Φ All facts in Φ are true w.r.t. an interpretation I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
e, T  Γ Type inference for CryptoVerif expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
P  Γ Type inference for CryptoVerif processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Γ,Φ, T ` e e˜ Typechecking of CryptoVerif expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Γ,Φ ` P  P˜ Typechecking of CryptoVerif processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
214
Index
⊥-propagating function, 127
admissible interpretation, 109
attacker process, 78
authentication, 3, 14, 152
auxiliary fact, 86
bitstring, 18
computational model of cryptography, 5
constrained interpretation, 109
correspondence property, 78
cryptographic fact, 86
CryptoVerif model, 73, 78
efficient family of interpretations, 78
encoder, 81
encoding expression, 81
encryption-sound formatting set, 123
environment, 20
evaluation context, 25
executing process, 24
formatting function, 82
formatting set, 123
formatting-normal form, 90
generalized interpretation, 110
going bad, 36
inline assumptions, 26, 35
interactive machine, 120
interpretation, 75
key-safe pi process, 124
length-regular function, 101, 123
locally encryption-sound formatting set,
131
negligible function, 18
observational equivalence, 3, 152
parser, 81
parsing expression, 81
process state, 24
proxy function, 42
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robustly disjoint encoders, 100
robustly injective encoder, 100
safe parser, 126, 129
safe parser application, 104
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security parameter, 18
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strong encoder family, 132
strong equality check, 119
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Notation
trace property, 2, 25, 152
type-safe, 112
type-safe up to failure, 127
typing environment, 75
uniformly efficient family of
interpretations, 120
weak secrecy, 3, 14, 152
well-formed process, 26, 35
well-typed process, 75
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